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in Jammu and Kashmir**

Arpita Anant



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New Delhi**

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Cover: The Yannar Bridge at Anantnag, J&K. Photograph courtesy the author.

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Arpita Anant

Introduction

The Indian experience of counterinsurgency has received scant attention from the scholarly community which led Sumit Ganguly and David.P. Fidler to put together a volume entitled *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*.¹ From the writings on the Indian counterinsurgency practice in this volume, it is clear that precedence is accorded to the political dimension of resolving the conflict, with the military operations complementing the larger objective. Yet there are serious criticisms of the manner in which the political and operational issues related to counterinsurgency have been handled. One such criticism targets the law and order approach of the political leadership which used “harsh, cruel and degrading tactics” in the initial years to counter the insurgency.² Rajesh Rajagopalan, in a significant work criticises the Indian Army’s counterinsurgency practice as suffering from a conventional war bias, that stems from its structure and organisational culture, which for a long time prevented any doctrinal innovation in its counterinsurgency operations.³

While such critiques of the Indian counterinsurgency practice since independence are invaluable in enhancing our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of counterinsurgency, they ignore a fundamental principle that was adopted at the height of counterinsurgency operations. This was the principle of minimal use of force and the recognition of people as the centre of gravity in any

¹ Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, “Introduction” in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (Eds.), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, London: Routledge, 2009, pp.1-5, p. 2.

² Sumit Ganguly, “Slow Learning: Lessons from India’s Counterinsurgency Operations in Kashmir”, in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (2009), pp. 79-88.

³ Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*, London: Routledge, 2008. He argues that special forces for counterinsurgency such as the Assam Rifles and *Rashtriya* Rifles are operational innovations rather than doctrinal innovations.

counterinsurgency operation. This oversight perhaps stems from the fact that many of these studies were based on the early years of the counterinsurgency operations of the Army, and also focussed on actual conduct of counterinsurgency operations. However, it is important to note that the principle of minimal use of force and the recognition of people as the centre of gravity resulted in the Indian Army undertaking welfare activities amidst the alienated populations. Some former Army officers, like V.G. Patankar, have indeed dwelt on this aspect in delineating the features of India's counterinsurgency practice.⁴ In Jammu and Kashmir, this informal practice was soon formalised as *Op Sadhbhavana* (literally meaning goodwill) in 1998. Since then, the Indian Army has been engaged in several goodwill activities, aimed at winning the hearts and minds (WHAM) of the people in the various areas of its deployment. Large posters with the message "*Jawan aur Awam, Aman Hai Muqaam*" meaning "the soldier and the people, peace is the destination" (translation mine) are a common sight as one travels through the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

There are two noteworthy studies on the Indian Army's *Op Sadhbhavana*. The first by K.A. Muthanna, is a useful survey of the various phases of counter-terrorist operations in the valley from 1989-2007. In his paper, *Sadbhbhavana* projects are discussed briefly in the context of changing forms of counterinsurgency. The author contends that it was only in 2006-07 that there was a visible change in the attitude of the people towards the security forces, and this was also reflected in the people's support for *Sadbhbhavana* projects.⁵ The second paper is by Rahul K. Bhonsle, in which he delineates a strategy for implementation of 'WHAM' campaigns in 'counter-militancy operations'.⁶ This study, limited to the Kashmir Valley, is largely

⁴ V.G. Patankar, "Insurgency, Proxy War, and Terrorism in Kashmir", in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (2009), pp. 65-78.

⁵ Brig. K.A. Muthanna, "Counter Terrorism Operations in Kashmir Valley: Contest for Hearts and Minds of the People", *USI Journal*, April-June 200, pp. 213-224. Interestingly, in this paper, the expanded form of WHAM is Welfare Humanitarian Aid Measures.

⁶ Rahul K. Bhonsale, "Winning Hearts and Minds: Lessons from Jammu and Kashmir", *Manekshaw Paper No. 14*, New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2009.

based on the author’s experience and draws on Western scholarly literature to suggest the manner in which such campaigns ought to be conducted.

The present work however is an empirical analysis of *Op Sadhbhavana*, based on a visit to the various *Sadhbhavana* projects. It seeks to evaluate these activities based on discussions with people who have directly benefited from these activities. It also presents a critical analysis based on interaction with government officials, educationists other important stakeholders in Kashmir’s transition to peace. It makes some suggestions for improving the manner in which the projects are implemented so that they are perceived better and have a better impact.

In doing so, the paper also addresses the debate on transformation of conflicts. Ever increasing instances of internal conflicts in the world have necessitated the involvement of scholars and policy makers in peace research and conflict resolution. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations too has responded to these crises by complementing its ‘peacekeeping’ activities with ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peace-building’ initiatives. Together, they aim at the transformation of conflict and bringing peace to strife-torn societies. Conflict transformation “...implies a deep transformation in the institutions and discourse that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationship.”⁷ According to Johan Galtung, the pioneer of peace research: “Transformation requires transcendence, going beyond the goals of parties, (creating a new reality like the EU) so that the parties can live and develop together.”⁸

In the literature on conflict transformation, the involvement of local and international, military as well as civil actors, at various levels in

⁷ Oliver Ransbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Second Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 29.

⁸ Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, London: Routledge, 2007, p.14.

these processes of transformation of conflict has received considerable attention.⁹ They have been seen as playing a positive role as enablers as well as a negative role as spoilers.¹⁰ Very often, the role of outsiders or third parties in bringing about peace has been celebrated. More recently, the importance of involving local actors has been recognised.¹¹ In much of this literature, the role of the militaries/armed forces of the state has been severely criticised.¹² Based on a study of the Army's *Sadhbhavana* in Jammu and Kashmir, this paper seeks to moderate the negative impression of the role of most militaries in the processes of transformation of conflict, including the characterisation of the Indian military as a 'spoiler' (though not deliberately so) in the process of peace-building in Kashmir.¹³ It concludes that these initiatives of the Indian Army have had a limited but certain impact on the transformation of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.

The paper is based on field visit undertaken in March-April 2010 to study and analyses the activities of the Indian Army in the area of responsibility of the Northern Command in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, especially the 15 Corps (Kashmir Valley) and the 16 Corps (Jammu). The study is limited to these areas and excludes the area under 14 Corps (Ladakh) because unlike in Ladakh, *Sadhbhavana* in the other two regions was a part of the Army's counterinsurgency operations. In each region, select places in three districts were visited

⁹ T. David Mason and James D. Meemik, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, London: Routledge, 2006.

¹⁰ Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (Eds.), *Challenges to Peace building: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006, p.4.

¹¹ Oliver Ransbotham (et.al), Note 7, pp.23-29.

¹² Carolyn Nordstrom, "Contested Identities/Essentially Contested Powers", in Kumar Rupesinghe (Ed.), *Conflict Transformation*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005, pp.93-113.

¹³ Jaideep Saikia "Spoilers and Devious Objectives in Kashmir", in Edward Newman and Oliver, Richmond (Eds.), Note 10, pp. 301-319, argues that the intelligence organisations, the Indian Army and the bureaucracy on the Indian side and the Pakistan Army, intelligence agencies and *jihadis* on the Pakistani side are all 'spoilers'.

to get an overview of the *Sadhbhavana* projects executed. The districts selected in the Jammu region were Rajouri, Poonch and Reasi. The districts selected in the valley were Anantnag, Baramulla and Kupwara. *Muskaan*, an orphanage in Srinagar was also part of the study since it is a unique attempt to rehabilitate children from families that have been victims of militancy from all over the Valley.

The visit to *Sadhbhavana* projects in these sensitive areas was facilitated by the Northern Command of the Indian Army. In the course of the field study, interactions were held with officials of the Indian Army as also with those benefiting from various projects. In most places, an attempt was made to talk to them without any Army officials in the vicinity. Interviews were also conducted with officials of the state administration, except in Anantnag and Reasi where the concerned officials were not available. Views of two officials of the state administration in places that were not selected for the case study, namely Udhampur and Srinagar, were also taken to corroborate the views of those in the select districts. Only in these two interviews, were Army officials present. Finally, the views of academics, journalists and civil society activists in the places selected were also solicited.

