

## Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean An Indian Perspective

*Sarabjeet Singh Parmar\**

*For a maritime nation like India, its conception of maritime security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and, specifically, its approach to maritime security has a long historical legacy. The modern Indian Navy has its origins in the colonial period. But it is the post-colonial period spanning independence and then the imperatives of the Cold War, and later to the interim phase in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present day strategic partnerships—all of which have contributed to moulding the Indian perspective of maritime security. This article looks at how India's conception of maritime security in the IOR has been affected by these changes and challenges.*

India's tryst with maritime security is often seen as being steeped in history. K.M. Panikkar writes: 'The importance of the sea came to be recognised by the Indian rulers only when it was too late.'<sup>1</sup> Panikkar elucidates the conditions under which the Indian Navy had to develop: firstly, more symbolic as the Royal Indian Navy; secondly, as a force to take over the coastal duties; and thirdly, to create a naval tradition.<sup>2</sup> Holmes, Winner and Yoshihara, while writing on the Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty First Century have called history firstly, an inexact indicator when looking at the future; secondly, difficult to grasp; thirdly, influential; and fourthly, interactive.<sup>3</sup> Although one can agree with these four aspects the historical

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\* Commander Sarabjeet Singh Parmar is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own. A version of this article was presented at the Third Conference on the International Order at Sea, CNA, Washington D.C., 6 May 2013.

ISSN 0976-1004 print

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*Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, January–March 2014, pp. 49–63



aspects have steered Indian Maritime thinking, from the retention of Royal Naval traditions (still followed to a very large extent today) to the evolution of Indian maritime thinking from a coastal preponderance to a blue water navy. This evolution highlights the break out from a continental mindset driven to a large degree by the diminishment of British power, a diminishment that resulted in a rapid reduction of the maritime security blanket provided by the British in the Indian Ocean post World War II and the ingress of other powers.

Post World War II, the British, realising their diminishing power and therefore reducing influence in the region, apparently induced the US to enter in the region when the US had no significant interests.<sup>4</sup> The Cold War, however, ensured that the focus within the Indian Ocean remained a subset of the US–Soviet rivalry. The end of the Cold War saw the region emerging as a relatively peaceful place with a new set of powers emerging and different dynamics coming into force. These dynamics are dictated by trade, economics and ‘freedom of navigation’, threatened by the ongoing tensions in the neighbouring areas—the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea—that could have spill-over effects in the larger region. These changes have affected the texture of security related aspects in the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

This article looks at how India’s perspective of maritime security in the IOR has been affected by these changes and challenges, and how India has shaped its strategy to meet them.

#### **POST INDEPENDENCE AND COLD WAR PERIOD**

History and geography in a way can both limit and, conversely, also set a limitless arena for a region’s maritime security. In the Indian Ocean context, prior to World War II, the maritime security issue, mainly due to the British colonial mindset, focussed on India as the maritime centre piece of its Indian subcontinent-ruled territories, territories which were connected to India mostly by the seas. This ‘British Lake’ was seen by England as its domain to firstly dominate the region, secondly to connect this area to London, and thirdly to connect to the Far East. British supremacy in the region more or less remained unchallenged from the early nineteenth century to World War II till ‘the entry of Japan into the Indian Ocean demonstrated clearly the entire dependence of the security of India on the mastery of the seas.’<sup>5</sup> The Japanese not only captured the Andaman and Nicobar Islands but also shelled the port of Visakhapatnam on the east coast of India and paralyzed merchant shipping in the Bay of

Bengal. In April 1942, the Japanese had also sunk Royal Naval ships off Colombo and Trincomalee, and their submarines were attacking shipping in the Mozambique Channel.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, 'World War II left Indians even more acutely aware of their nation-state's vulnerability to seaborne perils.'<sup>7</sup>

During the late 1940s, a committee was formed to look into the planning requirements of the Indian Armed Forces.<sup>8</sup> The committee based its reports on three assumptions:

- Japan would be defeated.
- The USSR and USA would be the principal powers in the east.
- China and India would maintain sufficient forces to overcome a minor power and would be able to hold out against a major power until Imperial Forces could arrive.

