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Under the Radar: China’s Growing Ties with Comoros

Maitreyee Shilpa Kishor
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Commentary

The re-conceptualisation of the Indian and Pacific oceans as an interconnected whole – the Indo-Pacific – is an idea that has gained momentum in the strategic circles of most countries that have a presence in the region. By encompassing the stretch from Eastern Africa to Western Americas as a single region, it sheds light on China’s increasingly visible attempts to assert itself as a maritime power capable of operating in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Aid to, and investment in, strategically located countries in the IOR to establish a strong presence has been the thrust of the Chinese strategy. The steadily growing economic cooperation with Comoros is part of this strategy. For a China with global aspirations and a large economy to bankroll that aspiration, the engagement with Comoros promises to yield significant benefits in return for relatively little.

The Comoros Factsheet

Comoros is an archipelagic country composed of 3 major islands – Grande Comore (Ngazidja), Anjouan (Nzwani) and Moheli (Mwali). It also claims Mayotte (Maroé), a fourth island that was part of Comoros under French colonial rule, but was retained by France through a controversial referendum before granting Comoros independence in 1975. It straddles the northern mouth of the Mozambique Channel between Mozambique and Madagascar1, a region where offshore oil was recently discovered and is being further explored.

As a multi-ethnic country, it has had a turbulent political history with over 20 coups or coup attempts and multiple secessionist attempts by islands wanting to return to France. The political instability combined with heavy export dependence on commodities with volatile prices2, lack of domestic employment opportunities, erratic and insufficient electricity supply, and poor physical and digital connectivity had stagnated economy the economy until 2015.3 Currently, Comoros is classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC) and stands 165th on the Human Development Index (HDI)4 with a GDP per capita (PPP) of just over $1400.5

Comoros is highly dependent on remittances which contribute to over 21 per cent of the GDP6 and mostly flow in from expatriates living in France and Mayotte.7 It also relies on foreign aid, which until recently, came mainly from France,8 which also was its largest trading partner till 2014.9 However, tensions with France over the control of Mayotte and the presence of illegal Comorian immigrants in the French overseas department have led to a deteriorating relationship.10

China’s engagement with Comoros

The politico-socio-economic situation in Comoros has given China the chance to step up its presence in the East African island country. According to Mohamed Soilih, Vice President of Comoros, “(A) fter 40 years, China has become the first partner. Before it was France, now it is China.”11 China has always had a steady relationship with Comoros and was the first country to recognise independent Comoros in 1975. Since then, the relationship has been a mutually beneficial one with Comoros receiving aid, investment and exports from China in return for endorsing the One-China policy. The trade-off for China has been extremely reasonable since the beginning. The economic costs of securing Comoros’s support were low and the result was a staunch ally in international fora. Chinese engagement with Comoros spans high level diplomatic visits, medical aid, financial aid to help build and renovate infrastructure and public facilities, visits by Chinese technical experts and doctors as well as donations in kind. So far, China has partnered in major infrastructure projects like the construction of a new airport complex and the renovation of the People’s Palace in Comoros’ capital city of Moroni and the construction of a new hospital in Anjouan but the cost of these ventures is miniscule for China.12

Though Sino-Comorian cooperation dates back to 1975, China’s foray into the Indian Ocean has further increased the value of Comoros as an ally. Wary of India’s presence in Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, China’s growing ties with Comoros can be seen as an effort to mitigate India’s footprint in the region. The strategic location of Comoros at the mouth of the Mozambique Channel gives China a legitimate reason to maintain a presence there, and though there are currently no reports of it building a military base in Comoros, this possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. China is reportedly providing military and Mandarin language training to Comorian soldiers in Beijing which opens doors to further defence cooperation. Comoros is also the ideal location to set up a surveillance and listening station, similar to India’s “listening post” in northern Madagascar.13

Given Comoros’s large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and its lack of resources to sustainably exploit it, Chinese support is crucial to further this “pragmatic cooperation”14. Recent discoveries of offshore oil and gas reserves off the coasts of Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique increase the importance of Comoros. Not only does it lie astride shipping lanes that carry oil to China, but explorations in the Comorian EEZ are likely to yield oil and natural gas15 which would help China’s quest for diversifying its sources of fossil fuel imports. The waters around Comoros are important fishing grounds that could bolster China’s seafood cache. Comoros had an agreement with the European Union (EU) to allow tuna fishing in its EEZ until it was terminated by the EU citing “the national authorities’ poor or non-existent monitoring and control capacities”16. China has a similar agreement with Madagascar17 and has expressed the intention to finalise one with Comoros soon.

The cooperation between the two countries is set to improve in the future as Comoros has requested a visit from President Xi Jinping, who said he was “in favour” of this suggestion.18 China has also forgiven Comorian debt in November 201819 and committed to further invest in connectivity projects to help President Azali Assoumani realise his vision of making Comoros a “developing country” by 2030.20 So far, the state-controlled Comorian media looks positively at Chinese involvement in Comoros and reports public opinion to be largely pro-China. Juxtaposing China with France, former Vice President Fouad Mhadji argued that Chinese aid and investment has come without interference in domestic politics and is long term, which will substantially benefit Comoros.21

Friction in the relationship

However, discontent against China has started brewing. Fish stocks in the waters around Comoros are depleting and this is adversely affecting fishing – one of the three major occupations in the country. The fishing communities believe overfishing by Chinese vessels in traditionally Comorian fishing grounds is the reason. This story was reportedly suppressed by the government at the insistence of Chinese authorities.22

In addition, a politically charged high stakes election is coming up in early 2019. The incumbent president has drastically revised the constitution through a referendum to do away with the contested system of a rotating presidency23, which the opposition boycotted.24 In such a tense political scenario, China will find it increasingly difficult to remain aloof from domestic politics in Comoros and maintain the positive public opinion that currently exists.

Conclusion

Despite the current satisfaction with the Chinese model of investment, examples from other countries show that it is generally unsustainable. Debt driven infrastructure development, largescale environmental degradation and lax regulatory standards are the side effects of engagement with China that smaller developing nations are forced to accept. Moreover, since a presence in Comoros is vital to securing interests in the Mozambique Channel, India and France are also trying to rekindle ties with the island nation. The competition between these powers could spill over into Comoros, causing damage to its political stability, sovereignty and economy. The highly asymmetrical relationship between China and Comoros is one of convenience and mutual benefit that has worked out well so far. However, the lack of a deeper cultural, ideological and historical connection makes it vulnerable to the forces of international competition for influence in the East African region.

Ms. Maitreyee Shilpa Kishor is Intern, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

Keywords: China
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