

Emerging Dynamics of Pakistan's Internal Situation and the Security Challenge for India

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As of now, institutions within Pakistan are strong enough to prevent both the balkanisation of Pakistan as well as the possibility of the state falling into theocratic hands. Pakistan is also unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as it considers the terrorist organisations to be its strategic assets. Internal disturbances within Pakistan allow it to maintain plausible deniability and the shifting of blame on to non-state actors over whom Pakistan claims it has no control. This paper argues that India's response to terror will have to be well thought out. Waging war against Pakistan to counter its support to terrorist activities within India is not likely to work. It will polarise Pakistani society and push it further into the hands of fundamentalist forces. In any event, the battle to be waged is ideological and peace can never be achieved unless India displays the will to act.

Background

Fault lines within Pakistan have existed since the creation of the state. The current high levels of violence afflicting large parts of the country reflect the failure of the state in dealing with separatist tendencies and in addressing ethnic, religious and sectarian issues. While the conflict in Baluchistan is an ongoing struggle for freedom being waged by the Baluchi people, the rise of terrorism in other parts of the country is the result of specific factors.¹ The first of these was the hanging of Bhutto after the coup staged by General Zia-ul-Haq. This led to the formation of a terrorist outfit, the Al-Zulfikar. Zia, fearing the resurgence of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), promoted the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) to counter the PPP's influence in Sindh. The violence by and against the MQM, which passed through certain evolutionary stages was responsible for most incidents of terrorism in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. Thereafter, Zia, to legitimise his dictatorship and create his own constituency, introduced the 'Zakat and Usher Ordinance in 1980', based on Sunni jurisprudence. The large Shia

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minority in Pakistan, which constitutes 20 per cent, of the population objected to the Ordinance and forced its repeal. To counter the Shia ascendance, Zia took recourse to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), an anti-Shia Deobandi religious organisation. The SSP was funded by both Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The SSP, later on, spawned several militant splinter groups, the most dangerous and notorious of them being the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).² Almost 30 per cent of terrorism in Pakistan is traced back to the SSP or its sub-groups and the Shia groups like Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP).³

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted the US and Saudi Arabia to invest nearly \$6 billion in the region to organise, train, and arm fighters to take on

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the Soviets. This further strengthened Zia vis-à-vis the PPP and the Shias. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) seized the opportunity to divert these mujahedeen in two directions: to create strategic depth in Afghanistan and to be used against India as strategic assets. However, after the Al Qaeda attack on the US on September 11, 2001, Pakistan began to support the US, which bought it the enmity of the Arab mujahedeen and the Taliban. The existing terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPT), FATA and some parts of the Punjab is a direct consequence of Pakistan's conflict with the Arab mujahedeen and the Taliban. To further aggravate the situation, drone attacks inside Pakistani territory have led to "a backlash among the tribesmen and even among the general population of Pakistan".

A Shift to Ideology

It can, thus, be seen that Pakistan is no stranger to terror attacks on its soil. Over the last few years, attacks on Pakistan's security forces, blasts in crowded places, suicide attacks, targeted killings and the like have become commonplace and barely evoke public outrage and condemnation. From time to time, outrageous acts of terror such as the attack on the Marriott hotel and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto do engage the public consciousness. But even these could not become game changers in the violence afflicted narrative of Pakistan's recent blood splattered history. The former was soon

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relegated to the background as the target was an elitist location belonging to an American franchise and frequented by the rich and powerful, a large number of whom were foreigners; the latter was rationalised over time as a political killing and not viewed in the larger context of a specific design to target the state of Pakistan. But, two incidents after 2009 can be viewed as having changed the narrative. The first of these was the terrorist strike on the Sri Lankan cricket team on March 3, 2009. The second was the assassination of the governor of Pakistan's Punjab province, Salman Taseer on January 4, 2011.