It is noteworthy that the committee did not take into account the possibility of an independent India and did not foresee the ensuing partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan; or perhaps it chose to ignore the possibility of independence. The report also mentioned the apprehensions of India coming under Russia's influence and spoke of China as a long-term threat. These apprehensions contained in the volumes published in 1980 by the British Government covering top secret and secret correspondence prior to 1947 reveal, says G.M. Hiranandani, the basis for developments in the Indian Ocean and the Anglo-American mindset during the second half of the twentieth century. Hiranandani also brings out issues that paved the way for Anglo-American strategic anxiety:<sup>9</sup>

- Threat of a Russian invasion post departure of the British.
- Implications for Imperial Defence if India opted out of the Commonwealth and became susceptible to Russian Influence
- Feasibility of backing Pakistan against threats from India and Russia.
- Russian domination of India would result in communications with Australia and New Zealand being cut-off.
- Effect on the British Commonwealth Defence System should India cease to be a member.

It is at this point that the British, as mentioned earlier, apparently induced the US to enter in the region when the latter had no significant interests. 'British practitioners like Sir Olaf Caroe, former Governor of the strategic Northwest Frontier Province were sent by the British Foreign

Office to convince the State Department about the importance of Pakistan as the inner circle of Western defence in the strategic Persian Gulf region and the southern belly of the Soviet empire.<sup>10</sup>

For India, the marking of its borders post independence resulted in a new-found continental crisis, wherein it was forced to look at its own protection as it was surrounded by a belligerent Pakistan in the west and east, and hemmed in in the north by a China with growing ambitions. According to Pannikar, 'it is hardly to be imagined that China will in future neglect her naval interest. With her bases extending as far south as Hainan, she is placed in even a more advantageous position than Japan.'<sup>11</sup> However, the Chinese maritime ambitions visibly arose in the early 1990s.

It was these issues that, in a manner of speaking, laid the basis of India's first Naval Plan papers and strategy till the end of the Cold War. After independence, the first Naval Plan papers envisaged the role of the Navy to 'safeguard her shipping on the high seas from interference in war; to ensure that supplies can both reach and leave India by sea in all circumstances; to keep open her ports and coastal shipping routes; to prevent any enemy landing on her shores; and to support the Army in any operations which may be required in the furtherance of the national policy.'<sup>12</sup>

The first Plan, with a suggested period of 10 years, included two light fleet carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines apart such smaller ships as were necessary for training and auxiliary purposes.<sup>13</sup> However, the Plan was not implemented due to the continental mindset, spurred by the 1947–48 war with Pakistan on Kashmir, and budgetary

**Table I** Warships Acquired by the Indian Navy 1947–61

| <i>Type of Ship</i>     | <i>Number</i> | <i>Year Delivered</i> | <i>Delivering Nation</i> |
|-------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| Light Cruiser           | 02            | 1948, 1957            | Britain                  |
| Light Destroyers        | 03            | 1949                  | Britain                  |
| Landing Ship Tank       | 01            | 1949                  | Britain                  |
| Escort Destroyers       | 03            | 1953                  | Britain                  |
| Light tanker            | 01            | 1953                  | Italy                    |
| Inshore Minesweepers    | 02            | 1954                  | Britain                  |
| Coastal Minesweepers    | 04            | 1956                  | Britain                  |
| Anti Aircraft Frigates  | 03            | 1958, 1960            | Britain                  |
| Surface Escorts         | 02            | 1958, 1959            | Britain                  |
| Anti Submarine Frigates | 03            | 1955                  | Britain                  |
| Light Aircraft Carrier  | 01            | 1961                  | Britain                  |

constraints. By 1961, the Indian Navy had acquired a number of major warships (see Table 1).<sup>14</sup>