Counterinsurgency and the Evolution of *Op Sadhbhavana*

In a recent analysis of India's counterinsurgency practice, Rajesh Rajagopalan identifies the features that have characterised it over the years: limited use of military force, isolation of guerrillas, dominating the area of operations, deployment of large teams in operations and 'restoring normalcy' to enable political resolution of the insurgency.¹⁴ The source of these practices has been traced by several scholars and analysts to Nehru's abhorrence of force and to the British counterinsurgency experiences in Malaya.¹⁵ Central to the British counterinsurgency practice exemplified in the working of General Gerard Templar were military-civil actions and cooperation.¹⁶

The Indian Army's counterinsurgency practice in Jammu and Kashmir evolved overtime to include tactics such as: development of road-opening parties, use of a counterinsurgency grid system, covert apprehension technique, use of *ikhwans* or captured militants in counterinsurgency and creation of a special counterinsurgency force,

¹⁴ Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency", http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_rajesh_rajagopalan.htm, accessed on 06 December 2010. For the phase-wise evolution of India's counterinsurgency practice see Rajesh Rajagopalan Note 3.

¹⁵ See Harinder Singh, India's Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities, *RSIS Working Paper*, October 2010; Dipankar Banerjee, "The Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine", in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, Note 1, pp. 190-206; Rajesh Rajagopalan, Note 3.

¹⁶ For the exposition on the British counterinsurgency practice see John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. On the importance of the political dimension of counterinsurgency and civil-military cooperation see David Kilcullen, *the accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one*, p. 265. For the 8 steps to be followed in counterinsurgency operations, and the primacy of activities aimed at the people at each stage see David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006 Edition, p. 75-94.

the *Rashtriya Rifles*.¹⁷ The culmination of several years of experience was visible in the Indian Army Doctrine (2004) and the Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (2006). The doctrine clarifies the limits and characteristics of the use of force in non-conventional operations, establishes a relationship between military and civil authority (the Ministry of Home Affairs), and seeks to guide military priorities in resource allocation, equipment acquisitions and training activities.¹⁸

Operation *Sadhbhavana*, which was put in place several years before the counterinsurgency doctrine was formalised, appears to have been a logical culmination of several discrete but significant developments in the evolution of the Indian Army’s counterinsurgency practice. First among these was the Army’s experience in the Northeast and the implementation of people-centric programmes under *Op Samaritan*. Some Army officers therefore came to the valley having internalised the idea that counterinsurgency is primarily a political endeavour and that the role of the military ought to be secondary and supportive.¹⁹ They were convinced about the importance of minimal use of force and of winning hearts and minds while conducting counterinsurgency operations. Secondly, around the same time, the budget of the Indian Army was increased which enabled the allocation of funds for such activities. Finally, it was felt that that the Army ought to be responsive to the concerns of human rights groups which had been severely critical of the harsh cordon and search operations undertaken by the Army in the early years of counterinsurgency. Thus, according to Harinder Singh, *Op Sadhbhavana* is not only indicative of organisational innovation, but also of operational learning over time. The *Rashtriya Rifles*, being

¹⁷ Sumit Ganguly, Note 2, pp. 83-86. For a more detailed story of the origin and growth of the *Rashtriya Rifles* see James Piazza, “Economic Development, Poorly Managed Political Conflict and Terrorism in India”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, 2009, pp. 406-419.

¹⁸ See Dipankar Banerjee, Note 15, for the reasons for the lack of a counterinsurgency doctrine, guidelines that guided counterinsurgency in the absence of a doctrine and the immediate impetus for the formalization of the doctrine in 2006.

¹⁹ V.G. Patankar, Note 4.

resident units, also realised the importance of the innovation and therefore learnt how to blend *Sadbhavana* with counter insurgent operations.²⁰ This strategy, which was termed by former Chief of Army Staff General J.J. Singh as the strategy of the “iron fist in a velvet glove” in 2005, had actually been implemented in Jammu and Kashmir since 1997.²¹ It had been part of the training imparted to soldiers in the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare Schools at Khrew (Kashmir), Sarol and Baderwah (Jammu).

In the initial years, three activities were believed to be critical for winning hearts and minds; conducting elections, reviving the tourism industry which had suffered immensely due to the insurgency and countering the negative propaganda. Thus, while the Army aided the civil authority in the first two endeavours, it took the lead in the third task. This was done by sending Kashmiri children to visit some parts of India (*Op Sangam*) bringing children from other parts of India to the valley (*Op Maitree*), and rebuilding schools that had been destroyed by insurgents/terrorists (*Op Ujala*).²² Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V.G. Patankar, who was responsible for initiating these programmes and framing the rules of conduct to be followed by Army officials in their interaction with the people, explained that two other activities were also started around the same time- first, people including children were taken to New Delhi to witness the Republic Day celebrations which showcased India’s diversity in all its grandeur. Also, a programme called *Siraj-un-Nisa* was initiated to provide elementary computer and typing skills to women and teach them mother and child care.²³ The initial idea of setting up schools with the help of the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) however, did not materialise because of the uncertain security situation. Other initiatives such as

²⁰ Interview with Col. Harinder Singh, Research Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi, 01 December 2010.

²¹ Interview with Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V.G. Patankar, New Delhi, 08 October 2010.

²² V.G. Patankar, Note 4, p. 74.

²³ V.G. Patankar, Note 21.

formation of self-help groups, involving villagers in the implementation of projects, using funds of the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) for development projects were also undertaken.

The earliest evidence of such thinking in Jammu and Kashmir is the report of a study group set up by the Northern Command that was published in 1984.²⁴ The report discusses in detail: the role of the individual soldier, the unit, the formation and of the Army as a whole in the state. It is therefore not surprising that for many Army officials, *Sadhbhavana* is just the institutionalisation of the welfare activities that the Army was already engaged in, though with very limited funds. So when it was formalised, it was not difficult for them to adapt to their new roles.²⁵ However, the formalisation of the process has added to the responsibilities of the Army officials. Since there is no specific recruitment for *Sadhbhavana*, soldiers and officers get involved in the nitty-gritty of administration and governance. Getting clearances for projects, acquisition of land, inviting tenders, ensuring quality in the infrastructure projects are now a part of the Army officials mandate in the Northern Command. Seniors officers of the Army are however clear in their mind that *Op Sadhbhavana* is not about logistics, nor is it about welfare, rather it is an important dimension of the operations of the Indian Army.²⁶

²⁴ Study Group, Headquarters Northern Command, *Soldier's Role in Jammu and Kashmir*, 1984.

²⁵ Interview with Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal, Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, 07 December 2009.

²⁶ Interview with Maj. Gen. S. A. Hasnain, Director, College of Combat, MHOW (Uttar Pradesh), New Delhi, 10 December 2009. Similar views were expressed by several senior officers interviewed in the course of the field visit.

Op Sadhbhavana: Concept and Execution

Op Sadhbhavana the Indian Army's military-civic action (MCA) was launched in 1998. The doctrine of sub-conventional warfare released in December 2006 also gives a central place to WHAM through civic action.²⁷ The initiative was conceptualised as part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy, with the added expected benefit of the collection of discrete intelligence. It was aimed at achieving two goals:

1. To wrest the initiative from the terrorists
2. To reintegrate the population to the national mainstream.²⁸

This was envisaged to be accomplished by restoring the infrastructure that was destroyed during the insurgency and by human resource development in Jammu and Kashmir, thus presenting a humane face of the Army to the local population. At the core of these actions is the belief that "human security is the key element of national security, which can only be ensured through human and infrastructure development."²⁹ The general principles guiding *Op Sadhbhavana* are:

- Projects must have a high impact, so they must be based on popular demand

²⁷ ARTRAC, *Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations*, 2006, pp. 44-47.

²⁸ HQ Northern Command, *Op Sadhbhavana*: Brochure 2008-09, read during the field trip.

