Rajiv Nayan

The 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India heralded yet another nuclear age. The instant response of a section of the international community was highly pessimistic. It foresaw regional instability, collapse of the global nuclear order and serious crisis in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a result, overlooking India’s security imperatives, a number of countries reacted with hostility against the Indian nuclear tests. Even international organisations were mobilised against India.

• Published: May 2018
• Strategic Analysis

Senior Research Associate, IDSA, Dr Rajiv Nayan’s article on Indo-China border issue, titled ‘In the eye of the storm’ was published in The Tribune on January 1, 2018.

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• Published: 1 January, 2018

Senior Research Associate, IDSA, Dr Rajiv Nayan's article on Syrian Chemical Attack, titled ‘Syrian attack: Chemical Crisis to Humanity’, was published in the in the March 19-26, 2017 issue of ‘Organiser’.

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• Published: 26 March, 2017

Senior Research Associate, IDSA, Dr Rajiv Nayan's article, ‘Comprehensive Review of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540’ appeared in the 1540 Compass, issue 11, Winter 2016, published by Center for International Trade & Security, University of Georgia and the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.

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• Published: 5 January, 2017

Senior Research Associate, IDSA, Dr Rajiv Nayan’s article on Indo-Japan civil nuclear deal, titled, ‘Indo-Japan civil nuclear deal: Despite the anti-nuclear test stance, it's a win-win for all’ was published by Firstpost on November 12, 2016.

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• Published: 12 November, 2016

India, which has ratified both the Conventions for nuclear security, is ready to participate in national and global nuclear governance with its institutional, legal and regulatory architecture, especially for nuclear security. The Indian nuclear establishment will have to play a more proactive role through the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership

The current format of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) ended in its fourth meeting in Washington, from March 31 to April 1, 2016. Ironically, the first NSS had also taken place in Washington in 2010. Subsequently, two more summits took place in Seoul in 2012 and The Hague in 2014. India has been a participant of the NSS process from the very first meeting. Actually, India started participating in the preparatory meetings called the ‘Sherpa meetings’ for the first NSS.

Of the four summits, India sent Prime Minister-led delegations to three summits, and only in The Hague summit, it sent a minister-level delegation. In all the meetings, Indian officials made statements and in the last three meetings, India filed its national progress reports on nuclear security. The reports have showcased the measures India undertook over the years to strengthen nuclear security in the country and abroad.

India has incrementally played a significant role in meeting the core objectives set out in the communiqués through the course of the four successive summits. It took up a number of key initiatives at both national and international level to allay the alarming threat of nuclear terrorism and reducing the risk of non-state actors and terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons, fissile material and related technologies. These efforts and initiatives reveal India’s firm belief that although the primary responsibility of ensuring and strengthening nuclear security rests at the national level, international cooperation to achieve concrete results needs to be sustained and coordinated.

The first Washington summit held in 2010 saw Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announcing the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) in India. He called for participation from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other foreign partners to make the centre a success. This announcement reflected India’s resolve to strengthen nuclear and radiological safety and security through ‘committed and coordinated’ efforts of the international security.

The GCNEP has five schools: School of Advanced Nuclear Energy System Studies (SANESS), School of Nuclear Security Studies (SNSS), School on Radiological Safety Studies (SRSS), School of Nuclear Material Characterization Studies (SNMCS), and the School for Studies on Applications of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technologies (SARRT). All these schools have state-of-the-art facilities. Later, it concluded MOUs with IAEA, the US, Russia and France. Further it gave off-campus training course on Physical Protection in November 2011 for 25 participants, including 17 foreign nationals.

The PM inaugurated the GCNEP in January 2014. Till the time the centre’s infrastructure had not been completed, off-campus training courses are being planned and conducted. The 2016 national progress report submitted by India during the summit noted: “For more than five years now, GCNEP has been steadily strengthening its portfolio of programmes and has conducted more than 30 international and regional programmes involving more than 300 participants from around 30 countries. Important and emerging nuclear security topics like insider threat, vulnerability assessment, transportation security, cyber security, detection, prevention and response to radiological threats etc have been covered in these programmes.”