Although it was considered a balanced force at the time, the omission of submarine procurement and actual numbers vis-à-vis the maritime area under India's immediate jurisdiction somewhat dilutes the argument. Submarine procurement was delayed due to budgetary constraints and the focus on acquisition of ships to match Pakistan's aggression in the aftermath of the 1965 war.<sup>15</sup> The first four submarines were inducted into the Indian Navy from 1967 to 1969, bought from Russia. This decision to acquire submarines, and subsequently ships, from Russia was taken firstly, owing to the British being unable to extend credit owing to a problematic financial situation—this was because Britain was already stretched due to the ongoing the Leander Project; secondly, due to the Indonesian naval intrusions into the Nicobar Islands; and thirdly, due to a Pakistani intrusion into Kutch in April 1965 that resulted in the 1965 war.<sup>16</sup> The decision was also influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union was the only nation willing to meet the Navy's increasing requirements: these requirements were driven by the recommendations post the 1962 Sino-Indian war that the Navy should have a fleet in both the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal with 'a force level of 138 ships'.<sup>17</sup> With these acquisitions, the Indian Navy could be viewed as having a balanced force to meet the country's security specifically and that of the IOR in general.

Post-1945, the Cold War also ensured that the focus within the Indian Ocean remained a subset of the US–Soviet rivalry. India was seen by the West as a Soviet ally and this further restricted the maritime discourse within India, to events in the Indian Ocean. India's maritime prowess was perhaps recognized for the first time after the 1971 war wherein the Indian Navy was used decisively with innovative ideas.<sup>18</sup> However, cognition of India's Navy as a stabilizer in the region was recognized only after the 1988 Maldives operation and operations in Somalia from 1992–94.<sup>19</sup> This was also bolstered by certain facts:

- The sine curve relation of the US with Pakistan.
- That India had good relations with most of its neighbours and was seen as a powerful ally and stable nation by them.
- That India provided assistance only when invited and therefore had no hegemonic interests.

#### **POST COLD WAR PERIOD**

The sea's past and continuing contributions to human development

could be boiled down to the four main attributes, or ways in which it has been used, namely—resources it contained, utility as a means of transportation and trade, importance as a means of exchanging information and as a source of power and dominion.<sup>20</sup>

The end of the Cold War followed by economic upswing, especially in India (which simultaneously undertook a liberalization of its economy) and China brought about a new focus on the Indian Ocean region: as an arena featuring important Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and maritime trade protection, both related primarily to the flow of oil. The focus, therefore, changed to ensuring a secure maritime environment that emphasized control of SLOCs to ensure protection of maritime trade and shipping as well as for exploitation of maritime resources in the region. For littorals like India, it also meant 'security of infrastructure and other assets in the maritime zones and the littoral related to the extraction, transportation and reception of domestic energy resources.'<sup>21</sup>

The early 1990s also awakened the littorals' nationalistic, economic and cultural thought processes that ignited a new process, which, in turn, led to the advent of regional interactions like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). These bodies are subject to the power play of both regional and extra-regional players. Although the member nations have changed their stances and alliances since 1991, there are some lingering effects of colonization and the Cold War that have stymied these regional interactions from blossoming into strong regional bodies. As a result, non-traditional challenges have, over a period of time, come to overshadow the threat of conflict between nations. Therefore, it is perhaps apt to refer to the Indian Ocean as a 'Sea of Uncertainty'.<sup>22</sup>

In order to bridge the existing differences between the IOR littoral states, India instituted the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008 with change in chair every two years.<sup>23</sup> This platform brought together 35 navies of the region onto a common platform for promoting cooperation through continuous consultations and dialogue with a meeting every two years to exchange view. The vision shared in the Symposium has assisted in the evolution of a common set of strategies to enhance regional maritime security. This initiative has the potential to go a long way in resolving existing misunderstandings and perceptions between nations abutting the Indian Ocean, and would thus require the continued support of all members. This initiative, along with the exercises India conducts with various littoral nations of the IOR, has added to the cooperation and

commonality of understanding amongst the regional nations.