²⁹ Additional Directorate General of Public Information (ADGPI), Draft Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Projects being Undertaken under Operation *Sadbhavana* in Jammu and Kashmir and Northeastern States, 2008, paragraph 1, read during field visit in March 2010.

- Planning must be centralised, but its execution must be decentralised
- Projects must be initiated mainly at the village level
- Projects must be aimed at self empowerment of people
- Projects must be sustainable
- There must be an integration of civic activities with state administration and community development plans
- Such initiatives must respect local religion, culture and traditions.³⁰

The focus of *Op Sadhbhavana* is on:

- Quality education
- Women’s empowerment
- Health care
- Community development
- Infrastructure improvement.³¹

Funding for the projects comes from the Ministry of Defence. The request for funds is made by the Northern Command in accordance with the demands received from the corps by October every year. After proper verification, the demand is projected to the Ministry by December 31. Funds are then sanctioned as part of the defence budget.

³⁰ Ibid. The final point is drawn from HQ 15 Corps, Briefing on *Op Sadhbhavana*, given to the author during the field visit in March 2010.

³¹ HQ Northern Command, Note 28. As stated in the SOP, the scope of *Sadhbhavana* has expanded as the demand from people has increased.

Table 1: Allocation of Funds for *Sadhbhavana* Projects

Sr	Projects	Allotment/Expenditure of Funds in each FY				
		98 - 05	05 - 06	06 - 07	07 - 08	Total
1	Amt Allotted (in Crores)	92.4	53.92	51.02	78.74	276.08
		Expenditure in lacs				
2	Construction of Schools	56	04	–	02	62
3	Assistance to Govt Schools	363	171	478	547	1559
4	Primary Health Centres	45	04	148	88	285
5	Artificial Limbs Provided	136	32	02	03	173
6	Community Development Centres	286	38	59	309	692
7	Vocational Training Centres	170	25	60	29	284
8	Construction of Roads	54	06	–	19	79
9	Construction of Bridges	37	11	16	08	72
10	Electrification of Villages	145	129	55	130	459
11	Water Supply Schemes	502	138	85	106	831
12	Micro Hydel Projects	151	197	606	46	1000

Source: HQ Northern Command, *Op Sadhbhavana*: Brochure 2008-09.

The financial powers for the use of these funds is as follows:

Table 2: Financial Powers for Implementation of Projects

CFA	Financial Powers (in lacs)	
	Without IFA Concurrence	With IFA Concurrence
Bde Cdr	1	5
GOC Div	1	10
GOC Corps	2	40
GOC in C	4	100

CFA: Competent Financial Authority (Army Officer)

IFA: Integrated Financial Advisor (Defence Accounts)

As indicated in the table, the commanding officer at each level, who is the ‘competent financial authority’, is authorised to sanction projects without/with concurrence of the ‘Integrated Financial Advisor’, who is an officer of the Indian Defence Accounts Service (IDAS). The Principal Controller of Defence Accounts (PCDA), Jammu (also an IDAS officer) is the final book-keeper of the *Sadhbhavana* finances.

There is also a sequence of actions specified for projects to be executed. The first step is the identification and selection of project at the grass root level, which is based on the demand of the people or the felt need of the people. The second step is the procurement of the ‘no objection certificate’ from the civil administration along with land for the same from the revenue department. Then a project report with a statement of cost and draft tender document is sent to the IFA for concurrence. Tenders are invited through an open tender system and evaluated by a tender purchase committee comprising of the chairman, CFA and IFA. Once the tender is passed, final IFA concurrence is sought. Then the CFA’s sanction is obtained and the supply order is placed. The completion report is checked by the Board of Officers (BOO). The project is then handed over to the civil administration. The project is completed and payment to the contractors is made latest by March 31. Following this documents are submitted for a post implementation audit.

Although *Op Sadhbhavana* was officially launched in all of Northern Command, it was introduced in Ladakh, the 14 Corps’ area of responsibility in 2002. The credit for this goes to the Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Arjun Ray, who promoted *Sadhbhavana* in the region in the aftermath of the Kargil War, to make the people in these border areas feel that they were part of the national mainstream. Thus, *Sadhbhavana* in Ladakh was envisaged as a “socio-political strategy, piggy-backing the administration for development and governance.”³² At his personal initiative *Sadhbhavana* was taken

³² Views given by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Arjun Ray, PVSM, VSM, in reply to queries by the author, 16 July 2010 and in other subsequent conversations.

beyond the military-civic action framework and funding for several projects was secured from the private sector.³³ The civil administration here was opposed to the Army's involvement in issues of governance, which they perceived to be the sole responsibility of the government. However, this was not the case in the other two regions of the state. This is because the challenges in the 15 and 16 Corps areas of responsibility were different. In these areas the task was to win the hearts and minds of alienated populations while conducting counterinsurgency operations. In these areas, *Sadhbhavana* continued to be implemented as envisaged.

The passion with which the Army implements *Sadhbhavana* is reflected in the writings of many young officers in *Prativedrohi* (counterinsurgent), the journal of the Army's Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairangte, Mizoram. They take pride in the medical aid being given to people in remote areas who have no access to even basic healthcare.³⁴ A similar sense of pride is taken in the active participation of women in several initiatives, including educational tours to other parts of the country.³⁵ They take an interest in the form such projects should take and the care and caution with which soldiers need to implement such projects.³⁶ They even suggest ways of improving the implementation of these projects by greater interaction with officials in the civil administration and helping the civil administration to cater to the daily needs of the people.³⁷

³³ Ibid. The Siachen Hospital which was built with the help of a donation of Rs. 2 crore given by the Pudhari Group of Newspaper based in Kolhapur, Maharashtra.

³⁴ Col. Anil Shorey, "Building Bridges with Blood in J & K", *Prativedrohi*, Vol. 1, March 2004, p. 27.

³⁵ Capt. Biju E.K., "Attitude of Kashmiri Women: A Welcome Change", *Prativedrohi*, Vol. 1, March 2004, pp. 56-57.

³⁶ Maj. Bhawesh Malhotra, *Prativedrohi*, Vol. 1, March 2004, pp. 54-55.

³⁷ Col. Rajesh Joshy, "Civic Action-How we Overdo", *Prativedrohi*, Vol.II, September 2006, pp. 46-48; Maj. C.H. Rao, "Indian Army: Harbingers of Peace and Stability in J & K", *Prativedrohi*, Vol.II, September 2006, pp. 67-71.

And yet, there were also the sceptics, who felt that the downside of being a people-friendly Army is that people no longer respect the Army. Many also felt that they are being perceived by people as corrupt government officials looking to make money by awarding contracts. Younger officers were also candid in admitting that a considerable amount of their time and energy is spent in implementing *Sadbbhavana* projects, in addition to regular duties.

Analysis of Op *Sadhbhavana* Projects

Sadhbhavana projects have mainly been implemented in the remote areas of Jammu and the Valley. The reason for this is their proximity to the Line of Control which makes them vulnerable to infiltration and influences from across the border. So the Army felt the need to provide basic amenities to the people in these remote areas to improve their living conditions and winning their hearts and minds. While there are some projects, especially student hostels, computer training centres, women empowerment centres in bigger towns also, their beneficiaries are mainly young people from remote areas.

Ten kinds of projects visited during field trip are listed below. (See Annexure I for details)

Table 3: Projects Visited

S.No.	Project	Number
1	Schools	11
2	Orphanages/Hostels	04
3	Women Empowerment Centres	04
4	Computer Training Centres	02
5	Community Development Centres	01
6	Model Villages	03
7	Educational Tour	01
8	Water Supply Project	01
9	Projects for Gujjar/Bakkerwal Community	02
10	Health Care Facilities	02

Based on interviews and discussions with those benefiting from the projects, the civil administration and some educationists and prominent journalists, this section analyses the various *Sadhbhavana* projects in Jammu and Kashmir.

