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
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Broadening the Education for Synergetic Civil–Military Relations

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Statecraft, diplomacy and warfare are not only a matter of brute force, but also a function of scholarship to understand the past, present and future of the art, science and literature of national and international security. At higher levels in their professional career, besides the armed forces, a number of civil servants too have to deal with the state's use or threat of the use of legitimate force. This article suggests broadening the education for synergetic civil–military relations (CMR). This education needs to be imparted, and sustained, in the military as well as in the civil domain, including in particular the political leadership, bureaucracy, and the academic community. By doing this, a healthy CMR will generate superior strategies.

> Military victories do not solve political problems.
> —Lawrence Freedman[1]

Introduction

It is a well-known adage that war is too serious a business to be left alone to the generals or, for that matter, to the political class and bureaucracy. The art and science of the military craft is deeply interwoven into the spheres of politics, and war and society. In other words, both warcraft and statecraft overlap. However, there has to be a division of labour. The mind is the most vital link and it is not possible for those in uniform or

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in the bureaucracy to be grandmasters of all the intellectual disciplines and discourses all by themselves. This intellectual slot has to be filled by academics from varied disciplines who, by and large, are civilians. Indeed, the nature and character of war can only be grasped through sustained intellectual efforts—a job perhaps best done in an academic environment.

Although the armed forces need to undergo rigorous training to be ready and relevant for combat, at the same time a substantial number of civil servants in their professional career too have to deal with the state's use or threat of the use of legitimate force, along with arms-related international negotiations and treaties. They also have to man various posts of the government which deal with national and international security. Overseeing the instruments of use of force are the elected leaders or the political class who are fed with options and choices as advised by both the military and the bureaucracy. An important method to capture this dynamic is through the prism of civil–military relations (CMR). Interestingly, the term civil–military cooperation is seldom used, though cooperation is a principle of war almost in all militaries. This is because it is a political phenomenon and there are bound to be disagreements, leading more to competition, and even acrimony, rather than cooperation. Why is this so? The simple explanation is that different stakeholders have different perspectives. So, why not understand and study these perspectives without preconceived notions?

This article is not about the unending debate in India on whether or how much the military is in the loop for national security decision making. Tracing that process is a complex one and beyond the scope of this article. However, rarely has there been an attempt to study and analyse the various aspects of CMR at a higher academic level from the point of view of all the stakeholders who deal with security. This article attempts a broad-based study that will help in improving the understanding of a subject as complex as CMR, which in turn can lead to better outcomes.

The main idea being presented here is that it is not only the military that needs to balance training and education but also the other stakeholders, namely, politicians, civil servants/technocrats and the academicians, need to do the same. In other words, education needs to be imparted, by professionals, both to the military and the remaining three stakeholders of the quad, that is, political leadership, civil servants/ bureaucracy, and the academic community. This will lead to building healthy CMR that can further improve the formulating and execution of

well-informed, and thus superior, strategies. It will also result in a better informed political leadership, military, civilian bureaucracy, and society at large on the larger issue of war and peace.

The article is divided into various sections. The following section deals with the theoretical foundations on the interlinkages of the stakeholders of CMR and the outcomes. The next section gives enduring examples from the military history of Germany and India. The penultimate section enumerates the steps that need to be taken for sustainable education for synergetic CMR in India, followed by the conclusion.

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Theoretical Foundation

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Civil–Military Relations (CMR)

In the field of politics, '"Civil–military relations" is the name given to the complex relationships among the governments, the military and society. The field is inherently both normative and empirical.'[2] This definition is not country specific and the framework can be used in any democratic society and nation. The Americans have generated a huge body of literature on this topic for their society. There are books as well as a number of journal articles which narrate the politics of CMR. Some examples of Western scholars (mostly from the United States [US]) are: Samuel Huntington (1957)[3] (objective and subjective control) and his critics;[4] Morris Janowitz (1960)[5] (military to reflect civil society writ large); Samuel E. Finer (1962)[6] (how much separation should there be between a civil government and its army?); Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood[7] (military moving from traditional 'institutional' format to a civilian or 'occupational' format); Michael C. Desch (1999)[8] (different attitudes towards military by civilians during war and peace); Peter Feaver (2003)[9] (classical principal–agent framework: civilian leaders as principal, military officers serving as agents); and others who have explained this relationship through various perspectives and theories. In the case of India, it is Samuel Huntington's ideas that are most often transplanted in the management of military by the civilian leadership. Huntington's argument on the way to control the military is:

> there are two ways to try to achieve control: subjective control, which involves treating the military as an interest group and a power player, and manipulating its demographic, ideological or religious make-up in order to align it with the ruling class; or objective control, which involves professionalising the military, such that it recognises

its sphere of competence (fighting) and refrains from participating in politics out of sense of duty and appropriateness. The idea is that the government—of whatever kind—has the legitimacy (if not the expertise) to run the country, while the military's expertise is in the extremely circumscribed realm of protecting the country from foreign attack and protecting the government from internal threats. Since the government has the greater competency, the military is supposed to accept, willingly, a subordinate position in running the state.[10]

A recent example of rewarding scholarship with regard to India is by Steven I. Wilkinson, a historian at Yale. After India's independence, the political leadership had to devise ways and means to guard against a military coup, a phenomenon which was often noticed in many newly independent Asian and African countries in the mid-twentieth century. Wilkinson (2015) shows how one factor has always been central to the political leadership: to make the military 'coup proof' by various constitutional, institutional and administrative checks and balances.[11] In contemporary times, this fear of coup has diminished considerably. However, objective control of the military by the political leadership is essential in a democracy.

In the case of the Indian democratic set-up, the consensus is on objective control. However, in India, this subject is not part of the education or even serious authorship by academics, unlike the way it is done by academics in the US. Thus, there is no informed debate and discussion, which is vital in a democracy. In India at least, whenever CMR is mentioned, the first thing that comes to mind is higher defence reforms, and there is enough policy literature on this.[12] However, there is not enough literature on military education for military leaders with a civilian oversight.[13] Besides, another understanding (or misunderstanding) on CMR is that the day-to-day transactions, tensions and problem solving are construed to be CMR.

The use or non-use of force is a part of foreign policy and diplomacy. The domestic situation or aspects of internal security are also drivers of foreign policy. Ultimately, implementing of policy is the responsibility and mandate of the executive or political class, supported by civil bureaucracy and military advice. The nature and character of war in which these choices or decisions are to be made in the international system are best captured and understood by the academics from streams of military science, social science and humanities. This may be both theoretical

for conceptual clarity and policy oriented for operationalisation of the instrument of force. The military is one of the most important instrument for coercing. Strategy is about matching ways and means to achieve an end. In the absence of a deep study of the stakeholders' viewpoints, it will be difficult to combine all the instruments cohesively for the best strategy for the desired outcomes. This is one main reason why educating all the stakeholders assumes importance. It is quite clear that the existing system of education is not well developed in this regard.

One of the classical examples of this interplay of strategy, operations and tactics is that of Germany. In various military forums, the performance of the German military is often a subject of study and enquiry. It is also a subject in some competitive and promotion-related examinations. To get an idea of the relative importance and interplay of strategy, operations and tactics, the next section has some enduring and classical examples from the history of Germany, followed by that from India.

Examples from History

Weighing Up Strategic Level with the Tactical

In the legitimate use of force for policy the final peace or the end state is reached at the concluding stage of negotiation. Therefore, in any military action, the end state is more important and thus it is sometimes said, 'we may have won the battle but have lost the war'. Also, any Indian Army general would testify: 'there is no military solution to an insurgency'. In CMR, the common understanding of strategic versus tactical must be well understood by policymakers and military leaders—during planning, training and education stage; during conduct; and after the war has ended when reports, inquiries and lessons learnt are analysed by academics. Why this comparative work on political strategy and military tactics and operational art is important is borne out by an apt example provided by the historian Williamson Murray. The Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had a brilliant strategy during the war for German unification. Bismarck ensured that Prussia only fought with one adversary at a time and never a two- or three-front war simultaneously. The linear sequence of the wars was: 1864, against Denmark; 1866, against Austria; and 1870–71, against France. In other words, the Prussian Army, under the able leadership of Helmuth von Moltke, the genius Chief of Prusso-German General Staff, 'took advantage of the strategic framework that Bismarck created'. But these military victories had one unforeseen

consequence: 'it persuaded most of the senior Prusso-German military leaders to believe that military force alone had achieved victory and that Bismarck's strategic polices had played only a subsidiary role in Prussia's success.'[14] Reed Robert Bonadonna argues that:

