

Sub-Conventional Warfare Requirements, Impact and Way Ahead

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Clear higher level directions, strategic and tactical directives are essential for the Army and other security forces trained and equipped for conventional warfare to operate in an extremely challenging and hostile sub-conventional warfare environment. Commanders and troops must understand that they are operating in a tricky situation and their overall aim will always remain achievement of more perfect peace. It simply implies that there is no such thing as a quick military victory. Conduct of counter-insurgency campaigns will invariably extend over a number of years. None should attempt to achieve 'quick-end' results, particularly by excessive use of force. Excessive use of force is counter-productive and must be avoided. Patience, perseverance, warmth and genuineness must be displayed by totally committed, dedicated and motivated leadership at all levels. Undeniably, counter-insurgency environment demands a very high order intellectual acumen unimagined ever before in conventional setting. The training methodology of security forces personnel has to strike a good balance in conventional warfare tactics as also sub-conventional warfare training requirements since possibility of conventional wars cannot be ruled out and at the same time sub-conventional nature of present and future wars cannot be ignored.

General

Most conflicts in future will occur in the form of sub-conventional/unconventional / low intensity conflicts.¹ This is being observed all around. Security forces personnel will continue to find themselves employed less in traditional roles and more in non-traditional roles characteristically found at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Sub-conventional warfare differs qualitatively from conventional warfare. Therefore, when employed in unconventional roles, it is imperative that personnel fully understand these qualitative differences and how they impact upon their actions in the operations.

The focus of this part of research study is three-fold. This paper will attempt to define sub-conventional warfare, commonly known as unconventional

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warfare and bring out salient differences between conventional and sub-conventional warfare before discussing various forms of sub-conventional warfare in which our security forces personnel may get engaged. Finally, list out typical requirements and peculiarities of sub-conventional warfare along with impact of such warfare on security forces personnel and thereafter suggest a way ahead in order to derive optimum output from our security forces personnel.

Understanding Sub Conventional Warfare

Sub-Conventional Warfare is a generic term encompassing all armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful co-existence amongst states and below the threshold of war. It includes militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism employed as a means in an insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently. Border skirmishes also fall within this category. Today, nations are challenged by this new variety of threats under the guise of low intensity conflicts (LIC), which carry with them an equally insidious danger of usurping national / regional stability. The full scale and devastating impact of these

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conflicts may not be felt for decades, but these will serve to set the stage for future violent struggles. Figuring at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and entails protracted struggle, sub-conventional warfare could also be characterized by asymmetry of force levels between regular forces and irregulars. The force applied and the violence generated depends on the modus operandi of the weaker side and the laws of the land, which bind the actions of the security forces. The modus operandi of weaker side is generally characterized by irrationality, indiscrimination, unpredictability and ruthlessly destructive behavior.

Management and resolution of such conflicts necessitates a multi-pronged thrust by all elements of national power to address the root causes. The application of security forces in the initial stages is aimed at providing a secure environment, wherein various institutions of the government can function devoid of any inimical interference. Having provided this environment, the security forces, thereafter, function in a manner that strengthens the hands of the government.

Sub-conventional warfare is the primary method by which LIC is fought and in its many forms it will continue to plague nations through out the world.² These conflicts are not wars of trenches, frontlines and masses of men in uniform

struggling against each other on bloody battlefields. Instead these are wars of subtleties, nuances, intimidation, fear, political mobilization, terror and revolution – at times bloody but most times characterized by psychological warfare, political maneuvering and mobilization, disinformation, deception, assassination and terrorism.³

Sub-Conventional Warfare is a broad spectrum of military and para-military operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source during all conditions of war or peace. It includes guerilla warfare and other direct offensive actions, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape. Such warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous people, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by external source during all conditions of war and peace. Such conflicts are political wars in the most literal sense. Thus, in finalizing a military reaction to sub conventional wars, security forces actions must be coordinated with the other instruments of national power in order to provide synergized solution to the conflict, where goals are simple, targets limited, terrain familiar, results immediate and satisfactions personal.⁴