As the Seoul Summit (2012) was seen to expand on the Washington communiqué and work plan, by focusing on three core areas ie cooperative measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism; protection of nuclear materials and related facilities; and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, India too moved forward to fulfil its responsibilities. India’s active participation in the summit process was witnessed in hosting of a meeting of the Sherpas in New Delhi in January 2012.

Furthermore, India announced that a Bill for the establishment of an independent Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority had been introduced in Parliament that would work towards enhancing oversight of nuclear security and strengthen synergy between safety and security in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Moreover, India expressed its constant support for IAEA’s crucial role in facilitating national efforts to reinforce nuclear security by pledging $1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2012-13.

India actively contributed to the IAEA’s action plans on nuclear security, including the third plan for 2010-13. It also adopted provisions of IAEA Code of Conduct and offered assistance to the IAEA for search and recovery of orphan radioactive sources in countries that were unable to effectively control them. India made contributions to IAEA’s other nuclear security efforts, such as the Commission on Nuclear Safety Standards, Advisory Group on Nuclear Security, Nuclear Security Series documents, international and regional training courses, and the Illicit Trafficking Database.

India cooperated with INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and the World Customs Organization. A new concept of ‘gift baskets’, presented as joint statements by the group of participating countries, was introduced in the 2012 summit. However, India did not participate in them at that time.

On the national legal front, India announced that it was considering amendments to the 1962 Indian Atomic Energy Act to strengthen the provisions for nuclear security measures. It had adhered fully to the NSG guidelines with respect to its interest in regime membership. During this period, India had made contributions in the area of reducing nuclear material by developing an advanced heavy water reactor based on Low Enriched Uranium and thorium with new safety and proliferation resistant features. Additionally, it was pointed out that the Highly Enriched Uranium-based fuel in the APSARA reactor was placed in a safeguard facility in December 2010 and that the fuel would be replaced by indigenous fuel, which is not HEU.

With The Hague summit held in 2014, India sought to continuously and consistently advance the efforts and initiatives made through the course of the previous two summits. India maintained its active role in global nuclear governance by fulfilling its international commitments to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. It participated at the ministerial level in the International Conference on Nuclear Security organised by the IAEA from July 1-5, 2013. India also actively participated in the December 2012 Fukushima ministerial conference on nuclear safety.

India, along with UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, organised a 1540 Workshop on Building New Synergies on Nuclear Security in New Delhi from November 30 to December 1, 2012. As a party to Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, India participated in the working groups on nuclear, detection, nuclear forensics, and response and navigation.

Furthermore, the 2014 summit brought to light the role of industry in implementing nuclear security measures and the role of academia in creating a thriving nuclear security culture. The first industry summit was held alongside the NSS in 2014. Following suit to this, India’s External Affairs Minister called upon the need to sensitise industry and academia about the importance of maintaining highest levels of nuclear safety and security whilst harnessing the benefits of nuclear energy.

On the national front, India set up a Nuclear Controls and Planning Wing in the Department of Atomic Energy to foster fulfilment of commitments to export controls, nuclear safeguards, nuclear safety and security. Additionally, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, was amended in 2012 to incorporate offences within the realm of and as described in several treaties, including the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

India played a momentous role at the 2016 summit. Since the 2014 summit, New Delhi has taken key steps in the ambit of nuclear and radiological security and safety through a strong institutional framework, independent regulatory agency, and trained and specialised manpower. India announced the establishment of a national-level Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team in order to foster coordinated and effective response to counter threats involving smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials for malevolent purposes. As part of the Special Nuclear Material Detection architecture, 23 Emergency Response Centres spread across India have been developed to respond to any radiological or nuclear emergency in the country.