Schools

The initiative of setting up Army Goodwill Schools (AGS) in remote areas has been greatly welcomed by people living in these areas since schools in these areas were either non-existent, not functioning properly, or destroyed by militants. It was widely held that the schools set up by the Army provide uninterrupted and quality education. In most places, the Army arranges buses for the children and teachers to be picked up from nearby villages and brought to school. The syllabus in these schools is the same as prescribed by the Board of Secondary Education (BOSE) so as to facilitate easy transition of students from these schools to other institutions of higher learning in the state.

While in the initial years, schools were set up in remote areas, two recent initiatives have been the setting up of Army Goodwill Public Schools in Rajouri (Jammu) and Pahalgam (Kashmir Valley). In these residential schools, the syllabus followed is that of the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE). These schools prepare students for all-India entrance examinations and higher education. Interaction with students in these and many other schools revealed that an attempt is made to bring students from the remote corners of the state that were affected by militancy. Admission to the Army Goodwill Public School is much sought after due to the quality of education it offers and the state-of-the-art facilities. Of the 22 students who passed out in the first batch of class XII, 10 secured admissions at the Baba Ghulam Shah University at Rajouri for engineering, two cleared the medical entrance examination of Punjab University and one is studying commerce in Jammu. Students are given career counselling and some even get motivated to join the Indian Army.³⁸ A nominal fee is charged from the students, and the rest is borne by the Army.

The popularity of the schools and the faith reposed by students and parents alike in them were also apparent. For instance, students at

³⁸ Interview with Kamal Zamani, Principal, AGPS, Rajouri, 24 March 2010.

the Pinewood School at Hamirpur said that they wanted hostel facilities so that they would not have to travel long distances. They also hoped that they would get the opportunity to study science subjects in class XI-XII, to learn computers and have a football ground to play.³⁹ According to the teachers at Baba Garibdas Academy, Jhallas, the parents of students studying there were requesting that the primary school be upgraded to a secondary school up to class VIII.⁴⁰ It was also interesting to learn that in many of these schools, most of the teachers are women. One of the teachers at the AGS Potha in Surankote reminisced about a time when there were only a handful of teachers at the school; the number has now increased to 26. Only five of the teachers are men, the rest are women. The administration of this school was handed over to the state authorities, but due to the pressure exerted by the people, the Army was forced to oversee its administration. Principal Nazir Qureshi, who retired from the state education department, explained that this was because there was financial transparency when the Army is involved and there is a culture of discipline which the state schools lack.⁴¹ He and others teaching in schools were of the opinion that the method of teaching in Army-run schools is much better since children are trained to think analytically.

Providing better infrastructure to existing state schools has also been of tremendous help. Nazir Hussain, the principal of the Government Higher Secondary School in Manjakote, has been able to provide basic education in computers at his school with the help of the Army. Even till date, computer training is given by Army officials. In addition, he approaches the Army for other upgradations such as tiling of the floor of the computer centre and the renovation of the old block of the school. Substantiating this, the Divisional Commissioner of Srinagar, Naseem Lanker, appreciated the fact that the Army was helping to improve the infrastructure in schools by

³⁹ Interaction with students and teachers of Pinewood School, Hamirpur, 25 March 2010.

⁴⁰ Interaction with teachers at Baba Garibdas Academy, Jhallas, 27 March 2010.

⁴¹ Interaction with Principal and Teachers of AGS Potha, Surankote, 25 March 2010.

building additional rooms, toilet blocks and providing computers, much before funds from the centrally sponsored scheme of Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) were made available for them.⁴²

Pervez Majeed of the *Sahara Times* affirmed that even in the Valley, where people have seen a very brutal face of the Indian Army and suffered casualties during militancy, people have come to appreciate the *Sadhbhavana* initiatives of the Army. In fact, even people who have suffered due to actions of the Army have sent their children to Army Goodwill Schools.⁴³

A common problem in most schools was the lack of qualified teachers in remote areas to teach in these schools. Another issue highlighted was that in the schools run by the Army, especially the public schools, considerable emphasis was being given to extra-curricular activities and this was affecting the studies of the students. Another critical perception was that in public schools, several students given admissions were from affluent backgrounds, whereas the emphasis should be on educating those below the poverty line and or from militancy affected families.

Hostels and Orphanages

The Army not only has hostels attached to its own public schools, it also aids the renovation and upkeep of state-run hostels for boys (Balashrams) and girls (Nari Niketan) from needy families. Such help has been greatly appreciated by the supervisors of these hostels. In fact, the supervisor of the Nari Niketan in Mendhar very proudly showed pictures of the Army officials participating in the wedding of one of the orphaned girls.⁴⁴ In other places like Manjakote, the boys' hostel was constructed and, as per requirement, handed over to the state authorities. Its maintenance since then though leaves much to be desired. The Army, however, continues to provide the students

⁴² Interview with Naseem Lanker, Divisional Commissioner, Srinagar, 29 March 2010.

⁴³ Interview with Pervez Majeed Lone, Sahara Times, 31 March 2010.

⁴⁴ Interaction with Caretaker and girls of Nari Niketan, Mendhar, 27 March 2010.

with notebooks, stationery and sometimes even uniforms. Also, no provision was made to store water in overhead tanks of the bathrooms outside the hostel since the hostel was located along a small rivulet and students were expected to use water from there. However, since the rivulet has dried up, students go without water and this problem has neither been addressed by the state authorities or the Army.

In the case of Ankur another hostel, in Reasi, the lack of maintenance by the state authorities had forced the closure of the hostel prior to the author's field visit. In contrast, the Army's own orphanage in Srinagar was maintained very well, and it was also supporting the education of the children staying in the orphanage by sending them to various schools in the city.

Women Empowerment Centres

Vocational training centres set up to train women in local crafts and market their products especially in remote areas is a project that seems to have had limited benefit for a variety of reasons. While it does help engage local women in remote areas in some productive activity, sustaining these centres is difficult since many of these initiatives are in very remote areas and the numbers of those seeking training dwindle over a period of time. Moreover, the marketing of these products has not been a success as the quality of products does not meet the requirements of the markets. The Usha Fashion Design School in Baramulla however was able to get sufficient women for the courses offered. Some among them went on to open their own boutiques, but the actual benefit of this programme was hard to gauge.

Computer Training Centres

Computer training centres in remote places have been appreciated greatly as school going children, especially girls, have been encouraged to learn computers. However, those in more urban locations seem to be providing computer training similar to other computer training centres set up by the local residents. The enthusiasm to set up computer centres sometimes even resulted in ill-conceived projects. Thus, a computer centre set up in village Khoas in Rajouri district

several years ago could not be made functional as the first road connecting the village to the road network was built only in 2009.

Community Development Centres (CDC)

These centres are envisaged as places where people in villages can congregate for social activities. In several places, the centres are part of a larger model village complex. While such places are required in remote places where people do not have a community hall, in the experience of some administrators, these centres were not of much use in other places. Citing the example of the Community Development Centre (CDC) in Shopian, Naseem Lanker narrated how it had to be finally converted into a Vocational Training Centre.⁴⁵

Model Villages

The Army has also supported model villages where schools, computer training centres, a basic medical facilities and a gymnasium are all contained in one complex in the vicinity of a few villages. In most places, the gymnasiums were not being put to use. In some places, existing schools around which the model villages had been developed were being run with basic infrastructure, while the gymnasiums were equipped with state of the art equipment. Also, the medical sub-centres were not functional since they had not been sanctioned by the state and no doctor was posted to these places.

Educational Tours

Interaction with those who had returned from educational tours to Mumbai and Pune revealed that the people were most impressed by the fact that there were Hindus praying at Haji Ali and Muslims praying at the *Siddhivinayak* temple in Mumbai. Young boys and elders both said that after seeing this they believed there was a need to change their way of thinking if they wanted a better future. They also mentioned the many other ways in which the Army has helped

⁴⁵ Naseem Lanker, Note 42.

their villages such as: electrification, improving infrastructure in existing schools, providing generators, computer centres, water tanks, school bags along with books and stationary for children of the four local schools etc.⁴⁶ Thus for Shafiq Mir, the only real success story of *Op Sadhbhavana* are the educational tours. These tours are well received and they have had a real impact in terms transforming the people's idea of India.⁴⁷ Most other initiatives, he felt only complemented state initiatives in remote areas and were not path-breaking.