> although a devotee of Clausewitz…Moltke passed on to his successors almost a complete reversal of Clausewitz's central idea that war was politics perused by other means. Moltke insisted that military officers alone should determine military strategy, with minimum inputs from civilian ministers…When the time came for general staff officers to think in terms of combined operations or large national objectives, their elaborate schooling failed them.[15]

At the strategic level, a price has to be paid by having too narrow a focus on only tactical and operational matters. Bonadonna, in fact, makes this point well. In the case of the Prussian General Staff, he argues:

> unfortunately it also cultivated a narrow, even politically naïve, and strategically obtuse form of professionalism that would make it a danger to a united, powerful German state by encouraging belligerent tendencies and prickly national paranoia. Ultimately this most 'professional' of the institutions would become a danger to humankind, prorogued to rise again as the servant of a mad tyrant. The German model would transform into a cautionary tale of excessive nationalism and deficient conscience, of narrow know-how rather than broad understanding or humanity.[16]

Using a historical methodology, in the case of Germany in World War II (1939–45), Williamson Murray shows that:

> On the strategic level the Germans repeated every mistake they had made in previous conflict with even more disastrous consequences. No matter how carefully they may have analyzed the tactical and operational lessons of World War I, that effort could not outweigh the disastrous results of strategic myopia—a myopia which the German government encouraged and fostered right from the beginning of the interwar period.[17]

Murray's work is addressed to the US policymakers and military leadership on the best practices to have a healthy mix of intellect and practical aspects of soldiering, or what he terms 'muddy boots'.

However, the historical analysis comes with a caution that has a universal appeal: 'the German example carries with it a warning: too narrow a focus on purely military attributes of the profession of arms will

inevitably carry with it misunderstanding of the broader political and strategic issues involved in war—a sure recipe for disasters.'[18] The German Army's weakness at the strategic level has become such a good case study that it is often quoted that 'the operational excellence produced by the German military education system was offset by the lack of education and competence of the German armed force at the strategic level.'[19]

The main lesson that the German example indicates is that just military power, or operational art or tactics, is not enough. Excellence at tactical and operational level does not mean that, by default, there is an excellence at the strategic level. Indeed, educating on CMR is more about strategy rather than just tactics. Let us now examine the case of India.

The Cases for India

What is relevant in this case of Prussia is that this sort of belief which the Prusso-German military leaders had wrongly formed may happen in any military.

It is well known that the defeat of India in the 1962 Sino-Indian War was due to excess civil inference, with no worthwhile inputs being accepted that were being recommended by the military leadership. The humiliating defeat made its impact. The general national consensus was that it was the inept civilian leadership, who also appointed the wrong type of military commanders, that had failed India. Shocks always spur nations to action. Srinath Raghavan has argued that the popular victimhood narrative by military is only a selective representation. On the contrary, Raghavan adds: '…when the idea of integrating the service headquarters with the ministry was first mooted in the 1960s, then army chief General J N Chaudhury rejected it arguing that the military should stay away from the civilians.'[20] Thus, in the case of India, this defeat did lead to military autonomy. Stephen Cohen, a lifetime observer and student of Indian military, traces the ups and downs to write:

> [the] wars in 1965 and 1971 reinforced military autonomy…This further ensured that political leaders remained wary of interference in the internal matters of the military so long as the armed forces accepted political supremacy…In the later crises, notably with Pakistan in 1999 and 2001-02, civilians called the shots.[21]

This case of India is an ongoing exercise. Thus, scholarship needs to engage with this subject from various angles and perspectives. This can be achieved by intellectual efforts for a sustainable education on various aspect of CMR for all stakeholders, which is covered next.

First, there is a need to understand the military mind just beyond the caricature or that image of 'Colonel Blimp'. Next is a typical South Asian problem: rather than objective control, the military drifts towards negative professionalism. After a discussion of these psychological factors, the rest of the section will focus on suggested steps for sustainable education.