Unconventional warfare is a form of warfare which is based on the idea that it is possible to destabilize an enemy so much that it concedes even if it has the ability to continue making war. Rather than relying on brute force tactics of conventional warfare, unconventional warfare is based on using creative, innovative and usually stealthy tactics so that the enemy never knows what to expect.⁵ This type of warfare is also referred as 'non-conventional' or 'sub-conventional' or 'asymmetrical' warfare or 'small war' or even 'new war'.⁶ Various forms, in which sub-conventional warfare exists today, include militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism. These forms may be employed as a means in an insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently.⁷

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The general objective of this type of warfare is to instill a belief that peace and security are not possible without compromise or concession. Specific objectives include inducement of war-weariness; curtailment of civilian's standard of living and civil liberties associated with greater security demands, economic hardship linked to the cost of war, helplessness to defend against assaults, fear, depression and disintegration of morale. The ultimate goal of this

type of warfare is to motivate an enemy to stop attacking or resisting even if it has the ability to continue. Failing this, a secondary objective can be to emasculate the enemy before a conventional attack.

Differences from Conventional Warfare

In conventional warfare, security forces have a clearly stated objective and a plan of getting there. However, in sub-conventional warfare, the goals are usually more nebulous and troops often work independently, in small groups, striking blows at the enemy as they see it. Any target is fair game in unconventional warfare, from uniformed troops to civilians, as the idea is essentially to collapse the enemy from the inside out, forcing them to capitulate and negotiate surrender.

The use of intimidation and coercion is common in unconventional warfare, where anything goes, as long as the greater goal of bringing about a concession is eventually achieved. The lack of clear goals and encouragement of subversive tactics sometimes leads to the development of rogue operators, who may have lost sight of the greater mission as they work independently. For example, a

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guerilla force may move from active harassment of villagers supporting the enemy to tormenting innocent civilians who have no vested interests in the outcome of war. Here, battle lines are not clearly drawn, the enemy is not identifiable and thus aggression can not be unequivocally channeled in his direction. Organizational as well as national goals are unclear and ambiguous as also public support is missing in this type of warfare. The use of firepower by security forces is restricted and application of force is under constant scrutiny by media and human rights organizations in unconventional warfare. Such restrictions and limitations are not imposed on the security forces in conventional warfare.

Some of the distinctive features of sub-conventional conflict zone vis-à-vis conventional conflict zone include blurring of the distinction between front and rear, strategic and tactical actions and combatants and non-combatants. In addition the environment is suitably manipulated by terrorists to enhance their relevance and credibility by employing 'mass disruptive' or 'mass destructive' methods through direct and indirect measures for psychologically influencing various sections of the environment.

Requirements in Sub-Conventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare is a complex phenomenon. The difficulties in dealing with such conflicts begin with its very nature – it defies the logical, geometrical and technological aspects of conventional warfare as well as its principles. It is often difficult to determine whether we are winning or losing, and who in the end, the ultimate victor is.⁸ Principles of war do not adequately guide the employment of forces in unconventional conflicts. One of the difficulties encountered with respect to formulating responses to unconventional conflict is that they all differ in some respects. Though generalizations can be formulated about such conflicts, the circumstances that surround the initiation of a particular conflict are never exactly replicated in other conflicts. Hence each conflict has its own genesis, unique environment, aim and methodology for combating such movements.⁹ Each insurgency problem requires a different kind of approach, strategy, training and leadership. All too often, we tend to apply the same tactics, techniques and lessons learnt from one conflict onto another and while the broad underlying principles can be enunciated, there can be no templates of such experience.