The Sri Lankan cricketers were en route to the Gaddafi Stadium when their bus was attacked by 12 armed terrorists near Liberty market.⁴ Five cricketers, including Mahela Jayawardene, the captain, were injured in the attack which killed six security men and two civilians. The contours of the debate on terror have changed dramatically since then: the attack was described in various quarters as comparable to the attack on the United States on September 9, 2001 and the attack on Mumbai on November 26, 2008. According to Imran Khan, former Pakistan cricket captain-turned-politician, "No one would ever dare attack a visiting cricketer because cricket is so loved in Pakistan. The entire nation would turn against the perpetrators."⁵ Khan later had to eat his words, though he subtly shifted the blame on lax security – "I think this was one of the worst security failures in Pakistan," he told the BBC. "The Pakistan government guaranteed the Sri Lankan cricket team that they would provide them security, and to see the type of security provided to the Sri Lankan cricket team was completely shameful". He further added that: "It certainly is a disaster for Pakistan sport. But I think much more, I think this was targeted at Pakistan's economy and at destabilising the country."⁶

That the perpetrators brazenly attacked a high profile publicly adored target which was under a security cover guaranteed by the government of Pakistan was intended to convey a more ominous message; the ability to strike at any time, at any place and against any target. In a sense this attack marked the beginning of an ideological war where acts of terror were designed to mould public thinking against taking a stand antithetical to the radical Islamisation of society. The attack signified the readiness of theocratic forces to take on any aspect of life in Pakistan – even a sport so widely loved as cricket, to promote their narrow fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The killing of the governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, in January 2011 was the next game changer which starkly highlighted the extent to which the forces of radical Islam have impacted the mindset of large segments of the population. Salman Taseer was killed because he wanted a change in the infamous

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blasphemy law which can be used to arbitrarily incarcerate anyone who is alleged to have insulted the Prophet or made any derogatory remarks against any Muslim holy personage. This law was used to convict and sentence to death, on November 8, 2010, a poor uneducated Christian village woman, Aasia Bibi on fabricated charges of blasphemy. Salman Taseer had spoken out against the death sentence awarded to Aasia and was seeking a presidential pardon for her. For his views on the blasphemy law, he was killed in cold blood by his own security guard, 26 year old Malik Mumtaz Qadri, who surrendered immediately after killing the man he was designated to protect. The reaction of Pakistan's civil society to this horrific killing was muted, people refusing to speak up for fear of meeting the same fate. Due to this fear, no notable cleric in Lahore, including the *Khateeb* of the famous Badshahi Mosque Maulana Abul Khatir Azad was willing to perform Governor

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Taseer's last rites. On the other hand, the clerics openly supported the killer, and frantic cheering crowds showered rose petals on him when he was produced before a magistrate in Islamabad. Even in the social media, Pakistan's public chose to side with the killer indicating the extent to which the moderate voice has been overtaken by religious fanaticism. The message coming out of Pakistan is clear - people opposed to radical Islam will be eliminated. In this war of ideology, it is the radicalised elements within society who are increasingly writing the narrative, pushing out the voices of reason and moderation in Pakistan.

Impact of Zia

The roots of radicalism in Pakistani society lie in the education policy formulated by President Zia ul Haq, which has been largely responsible for the spread of fundamentalism within society.⁷ When Pakistan came into existence, its educational curriculum was forward looking with an emphasis on multiculturalism and nationalism perceived in futuristic and modernist terms. This was revised by Zia and made to revolve around Islamic thought with an ideological orientation that aimed to unite the nation under the banner of Islam. History and geography, which were separate and distinct subjects, were amalgamated together as Pakistan Studies and made compulsory for all students from the ninth grade through the first year of college, including engineering and medical schools. History teaching was distorted, hatred for India was inculcated and 'Islamiyat' was made compulsory with specific directions ... "To demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion... To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan - the creation of a completely Islamised state" as per a University Grants Commission directive in 1983 .

In the process the cultures and histories of sub nationalities like the Baloch, Pathan and Sindhi were suppressed and an irrational paradigm denied the existence of cultural differences on the assumption that religion would bridge the gap between sub national identities. The strategies that Zia appropriated and propagated were based on narrow, medieval interpretations of Islam, which encouraged gender biased attitudes and policies and the taking up of arms for the sake of jihad. This stratification of Pakistan's educational infrastructure has created significant divergences of worldviews, with madrassa students tending to gravitate toward jihad. Public school or Urdu-medium students too have imbibed radical ideas but to a lesser extent. The small group of private sector educated elite children have more leeway for objective thinking, but tend to relate little with the two more mainstream educational streams. The educational system has, thus, contributed in large measure to the polarisation of society and the jihadi mindsets. As per Pervez Hoodbhoy:⁸

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Pakistan's self-inflicted suffering comes from the radicalisation of the education system that, like Saudi Arabia's system, provides an ideological foundation for violence and future jihadists. It demands that Islam be understood as a complete code of life, and creates in the mind of a school going child a sense of siege and embattlement by stressing that Islam is under threat everywhere.... If left unchallenged, this education will produce a generation incapable of co-existing with anyone except strictly their own kind. The mindset it creates may eventually lead to Pakistan's demise as a nation state.