Understanding the Military Mind

From a very young, impressionable age, the military mind is exposed to systematic training on national security. The military, in a way, is 'obsessed' with challenges and threats (actual or scenarios) to national security. Its main concern is a worst-case scenario. It needs to be realised that although soldiers are citizens first, they have to be trained and hardened for war, for effective command and control, and have to operate in a uniquely disciplined and regimented environment. This, as a 'natural process', makes the military stand apart in its behaviour, as noted by David Hume, in the words of Stephen Rosen:

> A soldier and a priest are different characters in all nations, and all ages, David Hume argued, and went on to cite as a not-altogether-false maxim that 'priests of all religions are the same' because, like soldiers, they live in highly structured, closed organizations divorced from their host society.[22]

This special attribute, conditioned by nurture and training over a long time, is a military necessity. The selection and training process is geared towards this aim of obedience to orders for unit cohesion and tactical skilling under extreme privation and violence. Today, soldiers may not be divorced or isolated from the civilian society due to economic changes, urbanisation and the social media, including rapidly changing information and communication technology. Yet, by the very fact of a rigorous, systematic and necessary military training for application and management of violence, a different soldierly mindset gets instilled. Military types across cultures and nationalities will and must remain a species apart—sui generis. This may, in some cases, result in a phenomenon called negative professionalism.

Negative Professionalism

It is not uncommon to find military populating the power centres as advisers, or public intellectuals, or even as politicians in many countries.

This unique nature of a military ideal type has some unforeseen impact in states which are not democratic. This is called 'negative professionalism'. Historian Kaushik Roy introduces the concept of 'negative professionalism' propounded by William C. Fuller. The argument is:

> the Prussian officers' professionalism is an example of negative professionalism. Historian William C. Fuller defines negative professionalism as the perception of officers that they are superior to other groups of civilian society. And this sense of superiority is all walks of life justifies the officers' insubordination to the civilians' orders. The Pakistan army's officer cadre is influenced by negative professionalism.[23]

There has been a lively debate on CMR in Pakistan. Rather, due the failure of democratic institutions and assertiveness of the military, former diplomat Husain Haqqani argues that the military in Pakistan calls itself 'the institution'.[24] Gowher Rizvi, in a foreword in a book authored by General Khalid Mahmud Arif in 1995, has given a penetrating insight:

> Scholars have long rejected Samuel Huntington's persuasive but wholly ahistorical view that the armed forces in the Third World are instruments of modernization, political stability and economic development. Nevertheless, in Pakistan the armed forces, especially the army, are a central factor in the country's politics and decision making process.[25]

Zulfiqar Ali argues that in Pakistan, military intervention is due to political instability, corruption and mismanagement and military takeover in often welcomed by some segments of the society.[26]

However, this charge of 'negative professionalism' cannot be just placed on the Pakistan Army alone. Surely, subconsciously or even consciously, there may be a mision creep of latent 'negative professionalism' in most militaries. Why is it so? A military has to have that elite image and a swagger for instilling esprit de corps and a sense of superiority over a likely enemy. Due to long periods of peace and a near-absence of inter-state wars, this impulse of a military élan and superiority may turn into a frustration. Therefore, engaging with this issue and debating these tendencies is an important aspect of CMR education.

Professional Military Education

Anit Mukherjee has recently made a good case for a civilian oversight of professional military education (PME). Mukherjee defines effective

PME as 'a system that is geared toward education and not training and intellectually prepares military officers to deal with future uncertainty.' He evaluates the evolution of military education in India, as well as its shortcomings. He points out the weaknesses which, to him, are 'primarily due to its model of civil–military relations, with a limited role for civilians.'[27] Mukherjee basically makes the case for greater dialogue on this topic of PME between civilians—both policymakers and academics—and the military community.[28] In curricula development and a focus apart from operations, Mukherjee suggests that education needs to be geared towards broader subjects related to statecraft, diplomacy and the use of force, including international relations, organisational theory, area studies, constitutional law, military history and security studies. Induction of civilian academics in military institutes to impart education is his main point. What this implies is that knowledge of a number of subjects is the need of the hour. Like Mukherjee, Colonel Ton de Munnik, in his essay on 'Teaching War', states:

> The development of knowledge about the application of military force cannot be generated by itself. The connecting field of behavioural sciences, international relations, technology, and laws of war shape the conditions under which military force is applied and provides conditional knowledge, but the direct source of knowledge for application of military force are military history and operations research.[29]

Surely the need for this multidisciplinary knowledge is not meant just for the military. The civil bureaucracy, the political class and the academics also need to be trained and educated appropriately. The very subjects that Mukherjee has prescribed for PME are the feedstocks for a comprehensive and wider education of those other than the military as well. James S. Corum, the Dean of the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia (a joint effort by the three Baltic countries comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), is an experienced military educator. He makes a very strong case for a matching PME for civilian employees of the defence ministries and security services. Corum argues: 'Indeed, no modern armed forces can operate without the support of a cadre of professional civilians who work in the fields such as logistics, education, medicine, administrative support, law enforcement, and research and development.'[30]

On the role of the civilian leadership and bureaucracy in matters of politico-military strategy, Christopher Clary asserts:

Militaries are complicated, expensive organizations, and there is a tendency for civilians to shirk the specialized demands of defense oversight. This generalized tendency has been reinforced in the Indian context by a set of beliefs that emerged in the aftermath of the 1962 war with China that civilian intervention in the operational military domain contributed to India's defeat. While politicians and bureaucrats have closely managed military budgets, which after all impinge directly on funds available for domestic purposes, they have avoided interference in military doctrine and planning.[31]

I believe that the civilians are not shirking on purpose, as charged above. To be fair, the civilian leadership and bureaucracy have to understand the viewpoint and psychology of the military. Also, academic investigation needs to be done to see the explanation of aspects of organisational theory as it has been said, 'Without civilian intervention, the Indian Army has engaged in behavior predicted by organizational theory.'[32] Thinking and acting in terms of organisational theory is not a sin. The civilian bureaucracy, likewise, has its own organisational theory and maybe, also the politicians. However, one thing is certain: it is not practical to expect the politicians to become academics or philosopher kings. So, the first step is that both the military and civilian bureaucracy need to develop a liking and quest for this knowledge so that they can give valued advice and options to the political class. It is here that an attitude to learn more of these disciplines has to be encouraged. The link in CMR is thus an academic one; hence it follows that the academia has a pivotal role to play in this idea of scholar warrior.

We are All Scholar Warriors Now

The term 'scholar warrior' is a powerful metaphor. There is even a journal by the same name published from India.[33] Received wisdom is that with this *mantra*, the military officers need to be intellectually endowed to approach the subject not only as practical warriors who learn the skill by hands-on training, or 'skill and soul',[34] but also by study and reflection. But is this expectation only for those in uniform? How about the civilians and technological bureaucracy? As argued earlier, an appropriate education is also the business of the civilian bureaucracy. This must be at the level of strategy, though tactical and technical issues cannot be ignored. At present, there exists a pyramidal structure with the National Defence College at New Delhi at the apex, where few civil

servants attend the course. However, this is rather late. Indeed, this education has to start early and for both military and civilians.

Organising Education

If this need for appropriate education is accepted, there will be the demand for the relevant human resources. The real problem is to have capable, committed and competent human resources for academics. Efforts need to be made to broaden and deepen this pool. The civil leadership and bureaucracy can make a case for this to happen by allocating budget and priorities.

Two parallel streams of this education will get the desired results. First, like the Department of War Studies and School of Security Studies in United Kingdom's King College London, select universities in India can have military history and modern war studies centres or departments to begin teaching and research.[35] Within this stream, the military can sponsor some centres of excellence in universities. Simultaneously, the state can encourage and endow select universities to set up programmes for military-related subjects, like military sociology, psychology, the regimental systems, military history, modern war studies, defence economies and technology, constitutional studies, human rights and human security, domestic and international law (including laws for space, cyber, futuristic robotics and artificial intelligence and autonomous systems) and so on. Existing defence studies departments could be rejuvenated as an initial step. The second stream is already in the making. The Indian Defence University, once established in the near future, will be an appropriate forum to have a mixture of military officers and civil servants, who have knowledge of their craft along with experience, and civilian academics to teach and mentor research.

Most importantly, the education will help in understanding the interplay of the contemporary nature and character of war and the relationship of strategy, operations and tactics.

