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Egypt’s About Turn on Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam

Sneha Bhura
Sneha Bhura is Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. read more
Commentary

In what some see as a startling change of stance, Egypt has said that it is now willing to reconsider its staunch opposition to the Renaissance Dam that its neighbour, Ethiopia, is in the process of building; and that it will also mull over participating in the construction of the same.1 The proposed dam on the Blue Nile tributary is officially known as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and is pegged to supply the much-needed hydropower to a resurgent Ethiopia, but it also has the potential to endanger the future of downstream countries like Egypt and Sudan, as a thus far, belligerent Egypt has been asserting. But in view of the rapidly changing geopolitical scenario in the Horn of Africa along with a steadily weakening Egypt, the gradual acceptance of the controversial dam was probably on the horizon.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has welcomed the cooperation of both Egypt and Sudan and has promised that the dam will be jointly owned by Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt. This apparent show of faith by both parties has been hailed as a positive step forward in the ongoing saga on the Renaissance Dam which will be Africa’s biggest hydroelectric dam. In a telephonic interview with AlMonitor on October 17, 2013, Mohamed Abdul Muttalib, Egypt’s minister for water resources and irrigation said:

Egypt doesn’t mind joining the Ethiopian government in building the dam for the service and development of the Ethiopian people. But we must agree on a number of items in a clear way to prevent any damage to Egypt as a result of the dam construction.2

He further added that:

During the coming negotiations with Ethiopia over the dam, we will clarify our position regarding the policy and method of operating the dam, the size of the storage lake attached to it, and how to fill it with water in times of flood and drought.3

Nile is the longest river in the world with 86 percent of the water flow of the river originating from Ethiopia. The proposed Renaissance Dam, to be built at a cost of $ 4.7 billion, is a gravity dam on the Blue Nile River and is situated in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, around 40 km east of the border with Sudan. The dam is pegged to fill the 74 billion cubic-metre reservoir it will create, in seven years.4 Egypt has been maintaining that this hydro-electric project grossly violates the1959 colonial-era agreement that allocated close to three-fourths of the Nile waters to Egypt, a country which does not have access to other alternative fresh water sources, and is dependent on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water needs. However, the Ethiopians insist that times have changed and the old, unequal water-sharing agreements must be scrapped considering the devastating famines of the 1980s and 1990s and also because they have been largely left out of the water sharing agreements in the past. The population projections for the Nile basin have further compounded the problem of securing waters for the future, with the UN estimating that population of the 11 basin states will rise to 860 million by 2050.5

Ethiopia has reassured Egypt that it need not fear about its future water security if the dam is built. The Egyptians however are apprehensive that with the damming of the water in Ethiopia the capacity of Lake Nasser in Egypt is bound to be diminished, thereby reducing the power-generating capacity of Egypt’s own hydroelectric plant at Aswan by 40 per cent. At least, till such time that the Renaissance Dam is completed, that is by 2017, downstream countries like Egypt and Sudan will have to contend with reduced water flows. Ethiopian officials have, however, pointed out that the storing of water in Ethiopia will lead to a lower loss of water by evaporation as it has a cooler climate. Each contending argument is as strong as the other and any resolution of the impasse can only favour the country that currently has a greater geopolitical clout. And Egypt seems to be at the short end of the stick on this front.6

Various factors indicate that a change in the geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa favours Ethiopia. With the disintegration of Somalia, Ethiopia’s regional presence in the Horn of Africa has strengthened since its traditional foe, who had political designs over the Ogaden region, has been eliminated. Also, the partition of Sudan has weakened the bargaining position of downstream countries in the Horn of Africa, and this includes Egypt as well. The participation of Ethiopia in the region of Abyei—that is being fought over by both Sudan and South Sudan—as UN peacekeeping forces since 2012, the calamity in Darfur, and the international isolation of the Sudanese president has further diminished the power of Sudan to fight a protracted battle over the dam with Ethiopia. The blossoming of a warmer relationship between the West and Ethiopia, especially with regard to their endorsement of developmental-infrastructure projects such as dams, apart from the ready availability of Chinese technical and financial help has made matters worse for Egypt, whose fragile internal situation is diminishing its ability to deal with regional and international actors.

As one diplomatic source involved in the negotiations between Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia recently admitted to the Al Monitor, ‘…Egypt’s decision doesn’t mean compromising its water rights, but Egypt needs special capabilities in the next phase to negotiate and to hold on to its cards for pressure to not accept the dam if it harms [Egypt.]’7

Various reports and studies released by Ethiopia with respect to the observation of safety standards for downstream countries like Egypt and Sudan in the building of the dam have been inconclusive and unfit for implementation. This was underscored in a June report by a team of international experts who claimed that the Ethiopian findings were ‘very basic, and not yet at a level of detail, sophistication, and reliability that would befit a development of this magnitude, importance, and with such regional impact.’8 Also, there has so far not been any environmental and social impact assessment of the building of the dam with regard to these downstream countries. That Egypt might exploit these loopholes to manoeuver a winning strategy for itself seems far-fetched. Further clarity on this can only be achieved in the next two months, when Egypt and Ethiopia discuss the various terms and conditions for a truce on the negotiating table.

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