In addition, the political and human dimensions of unconventional warfare complicate not only the formulation of an effective response but also the prosecution of it. It requires integration of all instruments of the national power and coordination of civil and military activities. An extraordinary

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comprehensive unity of efforts is required in order to conduct successful counter-insurgency operations. Since such operations are required to be carried out by unconventional methods and form an element of unconventional warfare, it becomes evident that our security forces are suitably prepared and equipped to meet the challenges of future. It must be understood that solution in such type of warfare is more of political and less of military in nature.

The principles of unconventional warfare derived from the analysis of guerilla warfare theory are objective, offensive, maneuver, mobility, unity of effort, economy of force, security and deception, speed, surprise, simplicity, knowledge, psychology, dispersion, concentration, flexibility, initiative, unpredictability, mobilization, legitimacy, perseverance and adaptability. Principles of war whether conventional or unconventional are neither like the laws of natural science where the observance of specific conditions produces a

predictable result, nor are they like rules of a game, the breach of which entails a prescribed penalty.¹⁰ Rather they are guides to action or fundamental tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning but their relevance, applicability and relative importance changes with circumstances. These must be adapted to a particular situation at the disposal and it must be recognized that every insurgency movement has its own peculiarities and nuances. Observing a set of prescribed principles, whether to be used as a checklist or framework for activity can not replace good judgment and leadership on any battlefield and understanding the nature of conflict is the first critical step in mission analysis.

Some of the basic requirements which are deemed necessary for successful operations in sub conventional warfare environment are listed below:

- Substantial effort must be devoted to promoting the government's legitimacy.
- The government must recognize that the insurgency is not primarily a military problem and it must recognize and address the legitimate grievances of the people.
- Operations must rest primarily on civil-police apparatus with the military in support role.
- Sound intelligence is imperative in sub-conventional warfare and the intelligence apparatus must be responsive to all echelons and organizations involved in the counter-insurgency effort.
- Security Forces should be deployed on an area basis. Junior officers should be allowed a considerable initiative and tactical flexibility must be observed.
- Restraint must be exercised.
- Patience is necessary. Counter-insurgency efforts may consume years rather than months.
- Security Forces must be able to afford protection to the population and government's instruments of political control and influence. They must also be able to perform non-coercive, quasi-military and military activities to mobilize public support.

Peculiarities

The constant threat of low intensity proxy war and terrorism has become a disturbing feature of national life. This constitutes the new face of war. Insurrectionist movements are likely to continue on account of religious, cultural and socio-economic disparities and state as well as non state actors will continue to exploit these to further their nefarious designs as also to offset the asymmetry in combat power. Armed cadres of almost all contemporary insurgency movements are increasingly showing scant regard for security of civilians, which traditional insurgents of the past displayed. Presently, almost all insurrectionist movements are witnessing a very high profile of criminal terrorist activity that aims to cause paralysis and disorder in civil society. This emboldens the perpetrators to shape the asymmetrical battle space to their advantage.

Intensity of threat has inherent capability of moving from one stage to the other based on the popular support base and does not remain compartmentalized. The level of popular support and degree of violence can vary due to success of either the government or the insurgent/ terrorist groups. Increasing popular support is crucial for the success of both the insurgency and the counter-insurgency operations and thus popular support is the final determinant of any movement or of the success of a counter-insurgency campaign.

The end state sought by a national counter-insurgency campaign is always 'conflict resolution', which generally succeeds 'conflict termination'. This entails demilitarization of the conflict zone and shaping the environment, wherein the remaining differences can be pursued without violence. The requisite shaping of the environment is effected through a concurrent application of all elements of national power by applying multiple prong strategy, where each being addressed simultaneously by two or more elements. Since this entails dealing with the attitudes and mind-sets of people, the process is long drawn and laborious. Various prongs of this process are creation of secure and conducive environment, isolation of conflict zone, addressing local aspirations and winning hearts and minds and managing perceptions of all state and non-state players in the domestic, regional and international environment through effective public information and perception management. Such information operations must also cater to the needs of the security forces personnel so that they all view various developments in the correct perspective and activities of inimical forces are not able to impact adversely on their morale.