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The radicalisation of society in conjunction with a weak economy and vast social and economic disparities in society is impacting negatively on Pakistan. The last three years have witnessed a slow economic growth rate- in the region of 2 to 3 per cent - with high inflation ranging between 10 and 15 per cent. Pakistan remains dependent on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international assistance for budgetary support and to keep the country more or less solvent. Its economy remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks

due to internal security concerns and the global financial crises. The devastation caused by floods in mid-2010 and reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows due to security concerns and domestic and regional political uncertainties have

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put additional pressure on the economy. Poor economic indicators further strain the credibility of the government leading to exacerbating existing fissiparous tendencies. The radicalisation of youth in conjunction with the socio-economic reality of Pakistan has produced a heady cocktail which has put Pakistan on the brink of disaster.

As per Shirin Sadeghi:⁹

The ugly truth of Pakistan is the overwhelming disparity between the wealth and abundance of the elite and the abject poverty of the masses. Embracing of religion by the masses then becomes the singular means of acquiring any authority or voice against the feudal lords and wealthy elite who are granted government positions from their friends to rule over people. Much of the elite are also perceived to be out of touch with the public's values. This has led to the country being influenced by fundamentalist forces and the murder of Salman Taseer was an outcome of this process".

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, Pakistan's former ambassador to both the United States and India, too views Pakistan's problems in terms of a "deeply dysfunctional and unjust political and socio-economic order".¹⁰ As per Qazi, while religion may provide solace to the poor, social and economic inequities enable the religious and other zealots to exploit this anger, frustration, faith and ignorance. Religion then becomes a violent stimulant for the masses and a means to power for the religious classes in accordance with their political agendas. The intimidation of the hated liberal elite, who are seen as largely responsible for their economic and emotional plight, provides them with a measure of consolatory satisfaction, as well as a false sense of empowerment. This attitude affects even the educated among the exploited classes. The murder of Salman Taseer, therefore, has significance much beyond its perpetration. If the political, security, social, economic and external challenges facing Pakistan are not addressed, class hatred will deepen and religion will continue to be used as a political explosive. These forces if not overcome could threaten the very existence of Pakistan.

The children who were born when Zia revised the educational curriculum are now young men steeped in radical ideology and believers in the primacy of religion. Qadri, who assassinated Governor Taseer, is one such man and there are millions more like him. The narrative they listen to is grounded in religion and championed by militant groups, pushing for a certain kind of Islamic polity; the narrative pushed by the more liberal elements of society emphasising the significance of making

progress in a more secular world is sidelined. A change of narrative would involve changing the whole socio-cultural, religious and political discourse – a task not easily accomplished.

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Impact of the Afghan Conflict

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has also contributed in large measure to the polarisation process. During the decade long Soviet occupation, the Afghan resistance operated from bases in Pakistan. The children of the refugees who had moved to Pakistan's western border grew up in refugee's camps and studied in seminaries set up by the Pakistan government with funds received covertly from the US and openly from Saudi Arabia, where they imbibed the ideologies of hate and revenge. This to a large extent also radicalised and influenced the population of the border areas of Pakistan. Following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the erstwhile leadership elements in Afghanistan also relocated to Baluchistan, FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Prominent among these were the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e Islami-Gulbuddin. The Pakistani Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also came into being during this period. Formed in 2007 by the late Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, the group is currently led by Hakimullah Mehsud, and poses a serious challenge to the Pakistani state. Another militant group active in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), was founded by Sufi Muhammad in 1992 with the objective of enforcing Sharia law in the country. Though banned by President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002, the group remained active and by 2007 had taken over much of Swat. While the group has been badly mauled by the Pakistan army in military operations over the last year and has been evicted from its stronghold in Swat, it has not been eliminated and continues to remain active under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah. It has been described as one of the most dangerous religious militant groups in Pakistan. Efforts by the Pakistan army to eliminate the TTP and TNSM have involved the use of air and heavy artillery. The brutal handling of the conflict in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has led to the destruction of entire villages and rendered more than a million people homeless.