Additionally, all major sea and air ports have been provided with detection equipment. In the realm of cyber security, India has successfully instituted robust cyber-security architecture. Likewise, India has taken a number of steps to ensure security and physical protection of radiation sources and facilities. As far as the nuclear material in the country is concerned, India is setting up a facility for medical grade ‘Moly-99’ using low enriched uranium and has been recovering Ceasium-137, a useful isotope from the high-level waste occurring from ‘reprocessing spent fuel from thermal reactors’. This is expected to help India’s need for radioisotopes for multiple applications. Further, in 2015, India made a voluntary contribution of $100,000 to the upgrade of IAEA’s Seibersdorf Laboratory, and in 2016, it has once again pledged a contribution of $1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

India has committed to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation circulated at the IAEA as INFCIRC 869 and also announced that it will propose a workshop on IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Services (IPPAS) along with the IAEA experts during 2016. Notably, India also pledged participation in gift baskets for 2016 summit in the areas of priority, such as counter nuclear smuggling, nuclear security contact group in Vienna, sharing of best practices.

The progress report submitted by the Indian Government during the 2016 summit mentioned: “International cooperation also includes cooperation at the level of NGOs and a recent example includes a conference on India’s Role in Global Nuclear Governance organised in February 24-26, 2016, jointly by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).” Indeed in this meeting, the Department of Atomic Energy experts informed the eminent foreign experts and global public opinion makers about the robustness of the Indian nuclear security architecture, especially for physical protection. The interaction made the Indian and foreign participants realise the flaw of the Nuclear Threat Initiative indexing methodology.

Unfortunately, the 2016 summit ended on a somewhat bitter note for India. On April 1, in a press conference, US President Barack Obama remarked, “One of the challenges that we’re going to have here is that it is very difficult to see huge reductions in our nuclear arsenal unless the US and Russia, as the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons, are prepared to lead the way. The other area where I think we’d need to see progress is Pakistan and India, that subcontinent, making sure that as they develop military doctrines, that they are not continually moving in the wrong direction.”

Although the statement talked about the reduction of the US arsenals as well, yet it infuriated India, especially its strategic community. In fact, the general understanding across the world is that the US and Russia, which possess about 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons stockpile, are still slow in removing the weapons even from active deployment, leave alone eliminating it. It is bizarre to advise a new nuclear weapon country like India to reduce its arsenals. Shockingly, Obama’s statement advises a country like India to develop military doctrine in the right direction.

The spontaneous angry Indian reaction on Obama’s statement is because of the pointless hyphenation of India and Pakistan. The Indian policy community has reasons for reacting strongly. Pakistan and China have been developing nuclear weapons through a clandestine network. In his famous 2011 statement, AQ Khan claimed that the enrichment technology, which he had stolen, was used in China for improving the Chinese enrichment capability.

Moreover, the arms build-up in Asia began with the opaque development of nuclear weapons in China. Quite significantly, it was the clandestine nuclear nexus between China and Pakistan, and the resultant arms build-up which forced India to nuclearise. Unfortunately, Obama was silent on the Chinese nuclear and missile modernisation. China is qualitatively and quantitatively developing its nuclear weapons. The Chinese modernisation is going to have serious security implications for not only friends and allies of the US but also for it.

On the contrary, India has a nuclear doctrine underscoring credible minimum deterrence and no-first-use. The US and Pakistan have the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. For sure, both countries may need doctrinal course correction. Some argue that the message in Obama’s press conference was for Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistan has been projecting that its tactical weapons may be used in a battlefield. The basic objective of this projection is to shield terrorism sponsored by Pakistan.

If the message was for Pakistan, there was a need to deliver it directly to Pakistan. To drag India into it was totally unnecessary. It is a case of an annoying Western habit of clubbing India and Pakistan together. However, there is another explanation. Some feel Obama’s message is meant for a section of the Indian strategic community that has been demanding revision in the existing nuclear doctrine so as to send a strong signal to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. If this is the case, then Obama should be held guilty of undermining the nuclear security which is supposed to counter terrorism. Obama, in any case, should be on India’s side.