Sub-conventional warfare operations have to be undertaken by the security forces with full respect to human rights in accordance with the laws of land since centre of gravity for such operations is the populace. The application of military power in such operations is so regulated that it enhances the control by civil authorities in the conflict zone besides strengthening their hands.

Neutralization of terrorists and their support base must be in consonance with laws of land so that the civil face of the governance is always visible. Terrorists must be afforded full opportunity to surrender and only those terrorists, who do not accept the offer and continue to resist, should be neutralized. The handling of over ground workers also has to be as per the laws. The orchestration of the military operations has to be such that they also induce a desired degree of fatigue amongst supporters of the cause. Since this is a double edged weapon, it needs to be imaginatively applied to ensure its efficacy. Otherwise, it may convert even the champions of non-violence into violence-seekers.

The thrust of military operations in the sub-conventional conflict management has to be on executing coordinated operations ranging from border areas to the hinterland. Various types of operations in such conflicts that may have to be undertaken by the military include effective sealing of borders to preclude trans-border movement of terrorists and war waging material, establishment of a comprehensive counter-terrorist grid in the hinterland with focus to deny population centres to the terrorists, provide security to military lines of communications and ensuring security of various vulnerable areas and vulnerable points, ensure effective public information and perception management initiatives and to undertake civic actions to address the aspirations of the populace and winning their hearts and minds.

The number of terrorists killed in action or captured alone cannot be used as a scale to gauge the overall success of their operations undertaken by the security forces. This has to be measured by the enthusiasm or groundswell for peace that operations generate among the populace which include general stance of locals towards security forces, number of over-ground workers neutralized, degree of real time intelligence available, local assistance for various civic action projects, protests against the security forces for any alleged human rights violations, number of seditious media reports and functioning of state government's institutions in the conflict zone.

Impact of Sub-Conventional Warfare on Security Forces Personnel

Soldiers operating in such an environment have experienced a number of stressful events including operational stressors, domestic stressors, intra-unit hassles, physical and situation attributes of operation zone, and socio-political stressors.¹¹ Troops deployed in low intensity conflict have been

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found to be suffering from significantly higher psychiatric morbidity, alcohol use, unfavorable response to task, diminished efficiency, frustration, maladjustment, tension, isolation etc.¹² Chaudhury reported high psychiatry morbidity, depression and alcoholism in soldiers in low intensity conflict.¹³ Nations customarily measure the costs of war in dollars, lost production or the number of soldiers killed or wounded. But rarely do military establishments attempt to measure the costs of war in terms of individual suffering. Psychiatric breakdowns remain one of the most costly items of war when expressed in human terms. Indeed, for the combatants in every major war fought in twentieth century, there has been a greater possibility of becoming psychiatric casualty than of being killed by enemy fire. Around the world the price of civilization is being paid every day by military units in low intensity conflicts/peace-keeping operations and para-military and police forces that are forced to engage in close combat. There have been and will continue to be times and places where combat is unavoidable, but when a society requires its security forces to participate in combat, it is essential to fully comprehend the magnitude of the inevitable psychological toll.¹⁴ Denial of the psychological consequences of combat may be perilous.¹⁵ The most strategic resource that India has in low intensity conflict is the young officer and soldier of the Indian Army. Hence it must be accepted that security forces personnel operating in such conflicts will suffer from numerous stress related problems and these problems need serious addressing at all levels without any delay lest it starts affecting efficiency of troops and their morale adversely.