Water Supply/Hydel Projects

Water supply projects such as tubewells daily use are greatly appreciated. This is especially so since the projects are completed in a time bound manner as compared to projects that are undertaken by the state authorities. However, several micro-hydel projects (MHPs) in remote districts did not work well as the source of water was not permanent and the village committees to which these projects were handed over did not have the technical expertise to run them.⁴⁸ Similarly, in Kupwara district, nearly 300 micro-hydel projects were dysfunctional. Also, in many places where micro-hydel projects were proposed, the state administration wanted that existing arrangements for generating power for individual use be replaced by the micro-hydel projects. Eventually, when these projects did not run properly, it disappointed many people.⁴⁹

Projects for Gujjar and Bakkerwal Communities

The nomadic Gujjar and Bakkerwal communities of the state have a pattern of seasonal migration that affects the education of their

⁴⁶ Interaction with Educational Tour participants, Mendhar, 27 March 2010.

⁴⁷ Shafiq Mir, Rajouri and Poonch correspondent for Greater Kashmir, in a telephonic conversation on 24 March 2010.

⁴⁸ Interview with Jaipal Singh, Deputy Commissioner, Rajouri, 24 March 2010.

⁴⁹ Naseem Lanker, Note 42.

children. In some places at their regular camping sites, the Army provides education by hiring local youth. Special hostels have been established for children of these communities and these have been provided with all modern amenities. However, there few students in these hostels perhaps due to the migratory character of the communities.

The need for *Sadhbhavana* initiatives among the communities was underscored by M.H. Shah of the Degree College at Poonch. He contended that in the districts of Rajouri and Poonch, several people had experienced the cordon and search operations of the Army in the years of militancy. There was thus a definite need for a healing touch. However, according to Shah, there was perhaps no need to ‘win hearts and minds’ in these regions since the Gujjar-Bakkerwal and Pahari communities in these districts were always pro-India. He cited the numerous agitations by these communities for scheduled tribe status that would guarantee them certain privileges under the Indian Constitution, to prove their point.⁵⁰

Health Care Facilities

The medical camps organised by the Army have been appreciated greatly. They are very well attended since in the remote areas, good medical facilities are not available. Another novel initiative of the Army was to support the Pritam Singh Foundation, a private health care provider in Poonch, who has been providing artificial limbs to victims of explosions during the years of militancy in the state.

However, the setting up of health care centres in some places, has been problematic. One of the reasons for this is because the ‘no objection certificate’ for a project was given by officials who were not aware of whether it had been sanctioned by the state or not. So for example, in village Seikhlu in the Poonch district, even when the health centre was handed over to the administration, they could not

⁵⁰ Interview with Prof. M.H. Shah, Degree College, Poonch, 26 March 2010.

provide for doctors, nurses and other staff for the health centre.⁵¹ In other places, like Garipindi and Khadi, the landowners who had provided land for the health centres insisted that their relatives be employed in them and the state could not provide trained people to run the health centre. For instance, a health centre in Sazipore, Langate was fully equipped and yet it had been locked-up since the previous year as there is no state sanction for a health centre there. In Baramulla, a medical sub-centre set up by the Army was equipped with medical facilities that even a Primary Health Centre does not get.⁵²

⁵¹ Interview with Kuldeep Raj Khajuria, Deputy Commissioner, Poonch, 26 March 2010. This was supported by the Dr. Niaz Ahmad, Chief Medical Officer of Poonch in the course of a telephonic conversation.

⁵² Interview with Showkat Ahmed Mir, Deputy Commissioner, Kupwara, 01 April 2010. The Chief Medical Officer Dr. Shafi also interacted with the author.

Op Sadhbhavana: A Critical Evaluation

Sadhbhavana involves interaction between the Army and the people on the one hand and the Army and the civil administration on the other. On both these counts, there is much scope for improvement in the manner in which the projects are implemented.

There is, for instance, scope for better assessment of needs of the people. Thus, in the Mangnar village in Poonch district, where in March 2010 a community hall was being built the people had other more pressing needs such as: a water tank, notebooks for students in schools, school bus for children studying in the Poonch town, an ambulance, a vocational training centre for women and a mobile tower. The reason for this was that the local administration had not paid heed to their demands for several years, and they felt these demands would be met in a time bound manner by the Army.⁵³ Several of these needs appeared more fundamental than the building of a community hall.

In addition, there is also the need for being responsive to the needs of people whose land has been acquired for large projects such as the AGPS Pahalgam, and for making such projects mutually beneficial. Thus, the village headman and people of the Gujjar locality near the school said that they would benefit from getting solar lights and cookers, and water tanks as part of *Sadhbhavana*. They also suggested that the community could provide groceries and milk to the residential school, and this could be a good source of income for them.⁵⁴ Another way to increase the interface between the Army and the people would be to employ qualified graduates, who have limited employment opportunities in the state. More engagement with civil society groups that are engaged in welfare or developmental activities is also desirable.

⁵³ Interaction with villagers in Mangnar, 26 March 2010.

⁵⁴ Interaction with the headman and some other people of village Lidru, 30 March 2010.

Thirdly, while the *Sadbbhavana* in the initial years was perhaps rightly geared towards the school going children and women, some engagement with the youth who have been directly or indirectly affected by the conflict since 1989 is imperative. Thus, according to M.A. Wani, principal of the Government Degree College of Kupwara, young people in the age group of 18-21 years who form nearly 60 per cent of the population of the Valley, have bad memories of the years of insurgency. It would therefore be useful to have some projects that could involve them, either as stakeholders in creating some assets, or as beneficiaries.⁵⁵

There is also a greater need for coordination with the state administration. In the initial years, the officials in the state administration appreciated the role of the Army in setting up schools, making walking tracks/roads, building small bridges and providing medical care in areas where the state government could not reach during the insurgency years. There was also the belief that if the Army got a good name, it would help in fighting militancy.⁵⁶ As a result in the case of some projects, such as four bridges in Anantnag district which were required to be completed in short time, cooperation between civil and military authorities was successful. In these years, the state administration supported the Army's initiatives by providing no-objection certificates and land for projects.⁵⁷ However, since the decline in the levels of militancy other development projects have been initiated, which require much better coordination between the Army authorities and the state administration. For instance, the Army contributed significantly in making roads to provide connectivity to villages. However, with the many other sources of funding for roads from the central schemes like the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna (PMGSY), National Bank

⁵⁵ Interview with Prof. M.A. Wani, Principal Government Degree College, Kupwara, 01 April 2010.

⁵⁶ Interview with Dr. S.S. Bloeria, former Chief Secretary, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu, 28 March 2010.

⁵⁷ Interview with Baseer Ahmad Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Udhampur, 23 March 2010.

for Rural Development (NABARD), Border Roads Organisation (BRO), Central Road Fund (CRF) in addition to district funds, it may be best for the Army to withdraw from this activity, unless specifically requested by the administration.⁵⁸ Thus for instance, in the construction of footbridges in remote areas of the Kupwara district like Machil, Keran and Tangdhar, the Army’s contribution would still be valuable; so would be the creation of sports facilities in remote places.

In this context, it is also important that the Army’s projects are dovetailed with the overall plan of development of the district. This would help in synergising all developmental initiatives.

On the other hand, it must also be taken into account that after the Army’s infrastructure projects are handed over to the state, the lack of maintenance often results in their deterioration over a period of time. One common refrain of Army officials is that there is delay in the take-over of projects by the state administration. As a result in many areas, facilities created have not been utilised. The micro-hydel projects set up by the Army were cited as the most common example. Army authorities have had to repair and re-hand over these projects to people time and again. Therefore, they were considering not funding such projects in the future. Although such issues are discussed at the civil-military liaison conferences at all levels, the problems persist.