The US has to realise that the task set by Obama has not been accomplished. The US administration needs to be focused. Challenges for nuclear security have not vanished. Even if the summit process has ended, there is consensus that international efforts have to continue. India, which has ratified both the Conventions for nuclear security, is ready to participate in national and global nuclear governance with its institutional, legal and regulatory architecture, especially for nuclear security. The Indian nuclear establishment will have to play a more proactive role through the GCNEP.

The article was originally published in The Pioneer.

• Published: 10 April, 2016

The Nuclear Security Summit process, which had been started in 2010 in Washington, ended in Washington with a meeting organised from 31 March to 1 April. Till the last moment, many hoped that one of the participating countries, especially from Europe, may come forward to host the next summit, and thus, save the termination of the NSS process. However, the communiqué released on the occasion dashed all the hopes, as the first line of the last paragraph inscribed: “The 2016 Summit marks the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in this format.”

Of course, during the summit, no country came forward to bear the torch.

The 2016 summit had 52 participating countries along with four international organisations - namely, the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol and the European Union. Around two-thirds of the participant countries were represented by their heads of state or government. But the usual festive atmosphere was missing. It appeared that the participants came together merely to perform the last rites for the process. Russia, for the first time, did not participate in the summit. This sombre mood could be witnessed even in the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) summit which had been started a day before the official summit.

]A session of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on 1 April. AP A session of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on 1 April. AP
The Nuclear Industry Summit had some of the unusual enthusiasm - although it had a depressing global nuclear business environment to confront. It seems the joint endeavour with the NGOs coalition in a couple of sessions generated extra energy. The awards ceremony was an exceptionally colourful event. Though all the awards had been announced much in advance, there was an element of excitement among some participants.

However, the end of the summit process should not mean the end of the challenge it sought to address. The spectre of nuclear terrorism very much exists as it did at the beginning of the summit process, and frankly speaking, even before that. President Barack Obama's mission to secure vulnerable nuclear material remains unfulfilled. It has not just missed the original target of securing these materials in four years, but also the extended deadline. Needless to say, the effort needs to be continued.

The question arises: Will this effort require the reopening of the summit process?

The summit process was an informal voluntary initiative; so, the announcement of the end of the process in the communiqué does not mean a formal legal termination of the process. If a group of countries feels that the process needs to be restarted and some countries take the responsibility of hosting a summit or a series of summits, it can be started at any time with or without the same enthusiasm. As no country came forward to host the summit beyond 2016, it may be inferred that for the time being, the international community may have to rely on mechanisms other than the summit in the fight against nuclear terrorism.

During different meetings, other than official summit, the idea of alternative mechanisms was fully explored, and in the all likelihood, it will be fully explored in the coming days and months. For the last few years, when there was a sense that the summit process would end, many were proposing the idea of holding it every fourth year instead of the current format of every second year. However, the most popular format that is finding wider acceptance is ministerial-level meetings. The format has already been tried at the IAEA.

Quite obviously, the direct involvement of the IAEA will have more countries participating in it than the current summit process.

Closely related is the idea that a contact group may be built. The contact group could be at the ministerial level and it could have the participants of the summit process plus a few more significant countries left out by the process. For sure, the countries and the policy communities, including NGOs will be active in some formats in the future.

The international community in general - and India in particular - needs to review all the initiatives and mechanisms to fight nuclear terrorism and to strengthen nuclear security. The international community should work to consolidate the gains the summit process has made. The global policy community is facing a dilemma: To universalise the two nuclear security conventions or work towards a new convention.

As of now, the two conventions supporting nuclear security are the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Interestingly, several countries that have been leading the campaign for nuclear security, ratified the two key treaties very late. The amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had come after the 11 September, 2001 attacks, struggled to enter into force. Interestingly, in March 2016, six countries, including Pakistan and New Zealand ratified the amendment of the Convention and on 1 April, 2016, three countries submitted their instruments of ratification.