The end of the Cold War also saw India rising to the challenge of adapting its strategy to balance between a US-dominated world as well as a multipolar environment. Therefore,

India's grand strategy concentrated on two important and seemingly contradictory objectives. One is to limit the vulnerabilities that it senses in a unipolar world dominated by the United States by seeking a new partnership with Washington, and the other objective is to promote the construction of a multipolar world with India as one of the poles.<sup>24</sup>

However, US–India relations have seen an upsurge since the signing of the civil nuclear deal in 2005. India is often seen as a predominant regional power with a benign approach. These internationally acceptable attributes aptly fit its envisaged role as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and as a lynch pin in the US pivot to Asia. A role brought out by Chuck Hagel in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2013 wherein he said:<sup>25</sup>

India's role as a stabilizing power is of growing importance with the increase of trade and transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The United States considers India's efforts to enhance its military capabilities as a welcome contribution to security in the region.

India's central position in the IOR overlooking the SLOCs, its proximity to the choke points in the IOR, especially the Malacca Straits, Straits of Hormuz and Gulf of Aden accord it the above specified importance. In the maritime arena, the Malabar series of exercises have enabled India and the US in achieving a high degree of inter-operability over the years, despite the varying types of ships and equipment India operates. The number of military assets being procured from the US by India has been growing steadily. Although the rejection of the F-16IN aircraft offered by the US for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal slightly marred relations, the procurement of assets such as P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, C-17 transport aircraft and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft placed India as one of the biggest customers of American weaponry in the past decade. Since 2003, India has procured military equipment from the US worth around \$10 billion.<sup>26</sup> Presently, negotiations are ongoing for the procurement of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters, and M-777 light weight howitzers. Post the third bilateral meeting between the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the US President Barack Obama on 27 September 2013, US–India relations are now

poised to enter a new level of defence technology transfer, joint research, co-development and co-production.<sup>27</sup>

However, the above relations are also affected by the US' relations with Pakistan and those between China and Pakistan. Although the US–Pakistan relations have seen a 'sine curve' ride, the overtures of the US to Pakistan in the past have affected its relations with India and continue to do so in the foreseeable future. It is evident that the US would need Pakistan in its withdrawal from Afghanistan, especially for maritime mobility. The request for \$1.162 billion (\$857 million for civilian assistance and \$305 million for security assistance) by the Obama Administration for the fiscal year 2014, which commenced on 10 October 2013<sup>28</sup>, could be a step in this direction. This aspect of assistance is a 'tightrope' walk that the US would need to tread with caution, especially as India is heading for elections in 2014.

Pakistan's defence relations with China commenced after the US stopped arms supplies to both Pakistan and India during the 1965 Indo–Pak war. Pakistan being the more affected nation turned to China and received more than 200 tanks and 100 military aircraft.<sup>29</sup> The flow of conventional arms from China grew and 'it was well established by the early 1980s that nearly 65 per cent of Pakistan's aircraft and 75 per cent of its tanks were supplied by China.'<sup>30</sup> In 2012, according to SIPRI, Pakistan accounted for 55 per cent of Chinese arms exports.<sup>31</sup> The flow of conventional arms also grew to include nuclear and related technologies. 'In the mid-1980s, China supplied Pakistan with a nuclear weapon design suitable for tactical aircraft delivery. In addition it provided Pakistan with important components required to detonate a nuclear weapon.'<sup>32</sup> The aspect of supply of nuclear technology is considered the most important and sensitive for the region especially after the Kargil conflict of 1999 that was fought under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Although China did not evince any support favouring Pakistan, it could take advantage of the strained relations to counter Indian steps to bolster its land borders and enhance and expand its maritime capability and capacity. Pakistan sees China as a balancer against India and the US—it views the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean as 'being caused by the heightening endeavours of US and India to gain the over lordship over Indian Ocean region, because of their respective self-conceived geopolitical right to do so.'<sup>33</sup> The increasing number of exercises conducted between both nations is indicative of a growing nexus to counter the US–India influence in the IOR.