Go About Gradually

The process has to be a gradual one. The first step is to take stock of the syllabus and the resource persons. Broad themes, as suggested earlier, can be broken up into subsets. Then, a question is to be answered: should this be made part of the existing course by substituting old with the new or would it entail a stand-alone module? This will depend on the capacity of the educational institute and the officers that can be spared

by the organisation to attend this education. Resistance to this idea is expected with a case being made regarding the shortage of officers in key positions from active duty. This needs to be weighed against the benefit the organisation will have in the long term by having a set of educated officers.

Research Design and Methodology

Research plays an important and necessary role in the intellectual education of both the military and the civilians. The research design and methodology need to be rigorous and unbiased. What methodology to follow also needs to be worked out. Writing too is important, though it should not be confused with just military writing; and as it has been realised in the Baltic Defence College, recording and assessing the rich experience of self and others has to be developed by writing. For a true critical assessment capability, extensive research and writing project is essential.[36]

It is important to appreciate that the main idea is to develop a capacity of 'what' to think and 'how' to think. It is quite possible that, for the same problem, there may be different perspectives—one of the military and the other of the civilian. For the same problem, a diplomat may be biased towards diplomacy, while the military member may be biased towards use of force. For example, the late Jagat Mehta, a seasoned diplomat and foreign secretary, in his autobiography, has a section with the title, 'In diplomacy immediate reaction must not complicate long-term vision.'[37] From the institutional prism of diplomacy, he then explains different perspectives of the stakeholders:

> Diplomacy is different from perspective of politicians (who have only a five-year perspective); also from civil services, where most decisions do not have to reckon with other sovereignties; historian and analysts tend to depend largely on hindsight and nearest past parallel; and from journalists who are concerned only with instant sound bites or the next morning's headlines.[38]

For diplomacy, Mehta lays emphasis on foresight by 'grasping the past, present and future'.[39] On the institutional behaviour and approaches of the military and intelligence community and others, he avers:

> For the military, it is understandably essential to have 'an enemy', the preparations are based on capability calculus, and after the start of the operations, the aim is unconditional surrender. For the

intelligence organizations, the assessment is that hostility of the adversary is permanent, and so, large scale covert efforts are made to undermine the strength of the hostile power.[40]

Mehta, in his brief comments, has captured the reality of the differing perceptions of the stakeholders. The best education on CMR is to understand and study these differing behaviours. After all, everyone is performing a job. With good methods of instructions, the students can be made aware of these tendencies. Even within the military, there are bound to be different solutions to the same problem by the three services. The why and what of 'turf wars' within the military and outside (with civilians) also needs to be understood as an important pillar of the prism of conflict. In a 2013 study, *Deliberations of a Working Group on Military and Diplomacy*,[41] an annexure by Lieutenant General (Retd.) Satish Nambiar explains the issue and the way ahead:

> The first aspect that probably needs to be addressed is that of 'turf battles' as it were. It is time we overcome the distrust, suspicion, envy and the 'I know it all' attitude that pervades the establishment. It is indeed sad that these nonissues are allowed to take precedence over national interests. How do we manage this? To add to the problem is the perennial suspicion of a possible military coup. Without any merit, I may add.
>
> Each agency has developed its own approach for addressing problems. The Armed Forces are, without doubt and with good reason, dedicated to systematic planning—but remain rigid. The foreign policy establishment tries to be more flexible but is disinclined to take risks. So, how do we achieve synergy?
>
> The culture of 'jointness' has not developed at all. We do not have it within the Armed Forces; each Service believes it can win a war on its own. Between the Services and the Ministry of Defence, integration is a myth. It is no surprise that there is no culture of a joint national approach that is shared by the different agencies of the Government. Part of the blame lies in the lack of application of the political class towards diplomacy as also matters military. (It is no consolation that a similar situation prevails within the US establishment between the State Department and the Pentagon). How do we overcome this serious flaw?
>
> It goes without saying that in the conduct of military operations, the civilian establishment must not try to exercise operational control. However, the military cannot be allowed to craft foreign policy; that is for the political authority and the diplomats to decide.