On a more critical note, speaking on condition of anonymity, a few among those interviewed pointed out the very poor quality of construction undertaken under *Sadhbhavana*; the lack of proper sanitation in some vocational training centres and schools; the favouritism in the awarding the contracts to select contractors in the execution of the projects; the condescending attitude with which certain officials behaved with beneficiaries; the unwarranted publicity, pomp and show with which projects are inaugurated. Some people expressed sadness that human rights violations occurred along side *Sadhbhavana* initiatives. Others felt that the aim of *Sadhbhavana*, quite unlike what the term suggests, was only to get more information

⁵⁸ Jaipal Singh, Note 48.

about militant activities from the common people. They were of the view that, especially in the Valley, people would prefer a reduced Army presence.

***Op Sadhbhavana* and the transformation of the conflict**

In the initial years of *Sadbhavana* in the Valley, the over ground workers (OGWs) associated with militant groups threatened those who were associating with the Army. However, as time went by, people started seeing the Army in a different light. Such overt threats have now nearly ceased, although in some towns, they have given way to false propaganda against the Army's initiatives. The popularity of Army schools and educational tours is a case in point. In most schools, hundreds of applications for admission have to be turned down due to limitations of infrastructure. This is happening despite the fact that in many schools, teachers employed are not fully qualified to teach. This is because they teach better than their counterparts in local government schools and the mushrooming one-room private schools. Also, the schools are in great demand even though the fee charged in these schools is much higher than in government schools.

In the opinion of most Army officials, *Sadbhavana* has made some difference in the way people perceive the Army. There is a difference in the body language of the people. This is reflected in the increasing demands made by the people. More so, in most places, including the valley, they do not hesitate to send women to computer centres and vocational training centres run/set up by the Army. In fact, they are often treated as substitutes for civil administration. Some even perceive a perceptible impact in terms of a decline in the support for militancy and rise in commercial activities.

Some others were disheartened by the fact that people's participation is often not forthcoming, and that they merely receive the benefits without changing their attitude towards the Army.⁵⁹ Officials at

⁵⁹ Col. R.C. Patial, SM, "Operation *Sadbhavana*-Shining", *Prativedrohi*, Vol. 1, March 2006, pp. 23-24

different levels and in different locales said that the achievement of *Sadhbhavana*, in terms of the stated aims of wresting the initiative from the militants and reintegrating the population into the national mainstream, is between 50-75 per cent.

More importantly though, among all the people who were interviewed, there were none who were opposed to the initiatives of the Army. In fact, Farukh Mustar, a prominent educationist of Rajouri in the Jammu region, revealed that the welfare activities coupled with improved human rights record of the Army and better public relations had certainly provided a healing touch.⁶⁰ Attesting to the acceptance of the Army’s initiatives in the Kashmir Valley, Tahir Mahiyuddin, editor *Chattan*, said, “(t)he ice is clearly broken”.⁶¹

It must be borne in mind that in places like Baramulla and Sopore, which have been the bastions of the separatist sentiment, these initiatives of the Army are still not well received. Explaining the reasons for this Raja Nazar, a prominent writer and educationist of Boniyar, said: “In places like Uri, people have seen the ‘good face’ of the Army since independence. They have also been dependent on the Army for jobs. So the Army’s *Sadhbhavana* in these areas is well received. However, in places like Baramulla, the first memories of the Army are those of their harsh response during the years of insurgency, so they are difficult to erase, making the task of ‘winning hearts and minds’ difficult.”⁶²

A crucial reminder of the limitations of the Army’s initiatives was a comment by Shujaat Bukhari: while the initiative of the Army is very praiseworthy, real peace will only come to the state with the resolution of the political problem.⁶³

⁶⁰ Interaction with Farukh Mustar, Director, Himalayan Education Mission Society and his colleagues, Rajouri, 27 March 2010.

⁶¹ Interaction with Tahir Mahiyuddin, Editor, *Chattan* and a group of journalists, Srinagar, 31 March 2010.

⁶² Interview with Raja Nazar, Writer and Director, Cova Van Kashmir Knowledge Centre, Boniyar, 03 April 2010.

⁶³ Interview with Shujaat Bukhari, Bureau Chief, *The Hindu*, Srinagar, 31 March 2010.

Conclusion

Contrary to the belief of the Army being completely anti-people, and all people being anti-Army, the study revealed that in the insurgency affected areas of Jammu and the Kashmir Valley, the two are engaging each other, selectively yet positively. In fact, there was discernible comfort between the Army officials and the people; more so in the Jammu region than in the Valley. Also, in some places, people spoke highly of the Army officials they had interacted with. They fondly remembered some officers who had been posted there and who had taken genuine interest in the welfare of the local people. While these initiatives do increase the responsibilities of the Army officials, they certainly help in improving its image and the image of the Indian state. The ease with which people- school children, women, patients, young men- were interacting with the Army officials made this obvious. The fact that people, instead of seeking help from the civil administration, go to the Army with their demands proves that *Sadhbhavana* has been well received. Conversely, they also are a pointer to the need for better governance.

Based on the analysis of various projects and the critique of *Sadhbhavana* above, it is clear that there is scope for improvement in the kind of projects undertaken and their manner of implementation. In the context of on-going initiatives, generally, the focus on remote areas must continue since the benefits of peace and prosperity will take time to reach the remote areas. More specifically, the current emphasis on education and health-related projects must continue as they have a direct impact on people's lives. The educational tours to other parts of the country which are hugely popular must also continue. There is a need to rethink initiatives such as community development centres and computer centres. Coordination with appropriate civil authorities at all levels could be improved. The quality of infrastructure projects, to the limited extent undertaken, can also be improved.

The following suggestions may be considered for better impact:

- The audit system of *Sadhbhavana*, availability of funds and their allocation for select projects could be made available in the public domain
- Policies guiding various projects and their implementation must be reviewed periodically
- Priority should be given to basic needs of people, especially in places where the state government has not been able to provide them
- Where appropriate, civil society groups or local people could be involved in implementing/taking forward initiatives to enhance their stakes in such work
- Specific programmes with a focus on youth, in both rural and urban areas, must be evolved. They could include adventure camps, sports competitions and other capacity-building initiatives.
- Local media (rural and urban) could be used to highlight best cases
- Prompt clarifications must be given in alleged cases of human rights abuses and appropriate action taken where required.

The *Sadhbhavana* initiative of the Indian Army preceded the doctrine on sub-conventional warfare. It is a symbol of organisational innovation and operational learning even in the absence of a formal doctrine. An understanding of India’s counterinsurgency practice that ignores this important aspect is therefore incomplete. The Army’s counterinsurgency operations and *Sadhbhavana* however are only one element of the counterinsurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Other dimensions, especially the political strategy of conducting elections and improving governance, that have always been given precedence in India’s counterinsurgency practice, are far more critical. However, considering the important role of the Army in overall counterinsurgency strategy, the *Sadhbhavana* initiative has played a

limited but critical role in the transformation of conflict. It is therefore important that these initiatives be adapted to changing requirements over time, be responsive to the people's needs and opinions, and be implemented with the right attitude.

Postscript

Shortly after the conclusion of the field study by the author, the Kashmir Valley witnessed a prolonged phase of unrest. The trigger for this round of unrest was the alleged fake encounter by the Army in the Machil sector of Kupwara district. In the mass protests that followed, several people lost their lives. It is important to point out that in the selected districts in the Jammu region, the protests were insignificant. The fact that the Army's action triggered the protests clearly highlights the need to exercise absolute caution while conducting counterinsurgency operations. In the Kashmir Valley, the protests were most virulent in the urban areas of the districts chosen for study. Historically, as the paper points out, opposition to the Army has been more severe in these very areas where the Army's presence is minimal. However, to the extent that the unrest did spread to the rural areas, it would be worthwhile to study the cause of the rural unrest.