In September 2013, Pakistan and China recently held a joint air force exercise—Shaheen 2—in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. This exercise is a follow on of Shaheen 1 that was held in Pakistan in March 2011. On the maritime front, Pakistan has proposed annual maritime exercises commencing from 2014 with the first scheduled in the Arabian Sea. Interestingly, the proposed exercises coincide with the planned first sea trials of China's new strategic submarine that is equipped with JL-2 missiles.<sup>34</sup> The introduction of these submarines in the planned exercises would alter the strategic scenario tremendously. The usage of Pakistani ports/bases as 'semi-military'<sup>35</sup> bases by China to enhance its maritime, aerospace and military footprint is a possibility given the commonality due to supply of assets from China as well as co-production of hardware.<sup>36</sup> Gwadar port, which has once again been taken over by China, is strategically placed overlooking the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz. Usage of this port would accrue China not only the advantage of reciprocity vis-à-vis the Malacca Straits but also give it greater operational flexibility in the Arabian Sea. The institutionalization of these exercises and possible usage of ports as semi-military bases could be viewed as a counter to India's Malabar series of exercises and a means of challenging India's maritime capacity and capability.

Thus, the Indian partnership with the US could have been a result of growing Chinese ambitions and that the US was the only dominant 'friend' in the region who could neutralize the growing Chinese presence. A presence with ambitions that have now entered the maritime domain and are impinging on India's interests not only in the IOR but also beyond its traditionally set boundaries. From being 'Pak centric', India could now also be seen as 'Sino Challenged'. Although '[t]here is no disputing that the gravest security challenge India faces is the jehadi terrorism for which the epicentre is Pakistan'<sup>37</sup>, the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, coupled with the land border issue that have polarized the strategic mind set, will dictate, albeit, a reduced continental outlook that will remain the foremost point in India's security mainly due to the influence of history and geography.

Therefore, the long standing Sino-Indian rivalry and the Chinese ingress into the Indian Ocean need to be examined more closely as '[t]he centrality of the "ocean" in the region's affairs is further underscored by the fact that problems on land invariably find a reflection at sea.'<sup>38</sup> 'New Delhi sees China's coming into the Indian Ocean not just from the east through the Strait of Malacca, but also from the north. From

the Indian perspective, the contemporary Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean is also driven by Beijing's enduring continental challenges.<sup>39</sup> This approach, with undertones of a 'Mackinder-Mahanian'<sup>40</sup> combine, could dilute the effectiveness of India's maritime outlook as China appears to be forcing India to look repeatedly at its land borders. For example, the incursion of Chinese troops 19 kilometres into Ladakh in Depsang and the resultant three-week standoff (April–May 2013), merits attention due to the distance inland from the border and time period of standoff and is supportive of this fact.<sup>41</sup>

The incursion could not have been better timed. Firstly, it was just prior to the visit of the Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang to India. New Delhi was scheduled to be first stop in his maiden visit abroad. Secondly, it corresponded with a declared reduction in India's defence budget. In this regard, two points stand out very clearly:<sup>42</sup> firstly, the defence expenditure as a percentage of total central Government expenditure (CGE) is the lowest in independent India's history, and secondly, the defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the lowest in 50 years since 1962–63, when it stood at 2.32 per cent. Therefore, the developing scenario could force the US to take a relook at the security conundrum in the Indian Ocean and pressurize it to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean. This could have a resounding affect on its rebalancing policy towards the Asia–Pacific, specifically its presence in the South China Sea and East China Sea regions. It is perhaps for this reason that the US is engaging the island nations in the region, where there is reasonable Chinese influence. A case in point being the recent reported signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Maldives to provide a 'cost free border control system'.<sup>43</sup> There was also a reported signing of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)<sup>44</sup>, but the US has denied setting up a military base in the country and the Maldives had stated that it was yet to decide on signing the SOFA.<sup>45</sup> It must be pointed out here that the setting up of a US military base could have a strong bearing on US–India relations as, firstly, India has always been against setting up of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean region, and secondly and more importantly, dilute the aspect of India being seen as a net provider of security in the region.