The Cost of Conflict

During the period 1974-2007, about 2590 terrorist related incidents took place in Pakistan causing 5840 deaths and injuring another 11,597 persons.¹¹ Over the last three years, violence levels in Pakistan have reached epidemic proportions and have far surpassed the figures for the previous 34 years. Turning the situation around may soon cease to be a possibility. In 2010 itself, there were a total of 2120

militant attacks – a staggering figure indeed. Add to this another 1,275 incidents of violence including clashes between security forces and militants, operational attacks by security forces (including drone attacks), political and ethnic violence, border clashes and inter-tribal clashes and violence levels in Pakistan assume numbing proportions. This violence has led to the deaths of 9,959 people with another 10,274 people injured. The figures for violence levels in 2009 are even higher. A total of 3,817 attacks of all types took place over the year (militant attacks – 2594) in which 12,625 people were killed and 12,793 were injured.¹²

Of the four provinces of Pakistan, Baluchistan is beset by insurgency and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is literally a war zone. In the FATA, the situation is more explosive than that existing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. East of the Indus, fundamentalist forces have spread their roots in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh though violence levels here are small as compared to the other two provinces. But still the fear of terror has turned the cities in Pakistan into virtual fortresses.¹³ The port city of Karachi is also plagued by chronic ethnic violence which is an off shoot of a historical legacy dating

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back to the partition. Indeed, there is no part of Pakistan which has been left unaffected by militant or ethnic or sectarian/religious violence. The signs of an impending implosion in the country are all too real and a cause for serious concern. The situation in Afghanistan and the proposed withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan beginning later this year will set into motion a new set of dynamics. However, the proposed withdrawal in the present scenario is likely to be a token pullout only, as complete withdrawal will depend on the ability of the Afghanistan government and its security forces to tackle terrorist forces within Afghanistan and keep Al Qaeda out of any future security calculation. This would mean a prolonged US military presence in Afghanistan. This is not likely to be viewed favourably by US public opinion which could then

lead to another possibility—the partitioning of Afghanistan as suggested by Robert Blackwill, a former US ambassador to India. As per Blackwill:

Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that the price of forestalling that outcome is far too high for Americans to continue paying. The United States and its partners should stop fighting and dying in the Pashtun homeland and let the local correlation of forces take its course - while deploying US air power and Special Forces to ensure that the north and west of Afghanistan do not succumb to the Taliban.¹⁴

Blackwill's proposal has come under tremendous criticism both within the United States as well as within sections of the diplomatic and strategic community within India. But any option pertaining to Afghanistan is loaded with negative consequences, so Blackwill's formulation could well be the silver bullet that brings peace to the region. India hence should seriously address the possibility and be prepared for the likely fallout should this come to pass. The government of Afghanistan has never accepted the Durand Line and therefore its applicability is followed only in its breach. The Pakistan army will also be hard put to ensure its writ in the region with 15 per cent of its army being drawn from the area. The negation of the Durand line will bring to an end the artificial partitioning of the Pashtun people and will undo the injustice perpetrated more than a century ago of dividing a people based on geo strategic interests that existed at that time in what was called the Great Game.

The aspirations of the Baluchi people for independence have not died down and a raging insurgency continues despite the presence of 150,000 troops in the region along with over 40,000 troops of the frontier constabulary. In June 2010, Mehran Baluch, son of the legendary Baluch leader Nawab Khair Baksh Marri speaking at a conference organised by Interfaith International at Geneva stated that:

Let me assure whosoever matters that the armed boys of Pindi and Islamabad – who are also called the Taliban in uniform — will have to respect the concept of mine and thine as the Baluch people are resolved to undo the Pakistani conquest of their homeland on March 27, 1948...when the desire of freedom makes its place in the heart of the masses it becomes a material force no power on earth can defeat. The 20 million Baluch people shall prevail.

The desire to support the Afghan Taliban to retain influence in a future Afghanistan free of US presence makes it an unwilling partner in the war against terror.

Baluchistan is sitting on a volcano ready to explode. If Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA merge into a larger Pashtun reality, it would be but a matter of time before Baluchistan gets its independence and the might of the Pakistan's armed forces will not be able to prevent such an outcome.