It is therefore, important that management of troops is given utmost importance and mechanisms created to identify personnel under stress so that appropriate corrective measures can be instituted in time. An intimate interaction by commanders at all levels with their commands contributes substantially to the creation of necessary organizational climate within units and formations. It is equally important that rest and recoup is factored into the daily routine at sub-unit and unit levels. Arrangements have to be ensured at all operating bases to enable all ranks to speak to their families on telephone and for timely dispatch and receipt of private mail. In addition, recreational facilities should also be catered for at all bases. Timely grant of leave to personnel needs to be addressed with due sensitivity. Availability of essential medical facilities in close proximity has to be ensured for troops operating in such an environment. Constant efforts have to be put in commanders at all levels to attend to physical and psychological needs of their troops apart from keeping them well informed and improving their living conditions and facilitating resolution of their domestic problems and ongoing disputes.

Indian Army draws its strength from its ethos, traditions and culture that have shaped the organization's psychology over centuries. The essence of these manifests amongst all ranks in the form of a spirit of self denial, moderation, tolerance, respect for women and elderly members of society and an ability to live in peace and harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment.

The need for continued reiteration and consideration of these values to the troops is, therefore, of paramount significance.

Impact on Conventional Battlefield Preparedness

It will not be out of context to mention here that training of security forces has to have a good balance in conventional warfare tactics as also sub-conventional warfare training requirements since possibility of conventional wars can not be ruled out and at the same time sub-conventional nature of present and future wars cannot be ignored.

Some attempt to justify that counter-insurgency provides an excellent opportunity to train our troops under 'near live' battlefield conditions. Such perceptions only expose our approach to training. In counter-insurgency, at best, platoon and column operations are practiced based on purely patrolling and raids, wherein troops barely operate at platoon and column levels at a distance of about 5-10 km away from their posts over a period of 48-72 hours. In fact, such activity is totally detrimental to conventional battlefield requirements in Indian context since battle procedures are hardly practiced and tested and physical fitness and endurance standards decline rapidly apart from developing indifferent attitude towards man-machine mix processes. Consequently, overall combat efficiency for hot war tends to deteriorate. It is essential that training of security forces personnel in training centres, various training academies and institutes/ schools of instruction and formation schools focuses on preparation for conventional as well as sub-conventional operations in a balanced manner.

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Tackling Insurgency

Military operations must aim at creating a sense of security by preventing depredations by insurgents on the people, and force misguided elements to seek an honourable negotiated settlement. Our conventional training philosophy, based on toughening a man, motivating him with an ardent regimental spirit and patriotic feelings, is not ideally suited to carry out counter-insurgency operations. If so, changes in attitudes are mandatory to achieve the primary objective of winning over the hearts and minds of the people. But sudden transitions are always difficult to manage, since it will often mean discarding conventional military wisdom. In fact, military hawks usually

term it as appeasement or live and let live approach/tactics. Hence reorientation training for counter insurgency environment is mandatory both for political masters and the army.

Even at tactical level, there is scope for refinement. It must be remembered that during the conduct of operations, tactical successes are necessary to retain initiative, to maintain morale and motivational levels of own troops and to force the insurgents to remain always on the run. But, if tactical operations are executed in an uncontrolled manner, they directly contribute to the achievement of insurgent strategy of creating a sea of hostility. Thus, there exists a contradiction. We must accept that fighting back is a fundamental human instinct, and even soldiers will retaliate in self defence, if their own survival is threatened by insurgents and their supporters. Anyone will retaliate, if their own survival is at stake. Therefore, it must be emphasized during training that security forces are carrying out extremely delicate tasks under serious tactical constraints. Patience and perseverance are the prime requirements in such scenarios. Also security forces must develop consummate, calculative and deft, tactical, psychological and political sophistication to come up with correct answers to numerous unforeseen situations that can crop up in an insurgency environment; be it during ambushes, or search operations, or interrogation of hostiles or their supporters, or innocent civilians. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic and impractical to produce templates for application.