Annexure I

Sadhbhavana projects visited during the field trip from March 22 - April 4, 2010

1. Schools

a. Army Goodwill Public School (Rajouri)

A completely residential school set up in 2005 with from class 6-12. It has hostel facility for 105 boys and 45 girls, and accommodation for teachers and staff. The school has state –of-the-art facilities. The school attracts students mainly from the not so prosperous areas of Jammu. Some students are admitted as *Sadhbhavana* students. These are children who come from militancy affected families, or remote areas or from families that are below the poverty line. The school follows CBSE syllabus.

b. Government Higher Secondary School, Manjakote (Rajouri)


The school which has existed since 1967 has been supported by the Army since 2003-04. In that year the Army gave four computers and built a computer room for students. In 2009 again, five computers were given to the school. Also, Army personnel teach basic computers to the children.



In addition, the Army provides logistical support for the celebration of Independence Day and Republic Day. The school has now requested the Army to tile the floor of the computer room and renovate the original building of the school.

c. Pinewood Army Goodwill School, Hamirpur (Poonch)

It has children from nearby villages like Basooni, Dharati, Beruti, Hamirpur, Balagot and Dharglum. Children are brought by Army vehicles, for which they pay Rs. 50 per month. The school was started in 1999 when there were only 30 children; its present strength is 458. Although it



was handed over to the state government, the management is with the Army and the principal is a serving Army Major. The fee charged is Rs. 150-300, the least being charged from the Class I and the highest from class XII. Nearly 100 BPL children are being given free education. The school has 20 teachers, many of whom are not fully qualified to teach. This is because the school is in a very remote area and since the salaries are paid from the fees of students, and so are very low. The children and teachers were hopeful that the school would eventually have a hostel, science subjects in higher classes, some opportunity to learn computers and a football ground.

d. Army Goodwill School, Potha (Poonch)

The school, which is located on the outskirts of Surankote, was started at the height of militancy 2003. It was handed over to the civil administration in 2005. However since the quality of education started deteriorating, there was local pressure and the school was handed back to the Army. It attracts students from remote places in Surankote Tehsil. The school requires six Army vehicles to bring students from their homes. The fee charged is Rs. 225-475, 18 students are sponsored by Sadbhavana funds. It is difficult to get qualified local teachers, so there are five teachers from Kerala. The premises of the school are used to conduct summer camps for promoting art and culture as well as scouts and guides since 2006. According to the principal, Nazeer Qureshi, this school has much better teaching and facilities as

compared to the four government schools and 10 private schools in Surankote.

e. Baba Garibdas Academy, Jhallas (Poonch)

This primary school was set up in 2007. The number of students has increased from 83 to 111. The school attracts students from Jhallas, Ghani, Balanoi, Salotri, Dherati and Nabna. Medical care for students and teachers is provided by the Army. The fee is Rs.100 per month and the teachers’ salary is paid from the fees. The Army intends to sponsor some students from BPL families from this year onwards.

f. Army Goodwill School, Khanabal (Anantnag)

This government school in Khanabal was set up in 1989 for nursery, LKG and UKG classes. In 1998, the Army got permission from the state government to run it as an Army Goodwill School. Anantnag town is known for having a well educated populace. The educated parents prefer to send their children to this school. From an initial strength of five, the number of teachers has now gone up to 18, majority of them being women. In 2004, militants burnt a school bus of the school along with school bags of children. As a result nearly 100 children stopped coming to the school, however later they came back. And since then the number of students has only increased.

g. Army Goodwill Public School, Lidru (Anantnag)

Along the lines of the AGPS, Rajouri, the AGPS at Lidru is a completely residential school that draws students from remote areas of the valley. The expenditure per student per annum is approximately Rs. 62, 000. All this and the maintenance of the school, the hostels and all other facilities are provided under *Op Sadhbhavana*. The teachers in the school are mostly from outside the state as this is a remote and fully residential set-up and not many locals are willing to come. Villagers are employed as Class IV employees.

h. Army Goodwill School, Chandigam (Kupwara)

The school was established in 2001, a year before the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan was launched in this area. From an initial strength of 150

students, it now has 437 students. The education of 12 students is sponsored by the Army. Students come from all over the Lolab Valley, and they travel by civil buses hired by the Army. Students of the school are taken for educational tours once a year along with some parents and teachers. The fees in the school range from Rs.120-220, lesser fee is charged from girls. The school has 20 teachers, all of whom are locals. The Zonal



Students at AGS, Chandigarh

Education Officer who was present in the school said that this was the best school in the region as far as infrastructure is concerned.

i. Army Goodwill School, Tangdhar (Kupwara)

This school was set up in 1999. Their first batch of class X students were toppers in the state. The Army's ongoing involvement has meant that the school has grown from a primary school to a secondary school with all facilities. Students of the school, including girl students have been taken for educational tours.

j. Army Goodwill School, Boniyar (Baramulla)

It was set up in 2002, and the first batch of class X students will pass out this year. The teachers come from Baramulla and some are from Boniyar, all of them are either graduates or postgraduates. Students come from nearby villages and 30 per cent of the students are girls. The strength of the school has grown from 135 in 2002 to 405 in 2009-10. The Army provides a free bus service to bring children and teachers to the school.

k. Army Goodwill School, Uri (Baramulla)

This school was established in 2000. The second batch of class X students is now passing out from the school. It has 23 teachers, many of whom come from Baramulla. The Army provides school buses to

bring children and teachers to school. Girls and boys from the school have been taken for educational tours. The fee ranges from Rs. 120-360. Computer training is given to children from class I.

2. Women Empowerment Centres

a. *Women’s Vocational Training Centre (VTC), Saujiyan (Poonch)*

The VTC was started in 2002 with 40 students. At present there are 28 girls learning stitching and embroidery. The duration of the course is one month. Most of the girls at the VTC do not go to school. The coordinator of the place is a local person. In the same complex, a computer centre



Women Learning Kadhai, VTC Saujiyan

has been started and some school-going girls and others from the VTC are given basic training in computers by Army personnel. There is no other centre of in the vicinity of Saujiyan.

b. *Shakti Sadan (Reasi)*

This vocational training centre for women was built by the Army and handed over to the state administration. However, it has not been used since then.

c. *Usha Fashion Design School (Baramulla)*

This school was set up in 2006. It teaches tailoring to girls from Baramulla district. It follows the standards set by the Usha company. It has a well ventilated hall, heating for winter months, a dining hall and running water. Since the school is on the Army campus, there is a separate entrance for women. It has four local teachers, all of whom were sent by the Army to be trained at the Usha Fashion Design School, Lucknow. They are also paid by the Usha Company. At the end of a three month course, a certificate is given to those to take the

exam and a free sewing machine is gifted to the student. Clothes stitched by students are also sold through the Army Wives Welfare Association.

d. Women Empowerment Centre, Uri (Baramulla)

This centre set up in 2003 has two classes, one for making knitting and the other for tailoring. The knitting section has 3-4 students at a time. It has no permanent teachers; those who learn the skill pass it on to others. Sweaters made here are quite popular and are sold locally. The tailoring course is taught by a teacher, whose is paid an honorarium by the Army. The course is year long and the number of students fluctuates from 20-25.

3. Community Development Centres

a. Community Hall, Mangnar (Poonch)

The community hall was being constructed to provide for a space for villagers to congregate for meetings, functions etc.

4. Model Villages (also contain community development centres)

a. Sagra Model Village, Mendhar (Poonch)


Sagra was adopted as a model village by the state government in 2000. Since then, the Army has also contributed to development of infrastructure in the village. The Army has helped set up a vocational training centre for women. It offers a one-year basic course and a two-year advance course in chamba and phulkari work. The teacher is appointed by the state government. Items made are sold for a good price in the market. Although the centre has been handed over to the state government, the Army supports the centre by providing a stipend of Rs.100 to each girl student. The six-month stitching course at the centre is completely funded by *Sadbhavana* funds. In addition, there is veterinary aid centre, which employs a trained vet.

