Chairperson: Vice Admiral P S Das (Retd)
Discussants: Cdr Kamlesh Agnihotri and Dr Krishnendra Meena

In order to understand the strategy adopted by China in spreading its maritime influence and implications for regional security, the tenets espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett have been studied in this paper.

The two great strategists differed from each other; whereas Mahan emphasised establishing Command of Sea, Corbett focused more on denial of command of sea. Mahan advocated the Big Battle theory (requiring big Ships and Weapons); but Corbett believed in advance indicators before big battles will occur. Whilst Mahan looked at the sea as means to an end, Corbett looked at a skilful combination of maritime and continental strategies.

On comparing the two strategists it was observed that the Chinese maritime thought process was heavily influenced by Mahan, but there are also shades of Corbett’s ideas.

China, in order to gain power, has consolidated the strategies of Mahan and Corbett in the present era and its strategy is now based on three conjoined aspects—economics, diplomacy and military expansion.

The importance of maritime strategy for China emerges in three ways: first, breakaway from the coastal defence syndrome; second, consolidation in the immediate area in the face of the Soviet threat and the presence of the US in Japan; and thirdly, break away from the immediate area and enter into the outer areas.

Comparisons were drawn between China’s wish to absorb Taiwan and the US annexation of Hawaii Islands and expansion in US maritime influence post the world wars, as these aspects hold important geostrategic indicators for China.

It was brought out that in order to expand its influence China must first gain the advantage of sea denial tactics through Submarines and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), second, gain sea control through establishment of working control and control in dispute, third, China’s naval operations outside the first and second island chains would fall more into the category of presence and trade protection and finally, the strategy of overseas bases which is followed by China in a subtle way in Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka, eastern coast of Africa, etc.
As far as the future is concerned, it was observed that with the steady increase in China’s defence budget, a US-China conflict cannot be ruled out. Whereas the US will spread its assets all over the world, China will concentrate only in areas of interest.

Conclusion:

1. The Mahan and Corbett views could have not foreseen subsequent technological advancements.
2. Laws of the sea are interpreted by China according to its interest.
3. China is following more of Mahanian intent, however capability gap still exist as compared to the US—in terms of technology the latter has an advantage. And till this gap is not bridged China will follow sea denial.
4. Concept of Chinese navy is moving ahead in modernisation of manpower/capabilities, building a professional navy. The idea of “removing the rust” is being followed in China. Anti Piracy law is used as a disguise for spreading its influence in the sea.
5. China was an inward looking civilization and the maritime outlook is a recent development, hence Chinese naval expansion is infantile and it’s just a beginning. According to Selby Cohen, ”geostrategically China since Post Cold War time has broken away from land oriented strategy to maritime.“
6. China is not a sea faring society and therefore it is not re-emerging as a naval power as it was never a sea power earlier.
7. China is facing an expert naval force in the form of the US Navy therefore technology should be its priority rather than numbers. China is engaging with a vast number of nations (mostly economically weak) and investing in their land, so that in future they can be used during war.
8. The national strategy and maritime strategy keep changing as capabilities increase.
9. There will be an arms race in future and the number of assets will be important; further instability in the maritime world will continue to exist.

Suggestions for the Paper:

1. The title of the paper should be revisited/ revised in order to describe the actual study undertaken in the paper.
2. The paper should consult Chinese writings like the 1993 ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’, which discuss the role of the PLA Navy, the guidelines provided by Hu Jintao in 2004, and Gorshkov’s four roles for the Soviet navy must be studied. 
3. Historic missions and strategic guidelines should be amalgamated in the paper.
4. Comparison between the US, UK and China could be avoided as the US perspective is more alarmist than is the actual reality.
5. Implications for India and other regions must be discussed.
6. Some mention of the South China Sea and China’s influence in the region must be discussed.
7. Elaboration on the regions involved in maritime issues is required.

Report Prepared by Soumya Tiwari, Research Intern, Centre for Military Affairs