To that extent, the elements of civilian control over the military and the limitations thereof must be understood. What measures do we need to put in place to institutionalise this?...there is little doubt that we need to integrate the military itself for 'jointness' within, and at the same time effect inter-agency integration, that is, between the military and the diplomat. What many other countries did sequentially we will have to implement simultaneously.[42]

Nambiar has posed an important question in the given extract: 'what measures do we need to put in place to institutionalise this?' The most common sense and practical measure is through the path of strategic education, as this article is arguing, for all stakeholders for jointness. For this, some suggestions are offered next.

Agenda for Research and Education

Just lectures, debates and interactive sessions for the CMR course may be insufficient. The practitioners and scholar warriors also need to engage in research. Both research and education needs to be tied together.

Study of Literature and Campaigns

One good method is to discuss and critique some books and articles by both non-Indian and Indian scholars. In the non-Indian category, work of scholars such as Stephen Cohen, Peter Rosen, Steven Wilkinson and others can be included. In the Indian category, a good article is Srinath Raghavan's 'Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After'[43] and S. Kalyanaraman's 'The Theory and Practice of Civil–Military Relations'.[44]

In the case contemporary India, it could be one good research question to address through the study of military and diplomatic history of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War as an example. Pending the release of archival material to National Archives of India, only a tentative work can emerge and not a rigorous scholarly inquiry. Another study may be on the diplomatic and strategic outcome of the army-inspired Cold Start doctrine against Pakistan, although this is only a peacetime exercise or may be a signalling episode.

Based on insights from these recent historical examples and rapid scientific and technological progress, education can progress on the new wars that are very common today, like hybrid warfare, counter-insurgency, limited wars under nuclear conditions, cyber and space wars, impact of disruptive technologies, and so on. Civil–military institutions

and their role in the evolution of doctrines, strategies and modernisation pathways for the present and future is another important subject for education. Nuclear issues also are a good platform to debate and discuss various aspects of the nuclear doctrines including implications of assertive and delegative control of tactical nuclear weapons by an adversary. It is obvious that military war colleges, academic departments in universities, and the military and civil bureaucracy have to do this work together on the entire spectrum. For fusion, there is a need for the exchange of ideas. This has to be proactive and not reactive.

Counter-Insurgency

Perhaps the most challenging subject for inquiry is the causes of insurgency and how counter-insurgency was carried out and what needs to be done in future. Classical division of tasks, wherein the military looks after external threats and the police looks after the internal security, does not exist. Further, both the army and the police wear the same combat-disruptive dress and cannot be differentiated easily. Yet, in the use of force, there are major conceptual differences. Unlike the police, the army does not operate non-lethal weapons and is trained to shoot to kill. This contemporary overlap of army and police is an important topic for study. On-job trial and error to learn from one another may not be enough. In counter-insurgency, the army, the police and the administrative service, all may have different perspectives. For example, the diplomat may have to argue for the case of India in international forum on issues of human rights, rule of law and treaties that India is signatory to. The intelligence community, similarly, may have differences over internal or home-grown or external factors. The approaches, views and concerns of the legislature and judiciary, likewise, need to be studied in depth. Good mentors and teachers need to have discussions on such cases in order to study the why and how of a problem from various perspectives.

Conclusion

The article shifts the focus away from transactional CMR and the politics over it. Instead, it argues for a wholesome cross-disciplinary and multidisciplinary education on various aspects of this relationship to understand the behaviour of various stakeholders. The stakeholders, it is argued, are not just the military, who have to constantly deepen, broaden and update their PME. Simultaneously, education at the higher political and strategic level also has to be imparted and organised for the civil

servants who deal with national security and strategy. The military, by itself, cannot be the sole creator *and* repository of knowledge. Linking and bridging the divide between the military and civil is an intellectual exercise. For knowledge creation, the intellectual foundation has to be broad-based, with a multidisciplinary focus, and filled up by academics who must bring in rigour, including a research design and methodology. This broadening of education will be a necessary step towards a synergetic civil–military understanding for generation of superior strategies.

In sum, imbibing this education is not only the job of the military but also of the civilian leadership and bureaucracy. This information and knowledge can only be generated with a good academic and research focus. To achieve and then sustain this objective, a vital link is that of a scholar and a fertile university support system.

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Notes

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