Terror attack in Kenya: resurgence of Alshabaab?
The terror attack on the upmarket Westgate Mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, which left 62 people dead including three members of Indian community, has heightened the sense of insecurity in the country with regard to the Somalia based terrorist group Al Shabaab. The Westgate Mall attack is eerily reminiscent of the 2008 Mumbai attack with terrorists targeting a mall frequented by expatriates and holding shoppers hostage. Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the attack in retaliation to the Kenyan government’s deployment of troops in neighbouring Somalia.
The Al-Shabaab Threat
Roots of Al Shabaab can be traced back to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).1 In 2006, Somalia made headlines with the rise of the UIC, a Taliban like movement that took control of Mogadishu. The UIC was a loose body consisting of 11 autonomous courts led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. It emerged in the early 1990s and its initial focus was to mete out justice because the collapse of the Somali state had undermined its formal judicial system. It is unclear exactly when, but at some point, the UIC was amalgamated with the Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI). The AIAI established in 1991, was led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a person of vast resources with Al Qaeda links. The Al Shabaab, which translates as ‘the youth’ in Arabic, is a wing of the UIC. Initially a loose network of Islamists groups opposed to Ethiopian intervention, it has, of late, become more extremist. At the same time within the organisation the hardliners and foreign jihadis have gained ground. The group was renamed the Harkat Al Shabaab al-Mujahidin in 2009 and has global aspirations.2 Last year, Al Shabaab suffered several setbacks because of the presence of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping troops, and Somali government forces. They were thrown out of the southern Somali port city of Kismayo, at the end of September 2012, primarily by the Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM.
Kenya’s Involvement
In recent years there is rising insecurity in Kenya due to the chaotic situation in neighbouring Somalia. Conflict in Somalia can be traced back to the toppling of President Mohammed Said Barre in 1991 and the subsequent civil war. In recent years the Federal Government of Somalia has been trying to deal with the inter-clan rivalry, piracy off the Somali coast and the various terror acts perpetuated by the Al Shabaab, with the support of regional powers such as Ethiopia and Kenya and the international community. The Somali crisis has received significant international attention over the last two decades. A number of UN and multinational operations were undertaken between 1992 and 1995, to restore peace in the country, but they proved unsuccessful. During the long conflict thousands of lives have been lost and vast numbers of people have fled their homes in Somalia and sought refuge in the neighbouring countries. It has been reported that over a million people have sought refuge in the neighbouring countries, notably, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, amongst others. In the last decade Kenya has played an active role in the Somali peace process.3
It hosted the Somali peace talks and allowed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)4 to operate from Kenya before they moved into Mogadishu in 2005.
According to the Kenyan government, the repeated killings and kidnappings of Kenyan nationals and tourists by the Al- Shabaab and their control over the Juba region in Southern Somalia adjacent to northern Kenya, has led to the deteriorating security condition in the country. Al Shabaab has made several hand grenade attacks against soft targets in Kenya in recent years. However terror attacks in Kenya can be traced back to the August 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi that had left 213 people dead and another 4000 injured. This was followed by the November 2002 attacks in Mombasa where the terrorists targeted an Israel owned hotel and also launched two surface to air missiles (SAMs) at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa airport. It was later reported that the terrorists accused of 1998 attacks (affiliates of Al Qaeda) were also responsible for the Mombasa attacks. Further they had fled from Kenya to Somalia and joined the militant Al Ittihad group and later when this group was liquidated by the efforts of the US and Ethiopia they joined the Al Shabaab. It was because of these grave circumstances that the Kenyan government agreed to deploy Kenyan troops in Somalia to root out the terrorists in an operation, code named Linda Nchi (“Protect the Country” in Swahili) in 2011.
Implications
The latest Westgate Mall siege is the worst terror incident since 1998, in Kenya and has several implications. The Al Shabaab claim that the attack was in reprisal for Kenyan military involvement in Somalia has led to a debate within the country on this approach. At the moment, Kenyan government has rejected any chance of withdrawal and “bowing to the terrorist’s demand”. However this latest terror incident threatens trade and tourism, the two vital sectors of Kenyan economy. Such incidents may make foreign investors more cautious about setting up office in the country. Further Kenya is the trade and financial hub of the East African region. Instability in the country will obviously have a negative impact on the entire region.
At the same time in other parts of the region, Ethiopia in particular, the Westgate attack has sparked off concerns regarding an imminent terror attack within the country by the Al Shabaab. Ethiopia along with Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti and Sierra Leone has contributed troops to the AMISOM. Officials from Medrek, Ethiopia’s opposition group have called for withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia as there is high risk of Al Shabaab launching a large scale attack in the country.5
There is no doubt that the Kenya attack indicates that despite the AMISOM’s successes last year Al Shabaab has regrouped and emerged stronger. While the last major regional attack launched by the terror outfit was in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda; in the last few months, Al Shabaab has escalated its attacks within Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu. In April, they targeted the court house which resulted in more than 50 deaths. A few months later, in June, they attacked the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) compound in Mogadishu, leaving more than 20 dead. In July, the security situation worsened with the Al Shabaab claiming to have carried out more than 50 attacks; the most prominent being the attack on the Turkish embassy where three people were killed. In early September, Al Shabaab has also claimed responsibility for bombing, The Village, a popular restaurant in Mogadishu. At the same time the recent siege in Nairobi, that involved 15 heavily armed militants and who were able to hold out for four days against Kenya’s security forces suggests that the Al Shabaab has acquired sophistication and fresh skills and capabilities.
While the international community, particularly, the United States, Israel, France, UK have been assisting Kenya and Somalia and the African Union in their fight against the Al Shabaab, the latest turn of events calls for a rethink of their strategy. Attempts should be made to choke financial aid and support to the Al Shabaab. In the past, Eritrea, Yemen, Syria and Qatar have been accused by the Somali TFG of providing funds and weapons to Al Shabaab. The Westgate siege has also brought to light the role of foreign militants and the Somalia diaspora based in the US and other parts of the world in the Al Shabaab cadre. In the past, there have been reports that militant organisations such as Lashkar- e – Toiba (LET), the Harkat- ul- Mujahideen (HUM) and others are active in Somalia and that volunteers from Af-Pak region also form a small part of the Al Shabaab.6 Moreover, Al Shabaab is also reported to have declared its intention of seeing “Kashmir liberated”.7 While India has in past contributed US$ 1 million to AMISOM, the killing of members of Indian community by Al Shabaab terrorists is a wakeup call for Indian officials about the threat from across the Indian Ocean.
- 1. A. Duale Sii’arag, “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of Africa”,
WardheerNews.com, November 13, 2005 at http://wardheernews.com/articles/November/
13__Alittihad_Sii’arag.html - 2. Ibid.
- 3. Luckystar Miyandazi, “Kenyan military intervention in Somalia: an intricate process,” Policy & Practice Brief, Issue
No. 019, November 2012, p.2 - 4. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognized government of Somalia until August,
2012 - 5. “Somalia: Ethiopia Could Face ‘Large-Scale’ Attacks From Somalia’s Al-Shabaab – Opposition”, Sudan Tribune,
September 22, 2013 at http://allafrica.com/stories/201309230996.html - 6. B Raman, “Reports from Somalia”, Outlook, August 23, 2010 at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266803
- 7. Times of India, 24 August, 2010