Pakistan's fight against terrorism is handicapped by conflicting requirements. The desire to support the Afghan Taliban to retain influence in a future

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Afghanistan free of US presence makes it an unwilling partner in the war against terror. The TTP is targeted but there is a marked reluctance to take on Afghan militant groups. At home, Pakistan continues to support and nurture a wide variety of terrorist organisations based in Pakistan such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and the Hizbul Mujahideen which were created by Pakistani intelligence to fight against India in Kashmir and are considered as strategic assets. These groups are now not fully under the control of their mentors and often team up with Pashtun groups and the Pakistani Taliban in actions inimical to Pakistani interests.

What Does All This Portend for India?

An ideal situation for India would be one where democratic institutions in Pakistan are vibrant and functional, civil society is secular, there is great interdependency in trade, people to people contact between the two countries is extensive and the military in Pakistan does not have an overriding voice in the affairs of state. A rather utopian scenario but one which is not totally implausible. While Pakistani society has by and large been conservative, their religious tradition has always been more influenced by the Sufi practice which is characterised by a very large measure of

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tolerance. The present move towards the forcibly turning of Pakistan into a theocratic state is thus alien to the Asian ethos and can be countered. The success of both the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia and the January 25 revolution in Egypt and the ongoing struggle in Libya, Bahrain and other Arab states seeking greater political freedom is a message that cannot be lost on the people of Pakistan for whom the way ahead lies in shunning radical theocracy. India must hence provide moral and material support to those sections within Pakistani society to whom a theocratic form of government is anathema and support those initiatives within Pakistan which will lead to strengthening the hands of the liberal society to make them capable of resisting the influence of theocratic forces.

The narrative in Pakistan is, however, increasingly being dictated by the more radicalised elements of society. While such sections are still in a minority, the larger liberal mass has been silenced through fear. If Pakistan comes under the control of theocratic forces and becomes 'Talibanised', India cannot remain unaffected by events. The immediate

danger may well perhaps be the inflow of millions of people from Pakistan into India. We need to plan for such a contingency as part of our security calculus. But the long term threat remains ideological – how to prevent Indian Muslims from being infected by virulent theocratic ideology? Given India's large Muslim population, this could impact negatively on the present security environment in the country and could lead to the polarisation of society in India on communal grounds. Economic reforms and inclusive growth will by themselves go a long way in preventing such an outcome. This to an extent is already happening on the ground and the results are visible. There was no violence following the court verdict on the Babri Masjid issue or post the conviction of the people responsible for burning the train in Godhra. India's Hindus and Muslims have moved on and today's youth want to get on to the bandwagon of a developing India, shedding in the process the baggage of history. Dividing people to seek the Muslim vote or invoking caste linkages to win elections is increasingly becoming irrelevant as the people of India seek a better life. Inclusive growth then is vital to prevent the spread of all forms of theocratic ideologies. As a long term measure, India needs to ensure that the educational curriculum being followed in madrassas in India is modernised and monitored. Eradication of illiteracy, emancipation of women, and the creation of a more just society are the goals which we must strive for. This will strengthen our democratic institutions and act as a strong countervailing influence to the spread of a radical ideology.

Given India's large Muslim population, this could impact negatively on the present security environment in the country and could lead to the polarisation of society in India on communal grounds.

The possibility of Pakistan balkanising too cannot be dismissed out of hand. Balkanisation will be resisted by the Pakistan army and if it comes about it will be only after a bitter and bloody struggle. But the outcome for India will be strategically favourable as it will diminish Pakistan's ability to pose a conventional military threat to India and would result in the Kashmir problem being finally resolved. To that extent, it would not be antithetical to India's interests if the ground situation in Afghanistan leads to a de facto partitioning with the Pashtuns holding on to the Southern half of the country. This will eventually lead to a merger of the Pashtun people on either side of the Durand Line and over time could also lead to the Independence of the Baluchi people who have been fighting a long and unsuccessful battle for independence from the Pakistani state. While India can neither influence nor shape the course of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the situation needs to be monitored.