Employment of army using conventional concepts and infantry tactics but with restrictions on the use of fire power, particularly in the initial stages of insurgency, is the first step and must start with the identification of the problem and accurate visualization of pattern of insurgent operations to include their initial, intermediate and final objectives. Furthermore, their capabilities must be accurately reviewed and tasks likely to be executed correctly identified. Of course, the overall aim of all clandestine and subversive activities would be to expand their influence over people by attraction or coercion with a view to assert their credibility in the minds of masses and to gain initiative in the military field. Expressed in terms of tasks, all insurgent activities include: guerilla operations to acquire military capability and ascendancy, recruitment to expand politico-military base, tax and ration collection to sustain expanding capability, selective killings to coerce non-partisans to extend support and political initiatives to gain and widen external and internal support. Perforce, security forces' tactical operations must be designed to combat such insurgent activities with least inconvenience to the people and contain insurgency. Therefore, counter insurgency operations automatically include: population control and denial, psychological operations, civic action programmes and search, ambush and raid missions to isolate and capture insurgents and destroy their camps. In such a complex situation, conduct of uncontrolled operations usually results in real and contrived excesses and loss of credibility. Thus, excessive use of military force

by uninitiated commanders and troops will always be counter-productive and must never be attempted.

To amplify further, general cordon and search operations are usually counter-productive and need to be replaced by selective cordon and search operations conducted on the basis of real time actionable intelligence, to prevent causing avoidable harassment and humiliation to people. Furthermore, excessive employment of road opening parties, convoy escorts and other security measures, particularly curfew restrictions, though defensive by nature, are not only counter-productive but also offer lucrative targets to the insurgents to inflict casualties and achieve their overall strategy. Therefore tactical operational activity should only be directed at insurgents and their active collaborators/ sympathizers with least disturbance caused to neutral and friendly people. Of course, intelligence capability will be the most vital Key Result Area to conduct such operations. Logic automatically dictates employment of special forces, operating from designated firm bases, to launch surprise strikes aimed at capturing maximum number of insurgents and arms or destroying their camps, vis-à-vis conduct of large scale and un-controlled operations during initial stage. However, during later stage of insurgency, guerilla activity will be widespread and will finally move into open conventional warfare. In both situations, the army will be forced to counter insurgent activity adopting conventional tactics with restricted fire power, but once again supported by a psychological warfare effort. The overall objective will continue to remain, winning over the hearts and mind of the people.

Way Ahead

We must accept that clear higher level directions, strategic and tactical directives are essential for the Army and other security forces trained and equipped for conventional warfare to operate in an extremely challenging and hostile sub-conventional warfare environment. Also, it has to be remembered that the Army has always been a target of the insurgents, since it represents the greatest obstacle to their designs. But to the common man, it has to represent a force for peace, stability and national integrity. To acquire this image, Army has to pay by its blood and sweat which has to be accepted with sagacity. There are bound to be incidents now and then, particularly after any violent incident involving loss of comrade's life. Even in such incidents, disciplinary aspects must be investigated and defaulters punished expeditiously. However, such incidents must be viewed in the totality of functional and operational requirements. Such incident that may take place merits more understanding and a little indulgence, particularly at higher level. A correct perspective for the future can only emerge then. Otherwise, one may be contributing to the promotion of insurgent's strategy, that is, drawing established government into a sea of hostility. In all cases, commanders and troops must not only sound genuine but also appear genuine and prove their genuineness of bringing peace by acts on ground.

Commanders and troops must understand that they are operating in a tricky situation and their overall aim will always remain achievement of more perfect peace. It simply implies that there is no such thing as, a quick military victory. Conduct of counter-insurgency campaigns will invariably extend over a number of years. None should attempt to achieve 'quick-end' results, particularly by excessive use of force. Excessive use of force is counter-productive and must be avoided. Patience, perseverance, warmth and genuineness must be displayed by totally committed, dedicated and motivated

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leadership at all levels. Undeniably, counter-insurgency environment demands a very high order intellectual acumen unimagined ever before in conventional setting. Since it is a 'No Win' situation, performance evaluation may not be based on head count of number of insurgents captured/ destroyed and weapons captured or on number of hearts and minds won over. At the same time there is no room for 'Zero Error' or 'live and let live' approach to the problem. Such is the nerve racking complexity of the problem that the need for ensuring correct type of mental conditioning at all levels assumes vital significance. Fighting insurgency in this backdrop tends to create tremendous pressure on the minds of security forces' personnel due to contradictory requirements and as such needs to be addressed appropriately at various levels.