The Army also supports the day-to-day functioning of the school by providing class rooms, science laboratories, playground, library, computers etc. The student strength has grown from 120 in 2001 to

324. The school is attended mostly by boys, and buses have been hired for Rs.20,000 per annum to bring children and teachers to school. It is difficult for the school to get trained teachers. Students and teachers of the school are taken for educational tours to different places in India.

b. Chandigam Model Village, Lolab (Kupwara)

This model village is entirely the built by the Army. It has been built around a local school that has existed since 1947. The campus now has more buildings for senior classes, a large playground with a shed for spectators, a computer training centre, a library, a gym, a vocational training centre for women and sub-health centre with a nurse and a cleaning lady.



Layout of Model Village, Chandigam

c. Model Village, Teethwal (Kupwara)

Teethwal, which is just across the Kishenganga river, and overlooks Pakistan was rebuilt by the Army after the 2005 earthquake. In addition to relief and rehabilitation of the villagers, an Army Goodwill School, a Community Development Centre with vocational training for women in *aari* work and *gabkari* work was set up. An Army official teaches computers to students from class III-V at the Goodwill School.

5. Educational /Motivational Tours

a. Educational Tour, Mendhar (Poonch)

From March 15-25 2010, a group of 20 men from villages in the Mendhar district were taken to Mumbai and Pune. They were also given the




Educational Tour to Mumbai-Pune, Mendhar

opportunity to travel in the Delhi Metro. In Mumbai, they met the governor of Maharashtra, went to Haji Ali, Elephanta caves, Gateway of India. In Pune they visited the Kelkar Museum, Aga Khan Palace, Dagdusheth Ganpati, and the National Defence Academy. They also saw the film “My Name is Khan” in the multiplex City Pride and were taken for shopping to E-Square Mall. The approximate expenditure per person was Rs. 6,000. During the trip, the travel, boarding and lodging expenses were borne by the Army from *Sadbhavana* funds.

6. Water Supply Projects

a. *Tube well project, Chowki Handan, Naushera (Rajouri)*

After acquiring land from the village headman, the Army built a tubewell that could supply water to all houses in the village. On completion, the project was handed over to the public health department and is fulfilling the need for potable water since then. This was mainly a demand of the women who had carry water from a nearby stream for all household work.



7. Gujjar/Bakkerwal Community Projects

a. *Pir Panjal Hostel, Talwara (Reasi)*

This is the only hostel for the Gujjar/Bakkarwal community that has been built by the Army. It was partly supported by a grant of Rs. 14 Lakhs by the central government to the Gujjar-Bakkerwal Advisory



Board. It accommodates 50 students; children studying in classes VI-XII are allowed to stay in the hostel. All the students in the hostel are from families below poverty line, 25 students are from militancy affected areas of Reasi district. The students who attend the local government schools are provided extra-coaching after school hours and also given computer training in the hostel. The expenses of food are Rs. 50 per student per day, and Rs. 1 lakh is spent on the uniforms of students every year. These expenses are born by the Army.


b. Seasonal School for children of the Bakkerwal community, Chowkibal (Kupwara)

The nomadic Bakkerwals move from Jammu region to this location in the Kupwara district and stay here from April-October every year. The Army has set up seasonal schools for children from 3-12 years of age. Local educated youth are hired to teach these children. In winters, the local teacher is encouraged to take tuitions so that he can continue to remain employed.

8. Health Care

a. Medical Camp, Talwara (Reasi)

At the medical camp being conducted in Talwara, the waiting halls were full and there patients in the porch awaiting their turn to meet the doctor. There were lady doctors especially for those women who were hesitant to be treated by



Medical Camp, Talwara

men doctors. According to the doctors present, they treat people for all minor ailments, and give medicines. If there is follow up required, they refer them to the civil hospital. Army hospitals in remote areas also cater to the needs of the local population. In some camps, doctors

from local PHCs are also involved as sometimes people are more comfortable going to civil doctors.

b. Pritam Spiritual Foundation (Poonch)

The foundation was founded by Jagbir Singh Sudan in 1990. Since then it has provided artificial limbs free of cost to 3122 people who have been victims of militancy, mine blasts or cross-border firing. Other aids provided include polio calipers, arthoshoes, crutches, wheel chairs, tricycles and hearing aids.



Artificial Limb Centre, Poonch

Since December 2009, the Army has helped this private initiative by constructing new dormitories for the Artificial Limb Repair Centre that the Foundation supports. It also helped in organising a camp for those visiting the rehabilitation centre.

9. Computer Training Centres

a. Computer Training Centre, Khanabal (Anantnag)

This was established in 2002. A local teacher is employed to teach the basic computer course for Rs.250 per month. There are about 5 courses in a year, with a total of 90 students attending. Most of those attending this computer course are students, while about 10-15 are those in employment.



Computer Training Centre, Khanabal

b. Computer Training Centre, Baramulla

This centre was set up in 2008. It has 37 students, some of whom travel 30-40 kilometres to attend the course. However, only 14

students (including one girl) attend the class regularly. A one-year basic computer course is offered by local teachers who are paid by the DOEACC. The course fee is Rs. 8600, half of which is paid from the *Sadhbhavana* funds. This course provides the students with the basic computer skills that can get them jobs in railway reservation centres, telephone billing centres as well as imparts basic knowledge of computer hardware. Teachers teaching in the computer centre said that they had to do their courses by correspondence from IGNOU for want of similar facilities ten years back.

10. Orphanages/ Hostels

a. *Ankur (Reasi)*

An orphanage built by the Army was handed over to the state administration and was recently in news as it was not being managed well and the deputy commissioner ordered that it be closed down.

b. *Balashram, Manjakote (Rajouri)*

This boys hostel was constructed under *Op Sadhbhavana* in 2006. While the department of social welfare of the state runs the hostel, the Army continues to provide stationery and books for children living in the hostel. 10 of the 25 students in hostel are whose parent (usually the father) was killed by militants. Currently, the Army is building a water tank for the hostel students.

c. *Nari Niketan, Mendhar (Poonch)*

The Nari Niketan of Mendhar was set up in 1972 for orphaned girls and those from families below poverty line. It was functioning in a one-room rented place until the Army decided to improve the set up in 2006-07. As a result, a new building was constructed with proper dorms, dining hall,



Nari Niketan, Mendhar

recreation room etc. Army also sponsors the education of six girls of the Nari Niketan. The Army provides logistical support for the wedding of an inmate.

d. Muskaan, Srinagar

In 2005, the Army established this orphanage in Srinagar. Currently it has 52 boys and 5 girls. Children from remote areas of the Valley who have been affected by militancy, or are from disturbed family backgrounds, or from poor families are admitted to the hostel.



Their education in local schools is supported by the Army. Ten seats are reserved for students coming through the social welfare department of the state. Special attention is given to preserving the cultural background. The staff of the hostel is given an honorarium from the *Sadhbhavana* funds. The hostel has a computer laboratory, tuition room, recreation room, indoor sports facilities. Food is provided as per the calorie scale approved by the dietician. It is envisaged that by 2013 the present group of children would all be educated/rehabilitated.

Prominent studies on India's counterinsurgency practice have criticised it for being excessively harsh and as having a conventional war bias. Based on a study of the Indian Army's initiative at "winning hearts and minds" in Jammu and Kashmir, this paper argues that such critiques have overlooked an important aspect of India's counterinsurgency strategy. Operation Sathbhavana is evidence of the Indian Army's "organisational innovation and operational learning". This paper documents the various initiatives being undertaken by the Army, seeks to understand the manner in which they are perceived by the people, and suggests measures to ensure better implementation. It argues that such initiatives have had a limited but salutary impact in transforming the conflict in Kashmir.

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Among her recent publications are "Identity and Conflict: Perspectives from the Kashmir Valley", *Strategic Analysis*, Volume 33, Issue 5, September 2009, pp. 760-773; "India and international terrorism" in David Scott (ed.), *Handbook of India's International Relations*, London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 266-277; "Group Rights and Identities: A Case for Theory beyond the Nation State" in Mangesh Kulkarni (ed.), *Interdisciplinary Perspectives in Political Theory*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011, pp. 87-116 and *Non-State Armed Groups in South Asia: A Preliminary Structured Focused Comparison*, New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2012 (forthcoming).



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