Now, the amendment is just two ratifications away from becoming operational.

The world will also have to be very cautious of broadening the scope of the summit process. When the process was started securing of nuclear materials, basically used in the civil nuclear programme, became the focus. Later, radiological materials found the place in the 2012 Seoul Summit. Many countries and members of the civil society were against the inclusion of radiological materials because of the impracticability of control as well as the fear that health centers might be adversely affected. Now it seems the global community has taken up the challenge to manage the difficult task of securing radiological materials which may be used for building dirty bombs.

A section of the non-proliferation community is also trying to bring their agenda from the back-door. The summit process had nothing to do with non-proliferation. In fact, it was an attempt to bridge the existing gaps, including the gap created by the non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, some non-proliferationists and a couple of leading countries like the United States were trying to push military nuclear materials into the summit process and the nuclear security paradigm. This, at many times, threatened to scuttle the summit process.

Indeed, the two tracks should not be merged. The concerned section of the international community is well aware of the fact that not all nuclear materials are bomb-grade materials. For bomb-grade materials, conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to be negotiated under the Shannon mandate is the best solution. The Conference of Disarmament is the most appropriate body for it.

In the post-summit scenario, the centrality of the IAEA is key to securing nuclear materials. True, other institutions are also performing the task of strengthening nuclear security. The centres of excellence like India's Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership may fill the institutional gap and play a complementary role.

However, the world will have to remain alert keeping in mind old concerns like Pakistan and the new concerns like the Islamic State. By remaining vigilant, the world may easily prevent nuclear terrorism. For this purpose, the international community will have to remain focused on the real threat, not politically-motivated imaginary threats pushed by the old non-proliferation paradigm.

If a country like the United States overlooks the imminent nuclear danger, and continues to play politics, it may land up in creating a new nuclear monster. The United States must not forget its disaster with Taliban and Pakistan. Before advising India to cut down its nuclear arsenal, the United States needs to eliminate its own nuclear weapons stockpile. The US and Russia together own around 95 percent of the nuclear weapons of the world. Any digression will de-legitimise the fight against nuclear terrorism.

The article was originally published in the FIRSTPOST.COM

• Published: 7 April, 2016

On 2 August, 1939, in a letter to the then President of the United States, FD Roosevelt, Albert Einstein wrote: “Some recent work by E Fermi and L Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future.”

In the same letter, Einstein surmised, “This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable ­ though much less certain ­ that extremely powerful bombs of this type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.” Tragically, in 1945, the bombs made by the US were used to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to assist in the cessation of World War II.

The American bomb was built using African uranium. Countries that employ the metal for peaceful or military purposes have often looked beyond their shores to procure it.

When India launched its nuclear energy programme, with Homi Jahangir Bhabha as the principal architect, the first of three stages of the project was to rely on nuclear reactors using natural uranium for its fuel. India declared its nuclear weapons in 1998.

India has been surveying and exploring uranium since 1949. The Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD) undertakes survey, exploration and evaluation of uranium. The Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL) is responsible for mining and processing of uranium ore. After the AMD completes the final exploration of uranium, it hands over its findings to UCIL, in Jaduguda, Jharkhand.

The corporation is the only establishment responsible for mining and processing of uranium ore for commercial purposes. The metal it extracts is used for weapons and civil nuclear programmes. (Imported uranium is used for civil nuclear energy purposes only. Citing ‘public interest’, the government does not disclose the exact quantity of uranium produced in India.)

But information about the country’s uranium reserves is available in the public domain; in response to a question in Parliament, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) informed the house on December 23, 2015 that “as of November, 2015, AMD has established 2,29,936 tonnes in-situ U3O8 (1,94,985 tonnes of uranium) reserves.”

