Arms Trade Treaty and Africa
Africa is a continent of developing countries. But unfortunately, in recent years, conflict and violence have dominated the continent. Illicit arms are considered to be one of the principal reasons for violence and conflict in Africa. Besides, the government also has to buy arms to ensure the security of the state and citizens. A consortium of non-governmental organisations estimated that Africa loses over 18 billion dollars every year because of violence. Most of all, it was the Kalashnikov rifles that were really wreaking havoc in the African societies. As a result, like India, Africa has also demonstrated a greater interest in regulating small arms and light weapons.
On April 2, 2013, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved the draft text of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) – 154 countries voted for the treaty, three voted against and 23 abstained. Of the 23 countries that abstained, only three were from Africa. These were Angola, Egypt and Sudan. Earlier, on March 28, 2013, the passage of this treaty was blocked in the Negotiations Conference by Iran, North Korea and Syria. Later, the three countries opposed it in the General Assembly as well. The treaty was opened for signature on June 3, 2013. As of December 26, 2013, 115 countries have signed the treaty, and 9 have ratified it. Thirty-one signatories are from Africa and two of those have already ratified. Nigeria was the first African signatory country to ratify the treaty, followed by Mali.
For years, the UN General Assembly had been passing resolutions for an ATT, but it was the 2009 resolution that set in process negotiations for the current treaty. That resolution required the convening of four sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 2010 and 2011, to ensure that the legally binding instrument is balanced and effective. The resolution prescribed the convening of a ‘United Nations Conference’ on ATT in 2012, which met from July 2, 2012 for four consecutive weeks. During the period, the member countries were expected to formulate ‘a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.’
Though the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference failed to agree on a treaty, a draft treaty was circulated. This draft treaty had provisions for control of select categories of weapons systems and their ammunition. Some proposals had been made earlier in the preparatory meetings as well. The African countries played an active role not only during these crucial negotiations and submitted their position papers individually, but also as members of different groups. Prior to this, when a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was set up to examine the feasibility, scope and draft parameters of a comprehensive, legally binding instrument for establishing common international standards for the business in conventional arms, five African countries— Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa—were part of it.
African countries had been trying to regulate the undesirable flow of arms even before this. In this regard some moves such as the Bamako Declaration on an ‘African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons’ to eradicate dumping of excess weapons; and the Best Practice Guidelines of the Nairobi Protocol had been in place for affected African countries. However, the African countries did not find these moves sufficient to stop the flow of illicit arms. Yet, these countries and analysts from the continent stated that these moves had helped in constructing the 2013 treaty. African leaders in general wanted an international standard for regulating conventional arms, and supplier countries to have the major obligation of checking aberrations in the illegal or legal arms flow.
As the GGE gave the mandate for a comprehensive ATT, the African countries, too, evolved their positions. The ATT was not just for small arms and light weapons, some major platforms such as aircraft and battle tanks were gradually added to its scope. The treaty also included ammunition and the research and development of defence items. Generally, the developing world was sceptical of the inclusion of defence research and development, yet the African countries chose to overlook such provisions and appeared determined to support the treaty. In fact, among the developing countries, the overwhelming support of the African and Caribbean groups made the ATT feasible in 2013.
During negotiations, Africa appeared to be a divided house. Some wanted a robust treaty, but some preferred a greater scope for flexibility. For example, Egypt advocated a politically binding treaty for a long period, but a country like Nigeria preferred a legally binding treaty. The current treaty is legally binding. The geographical division among African states became apparent during negotiations. Some analysts assessed that the division occurred because some countries were suppliers and others were merely recipients. There was also a division because some countries maintained that they needed arms to defend themselves and for some, the purchases were a mere drain on their resources.
Although a number of forces, including international organisations like the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and some faith groups were trying to influence African countries, the real driving force behind the African countries’ support for the ATT were the international NGOs who are heavily invested in these countries. They not only worked and collaborated with civil society groups in African countries but also interacted very closely with the governments. These NGOs were pushing these countries to evolve a common, undivided position on the ATT. Though some differences persisted among the countries on the nature of the treaty, even till the very last, yet most of the African countries working under the direction of the NGOs backed the evolved treaty.
Most of the African countries did not take into account the inherent imbalances in the treaty. Article 7 of the treaty consists of an export and export assessment. This article gives enormous power to the licencing authorities of exporting countries that may deny licences on the basis of highly subjective criteria, provided in the various subsections and clauses of the article 7 Importing countries also have to provide ‘appropriate and relevant information’ such as end use or end user documentation. The treaty has some positive provisions to importing countries such as following their own national laws when providing information about ‘pending and actual export authorisation’.
Currently, the treaty has yet not entered into force. As the treaty can be amended only six years after it enters into force, there is no scope for the inclusion of concerns of those African states that are staying away from the treaty. The treaty needs to be ratified by fifty countries for entry into force. After the operationalisation, it will be really interesting to see whether the treaty succeeds in fulfilling the goal of curbing violence in Africa because of the illicit and illegal supply of small arms. The Regional Centre of ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering State’ could act as a watchdog.