Another issue that could affect the US presence here is the directive signed by the US President, Barack Obama regarding the sequester. Although to ascertain the overall impact is uncertain and too premature to calculate, it definitely could result in a cut back on vital issues like operations, training and maintenance.<sup>46</sup> Admiral Jonathon Greenert, the

US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in his blog dated 27 September 2013, stated: '[I]f sequestration-level reductions persist in the years after FY 2014, the Navy of 2020 would not be able to execute the missions described in our defence strategy, the Defence Strategic Guidance.'<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, the future of maritime security in the Indian Ocean appears to be entering a new phase as the US would have to look at internal balancing of its budget, positioning and utilisation rate of assets. At the same time, in order to face the changing maritime security scenario, India too is modernizing its navy with new ships, aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines, including indigenously built ones.

#### CONCLUSION

India's view of maritime security in the Indian Ocean has been driven and affected by the influences and strategic thought processes of the colonial period and Cold War. The presence of extra-regional nations, relations between nations and the predominant, unresolved border issues are aspects that have driven India's maritime strategic outlook. The post Cold War period, the ingress of China and the present disposition of the US in the region have also resulted in a change in India's perspective. Any increase in the US presence and shift in policy to engage nations where there is both an existing Indian presence and growing Chinese interest could dilute the aspect of India being seen as a net provider of security. The myriad of issues could result in the Indian Ocean evolving from a comparatively 'peaceful' area into an area of severe competition and confrontation. Therefore, resolution of border issues and establishment of a cooperative security mechanism involving both regional and extra regional players is an option that could retain the 'peaceful' element in the Indian Ocean security debate.

#### NOTES

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4. See details see Ashok Kapur, 'Imperial America and The Indian Subcontinent', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Summer 2004, pp. 1–23.