The role assigned to the security forces is to assist civil administration in combating insurgency and maintaining law and order. In some states, the role is to provide internal security cover, if required. To facilitate smooth conduct of operations by the Army, some Acts are passed by Legislatures and areas declared as 'Disturbed' from time to time. Whereas some states may accept the need for better legal standing for the security forces in private councils, they feel diffident to pass public laws out of fear of losing vote banks. At all such places in our context Armed Forces Special Powers Act is in vogue and takes care of legal aspects while operating in such circumstances but the frequent airing in media about scrapping of such acts puts pressure on the minds of troops and thus must be avoided till such time troops are deployed. It is essential that personnel employed to assist in combating insurgency and maintaining law and order at the behest of local state governments should continue to enjoy the powers and legal protection available to them during employment to resolve the situation. The insurgent elements preaching and practicing sedition have to be denied release on bail in order to prevent their rejoining insurgency and pursuing violence. The need is, therefore, to treat insurgents on the same legal status as hostile combatants at war by the judiciary. A suitable Act in this regard needs to be framed and passed by the government.

Security forces all over the world would like to pack up and go home from a thankless job in such an environment. But such an act will be considered as dereliction of duty. Therefore, security forces must learn to live and survive in insurgency situations. Whenever situation improves radically and misguided elements rejoin the national mainstream, continued security forces employment would become irrelevant. Otherwise also, as and when the efficiency and effectiveness of local police forces improves and they attain effective wherewithal to counter insurgency and maintain law and order, the security forces must be located slightly away from population centres, ever ready and available to guarantee peace and stability against both external and internal threats. The exploitation of technology and modern equipments must be given due weightage while fighting in this type of environment for achieving superiority over insurgents and minimising on casualties.

Conclusion


This paper has attempted to highlight relevant issues pertaining to future as well as today's warfare commonly known as sub-conventional warfare, which encompasses all types of armed conflicts above the level of peaceful co-existence and below the threshold of war, such as militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism apart from border skirmishes, with a view to promote a better understanding of the hostile and challenging environment in which Army is expected to operate.

There is only one option to counter insurgency and that is, to find a political solution. Any talk of exercising military or hard option mercilessly will only reveal the blinkered strategic perceptions of policy decision makers and must be avoided at all costs. Military pressure should invariably be applied only in a deft and calculative manner, deliberately avoiding excesses all the time.

The principle of minimum force needs to be ensured, particularly during the initial phases of insurgency to encourage the insurgents to seek an honourable political settlement. For reaching desirable political settlement, suitable political initiatives and offensives need to be launched at critical times. Timing is critical as otherwise opportunities provided by military means may be wasted. It has to be always remembered and reiterated again and again that basic aim of military in counter-insurgency operations is to win over the hearts and minds of local population.

Considering the importance of managing stress among security forces personnel operating in sub-conventional warfare environment, it will be in the fitness of things to understand relationship that exists between stress and performance in such conditions. Evaluation of impact on motivation of troops operating in low intensity conflict environment with a view to suggest remedial measures to prevent undesired levels of stress among them will form

the next important step towards meeting the requirements of man-management challenges.

The training methodology of security forces personnel has to strike a good balance in conventional warfare tactics as also sub-conventional warfare training requirements since possibility of conventional wars cannot be ruled out and at the same time sub-conventional nature of present and future wars can not be ignored. Hence, there is a need for devising a human resource development strategy to suit the requirements of sub-conventional warfare while keeping the conventional warfare capability of army intact. 

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