For the present, the institutions within Pakistan are strong enough as of now to prevent both the balkanising scenario and the possibility of the state falling into

theocratic hands. Pakistan also is unlikely to wind up terror operations against India as internal disturbances within Pakistan gives it plausible deniability and enables the blame for such acts to be shifted on non state actors over whom

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Pakistan can claim it has no control. Indian response to terror will have to be well thought out. Waging war against Pakistan to counter that country's support to terrorist activities within India is not likely to work. It will polarise Pakistani society and push them deeper into the hands of fundamentalist forces. In any event, the battle to be waged is ideological. Targeting specific bases of the terrorists is an option but would require foolproof real time intelligence which may not be forthcoming. Acting on outdated or incorrect information would be counterproductive as the terrorists frequently change the locations of their hideouts and camps. As these are generally in close

proximity to civilian habitation, the risk of collateral damage increases manifold without any surety of effective engagement of the terrorists. Limited military action in Jammu and Kashmir to seal the more prominent routes of infiltration would pay better dividends and could be considered if terrorist activities do not abate. This could take place with effective conflict control mechanisms in place and with garnering diplomatic support from the world community. While the possibility of such actions leading to war cannot be ruled out, the risk is something which India will have to take. Peace can never come about unless India displays the will to act on its concerns.

But India needs to look within too and set its own house in order. This must encompass a long term strategy to promote equitable economic growth and a more inclusive culture within India's polity and a broad consensus among all political parties to prevent the use of religion as vote bank politics. Revamping the criminal justice system is also the need of the hour to enhance confidence levels among the people and to give an unequivocal message that acts of terror will not be tolerated. It must be remembered that it is not the quantum of punishment but its certainty that acts as a deterrent to crime. A reduction of terror can be brought about if the guilty are brought to book expeditiously.

For Pakistan, its enlightened self interest dictates good and positive relations with India. The people of Pakistan need to rise to guide the destiny of their nation. The Arab world has shown the way; can the

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people of Pakistan follow their lead? It is a tall task but not outside the realms of what is possible. According to Zafar Hilaly:

The extremists in Pakistan cannot succeed on their own strength or on their political appeal as their ideology has nothing to do with tackling issues that really matter to most people, such as governance, economic and financial problems, generating jobs et al... It's not elusive miracles that we should be looking to save us when a modicum of common sense accompanied by a bit of strait laced courage would suffice.¹⁵

Zafar may be right, but time is running out and Pakistan may soon reach the point of no return.



Notes:

- 1 This analysis is taken from the work of Syed Ejaz Hussain, University of Pennsylvania, Scholarly Commons, "Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns, Terrorists' Characteristics, and the impact of Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism", May 17, 2010, available at <http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/136>.
- 2 The army of Jhangvi, the killed founding father of SSP.
- 3 See note 1.
- 4 "Gunmen Shoot Sri Lanka Cricketers", March 3, 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7920260.stm>
- 5 "In Terror's Shadow", *Business Standard*, March 08, 2009, available at www.business-standard.com/india/news/in-terrors-shadow/351160/
- 6 "Imran Khan Slams 'Shameful' Security For Sri Lanka Team", March 03, 2009, available at www.cricbuzz.com/cricket-news/11444/
- 7 Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas, "Polarisation of Social Studies in Text Books in Pakistan", Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), December 2010.
- 8 Pervez Hoodbhoy- "Paradox of Pakistan: An Unyielding Islam"; The Saudi-isation of Pakistan., available at <http://www.insaf.pk/Forum/tabid/53/forumid/1/tpage/1/view/topic/postid/47229/Default.aspx#47229>
- 9 Sadeghi, Shirin, "What Really Killed Pakistan's Taseer", January 7, 2011 available at www.huffingtonpost.com/shirin-sadeghi/what-really-killed-pakistan_b_805926.html
- 10 Qazi, Ashraf Jehangir, "Rejecting defeatist arguments", *The News*, January 16, 2011, available at www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=25989&Cat=9
- 11 From the figures tabulated by Syed Ejaz Hussain, see note. 1.
- 12 All data of terrorist attacks and casualty figures given in this paragraph for the period 2008 – 2010 have been compiled from figures published by Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS). The PIPS is an independent think tank in Pakistan.
- 13 Excerpted from the article, Katoch, C. Dhruv, "Will Pakistan Implode", *Indian Defence Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2011, available at <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/military-and-space/Will-Pakistan-Implode.html>
- 14 Blackwill, Robert D., "Plan B in Afghanistan", December 21, 2010, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-12-21/edit-page/28217106_1_qaida-al-qaida-taliban
- 15 Hilaly, Zafar, "Extremism not the only Problem", *The News*, February 10, 2011. Mr Hilaly is a former ambassador.