The Jaduguda complex houses all the seven of India’s active uranium mines (and two milling units) - Jaduguda, Bhatin, Turamdih, Bagjata, Narwapahar, Mohuldih, and Banduhurang (barring the last one, the rest are underground mines). I visited the complex four times in the last two years to gather material for my research on uranium governance – the first trip was in May 2013. The heat in Jharkhand was intolerable.

I

A week before Parliament was informed of India’s uranium stockpile, Adrian Levy, a reputed investigative journalist, known in India for his book, the Deception that brought to light both known and unknown facts about the murky nuclear business of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, published an article on the Jaduguda uranium complex. It alleged that nuclear scientists employed at the site, and villagers living near it were exposed to risk from exposure to water adultrated with radioactive alpha particles.

UCIL countered the Adrian Levy’s article by denying that there was any alarming radiation level in and around Jaduguda. It found that his piece was predominantly based on past reports, which were not predicated on scientific fact. Meanwhile, the Indian National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) issued notices to UCIL, the secretary, DAE, the government, and the chief secretary, government of Jharkhand.

I find Levy’s article to be unnecessarily alarming. During my trips to Jaduguda complex, officials of UCIL and the Health Physics Unit Laboratory of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), which monitors radiation level in the complex, took me to all those places mentioned in the article without hesitation. One of these was the tailings pond, which has frequently figured in headlines. It is where waste from the milling stations is deposited.

There are four ponds in the Jaduguda complex: Two are filled up and the others are still in operation. These ponds have natural hills on three sides and an earthen bund covers the fourth side. The UCIL says the “design features of the earthen bund is based on nature and quantity of tailings, local geological features, sustainability under abnormal situations like heavy rain, flood etc. Fine solids of the slurry settle in the pond. The overflowing liquid, through a set of decantation wells, is led to the Effluent Treatment Plant in concrete channels. Vegetation of Typha latifolia, Saccharum spontanium, and Ipomoea carnia has covered the non-operational tailings ponds.”

I was shown the readings of radiation on the pipe that carries slur as well as the area 20-30 meters from the edge of the pond. The readings of the level of radiation were compared to the natural radiation existing in several towns. There was nothing unusual. In fact, the government has submitted readings of the levels of radiation at different places in and around the Jaduguda complex to the Jharkhand High Court when a petition was filed regarding the radiation level in the area.

II

As the control of atomic energy lies with the central government, its body or delegated authorities such as the DAE, its body AMD and the UCIL undertake regulatory or other atomic energy activities. Yet, a number of other central and state-level institutions ­ Ministry of Environment and Forests, State Pollution Control Boards, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and Directorate General of Mines Safety regulate uranium related activities with the help of laws and regulations.

There are general laws and institutions meant to regulate industrial activities in general and other related activities. Self-regulation is the dominant philosophy of the Indian atomic establishment. Yet, the nuclear establishment codifies through mechanisms other than the 1948 Act, which was later replaced by the current Atomic Energy Act in 1962. This act was amended a few more times. The Atomic Energy Act 1962 designates uranium as a “prescribed substance”, and the use of “prescribed substances” is to be carried out in provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 1962, and the Atomic Energy (working of mines, minerals and handling of prescribed substances) Rules 1984.

India also regulates uranium with several laws, rules, codes and directives. These controlling regulatory mechanisms have evolved over the years. Currently, the Indian regulatory system categorises natural uranium as a Low Specific Activity (LSA)-1 material. AERB documents reflect publications and guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other multilateral and international bodies. However, if the AERB finds that IAEA codes and guidelines are inadequate for its purposes, it adds its own provisions. Some of the codes and guidelines for uranium too have such provisions. It is also responsible for safety reviews of transportation and training programmes.

India has to produce safe and risk-free uranium for its economic growth and security. But at the same time, anti-nuclear activists and writers don’t believe in those institutions created to guarantee that safety – regulatory bodies, monitoring authorities, or even the courts. To add, democratically elected governments will find it extremely difficult to simply ignore those people who live near or work in nuclear facilities. It is just as important to consider effects on the environment. Needless to say, an informed debate is required, but false propaganda only serves to hurt the country’s long-term prospects.