5. Panikkar, 'India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History', n. 1, p. 81.
6. See G.M. Hiranandani, 'Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976–1990', New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2005, p. 5.
7. Holmes et al., 'Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty First Century', n. 3, p. 28.
8. For details see Satyindra Singh, *Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–1950*, New Delhi: Oxford and IBH, 1986, Chapter 2.
9. Hiranandani, 'Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976–1990', n. 6, p. 6.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
11. Panikkar, 'India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History', n. 1, p. 85.
12. Details sourced from Satyindra Singh, *Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–1950*, n. 8, p. 36.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Details taken from Hiranandani, 'Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976–1990', n. 6, pp. 21, 22.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 13. Post the 1962 war with China, Indonesia voiced a claim to the Nicobar group of islands and a number of intrusions into Indian waters took place. Indonesia also claimed that that Indian Ocean be renamed the Indonesian Ocean.
17. Singh, Anup, 'New Look Indian Navy', *Defence and Security of India*, Vol. 5, No. 2, December 2012, p. 7.
18. The utilization of OSA class missile boats to attack Karachi by towing to a certain point took even the Soviets by surprise.
19. In November 1988, a coup to over throw the Maldivian government of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom was thwarted by the intervention of the Indian Armed Forces. The assistance was provided on the request of the Maldivian President. The coup leader and other members were apprehended by an Indian Naval ship on the high seas after a coordinated maritime search for the vessel they were escaping in. In Somalia, the Indian Navy was used extensively to evacuate the Indian Brigade operating under the UN flag there. This was the first instance in the history of the UN that an Asian naval force had been used for such a task.
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22. See 'Indian Ocean: A Sea of Uncertainty', Future Directions International, February 2012, available at <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/IndianOceanASeaofUncertainty%20.pdf>, accessed on 26 April 2013.
  23. India was chair for the first IONs from 2008 to 2010, UAE from 2010 to 2012, South Africa from 2012 to 2014. Australia will take over as chair in 2014.
  24. Raja Mohan, C. and Ajai Sahni, 'India's Security Challenges at Home and Abroad', The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report #39, May 2012, p. 28.
  25. The text of Chuck Hagel's speech is available at <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d>, accessed on 8 October 2013.
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  28. See Warren Strobel, 'As Relations Thaw, US Starts Security Aid to Pakistan', *Reuters/NBC News*, available at [http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/\\_news/2013/10/20/21053640-as-relations-thaw-us-restarts-security-aid-to-pakistan?lite](http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/20/21053640-as-relations-thaw-us-restarts-security-aid-to-pakistan?lite), accessed on 21 October 2013.
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  35. A semi-military base means the usage of ports/bases for not only refuelling and resupply but also for logistical support in terms of maintenance, repair and re-ammunitioning that would be supplied by the host nation as per a pre-arranged understanding.
  36. As per various newspaper reports, Pakistan is looking at procuring hardware like JF-17 fighter planes (co-production planned), eight F-22P frigates (four of these were delivered in July 2009). Pakistan has reportedly already received C-801/C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles.
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  38. See talk by Admiral D.K. Joshi, Indian Chief of Naval Staff, at IDSA on 'Role of Indian Navy in Maintaining Peace in Indian Ocean Region', held on 5 March 2013, available at [http://idsa.in/keyspeeches/RoleofIndianNavyinMaintainingPeaceinIndianOceanRegion\\_CNS](http://idsa.in/keyspeeches/RoleofIndianNavyinMaintainingPeaceinIndianOceanRegion_CNS), accessed on 20 April 2013.
  39. Raja Mohan, C., *Samudra Manthan*, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, p. 111.
  40. See Zorawer Daulet Singh, 'China Strategy: Mackinder Vs Mahan', *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, 26 April 2013.
  41. Chinese troops entered into Indian Territory and pitched camp. As on 1 May 2013, the third flag meeting failed to come up with any solution. This issue has resulted in a debate covered by various print Indian media from end-April 2013.
  42. See Shruti Pandalai and G. Balachandran, 'India's Defence Budget: Trends Beyond the Numbers', IDSA comment, available at [http://idsa.in/idsacomment/IndiasDefenceBudget\\_balachandran\\_040313](http://idsa.in/idsacomment/IndiasDefenceBudget_balachandran_040313), accessed on 20 April 2013.
  43. Merrett, Neil, 'US to Provide Maldives with Cost-free Border Control System', *Minivan News*, 28 March 2013, available at <http://minivannews.com/society/us-to-provide-maldives-with-cost-free-border-control-system-55343>, accessed on 21 April 2013.
  44. A draft copy of the SOFA is available on the Internet and can be viewed at <http://www.dhivehisitee.com/images/US-Maldives-SOFA-draft.pdf>,

accessed on 1 May 2013.

45. See M.K. Bhadrakumar, 'US Seeks Military Presence in Maldives', available at [http://indrus.in/blogs/2013/04/26/us\\_seeks\\_military\\_presence\\_in\\_maldives\\_24183.html](http://indrus.in/blogs/2013/04/26/us_seeks_military_presence_in_maldives_24183.html), accessed on 21 April 2013, and Abdullah Jameel, 'No Proposal for US Military Base in Maldives, Insists Minister', *Haveeru Online*, 25 April 2013, available at <http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/48670>, accessed on 1 May 2013.
46. See Andrei Akulov, 'Sequester: What Does It Mean for US Military Might?', Strategic Culture Foundation, Online Journal, available at <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/03/06/sequester-what-does-it-mean-for-us-military-might.html>, accessed on 22 April 2013.
47. See 'The Impact of Sequestration (Part II)', posted on 27 September 2013, US CNO blog, available at <http://cno.navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/09/27/the-impact-of-sequestration-part-ii/>, accessed on 1 October 2013.

