Ali Ahmed

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Archive data: Person was Research Fellow at IDSA from July 2008 to February 2012

Joined IDSA
July 2008
Expertise
Defence doctrine and strategy, Military Affairs, Internal security, Military sociology Education
MPhil in International Relations (Cantab), MA in War Studies (London), MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies (Madras)
Current Project
Defence Doctrines in the India-Pakistan context
Background
A former infantry colonel, he has participated in counter insurgency operations in India and in Sri Lanka. He has been a miiltary observer in a UN peackeeping mission. In 1999-2000, he was Ministry of External Affairs Fellow at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi. He has submitted his doctoral dissertation in International Politics at Center for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His articles have appeared in idsa.in, claws.in, ipcs.org, foreignpolicyjournal.com and in professional journals.
Select Publications
Monograph: Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, IDSA Monograph Series No. 3, 2010
Edited Book: Ali Ahmed, J Panda and Prashant Singh (eds.), Towards a New Asian Order, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2012.
Book Chapter: ‘Countering Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: Debates in Indian Army’ in Maroof Raza (ed.), Confronting Terrorism, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2009.
Other publications.

Research Fellow
Email: aliahd66[at]hotmail[dot]com
Phone: +91 11 2671 7983

Publication

India’s Response Options to Pakistani Nuclear First Use

The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.

The Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

2011 and beyond: Visualising Af-Pak

Getting the hard core Taliban to concede the fight without loss of face is preferable to destroying them. The latter course is rendered risky by the linkages between the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and Punjabi Taliban and their penetration of the Pakistani state and society.