This article was originally published in First Post.

• Published: 10 January, 2016

On the morning of 6 January, North Korea stunned the world by announcing that it had conducted a miniaturised hydrogen bomb test or thermo-nuclear device test. This test was conducted at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Several monitoring stations recorded this ‘man-made seismic event at the 5.1 magnitude’. According to the North Koreans, the test was a response to an aggressive United States. North Korean Television also announced: “We will not surrender our nuclear arms, even if the sky is falling.”

Reactions ranged from disbelief to acknowledgement that this was a long time coming. Several experts expressed scepticism about the authenticity of the news. The basic argument of this group was that North Korea does not have the capability to manage fission or what is generally considered a nuclear weapon, leave alone develop a hydrogen bomb. Some leading analysts are of the opinion that it could turn out to be a lower-yield ‘boosted explosion’, not the real hydrogen test. In this kind of test ‘hydrogen isotope tritium undergoes partial fusion, allowing them to describe the device as a hydrogen bomb’. This expression may be just a case of optimism in an odd situation.

To an extent, we may tend to agree with the view point that North Korea on its own may not conduct this kind of test. However, it needs to be remembered that the same scepticism was expressed when the country threatened to develop nuclear weapons. Finally, in 2006, it conducted a verified nuclear test and subsequently, it performed two more tests, in 2009 and 2013.

Kim_JongUn_APThe whole world knows that North Korea has benefited from the proliferation network. At that time, too, it did not have the capability to develop nuclear weapons on its own but the network provided it the required enrichment technology. Of the network countries, only China has demonstrated the capability to develop a thermonuclear device. Pakistan publicly admitted that it had not tested hydrogen bomb because it did not possess the capability to develop one.

If the announced test is of a hydrogen bomb, there is a great possibility that the proliferation network is still alive, and China is still the kingpin of this network. The proliferation network has become too sophisticated to be detected. The US has the greatest capability to really gather information on such sophisticated technology. But it seems to have lost the will to confront China directly. Even the western media is downplaying the role of China.

China’s condemnation of the test is being projected. The British media has reported that the British foreign minister and the Chinese leaders are seriously debating the mechanics of dealing with the situation in the wake of the test. The western leaders must run a reality check. The North Korean test could be a proxy exercise. As Pakistan does not want to come under pressure and China does not want to overtly appear a defiant country, they are using North Korea as a country to undertake tests for them. Such tests may continue in the future as well.

The global nuclear order will be tested. The international community may have to think about this extended deterrence which is going to affect the regional and at least extra-regional security arrangements. Some argue that as North Korea does not possess an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) it may not affect security or the deterrence structure of the US. Such an analysis is dismissive of extended deterrence, and China is a partner which possesses ICBMs.

India should not be a mute spectator to such a development. It must review its security and strategic options. The proliferation network that is feeding the weapons development programme of North Korea passes through India’s neighbourhood. A question mark on the success of its hydrogen bomb test has been raised. Even if India does not conduct nuclear tests immediately, it should weigh the options for doing so in the future.

Moreover, India must undertake serious strategic and diplomatic exercises with all important stakeholders affected by the test. It needs to ask the western world to pay more serious attention to the development. As of now, the western world seems to have outsourced the task of managing North Korea to China. It is a clear deception. China is using North Korea as its pawn and proxy in the great game. India may even propose South Korea and Japan to play a far more active role in the mediation and negotiations to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula.

The author is senior research associate, The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses.

This article was originally published in First Post

• Published: 7 January, 2016

Like a section of the US non-proliferation community that relishes supporting and sympathising with China and Pakistan, Levy and the Center for Public Integrity have followed the same approach.

• Published: January 04, 2016
• IDSA Comments