

# Japan: Dynamics of Military Alliance in Disaster Management

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*The March 2011 triple disaster in Japan obligated a response from the US, its long-time ally. The US disaster assistance to Japan went beyond the customary nature of the countries' relationship, and was conspicuous for the scale of military involvement that was embedded in the US-Japan alliance. The success of the US assistance programme Operation Tomodachi is attributed to interoperability between the defence forces of the two allies. In so doing, the alliance which was originally meant for projecting hard power has assumed a new role which is in sync with the new meaning of 'security' as defined in the wake of the end of the Cold War. This new orientation makes it necessary to revisit the theoretical understanding of military alliance. However, the success of Operation Tomodachi is likely to spur greater interoperability which in turn would enhance Japan's military modernisation.*

## Introduction

Defence force is ubiquitous in national security. Traditionally defined principles of security have been upholding the well-established institutions of international politics, embedded in the Westphalian moorings that privilege the nation-state as the principal unit of political organisation, with state sovereignty as the prime objective. The Westphalian model renders primacy to the state as an actor authorised to legitimately use or threaten use of force primarily to ensure its territorial security. Army and its other facets have been a classical instrument for defence. Lately, even in disasters, the chipping in of the defence forces has caught attention for their invaluable contribution. A natural disaster of colossal dimension has come to equally define a national crisis hitherto defined only by war. In the wake of the end of the Cold War and 9/11, "security" had been given a new connotation by eminent thinkers<sup>1</sup> and policymakers<sup>2</sup> that was vigorously debated amongst theoreticians<sup>3</sup> in "security studies" as being radically different from the conventional formulation.<sup>4</sup> The notion of non-traditional security (NTS) has since deeply invaded the traditional concept of state security. The role of military assets,

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namely their operational capacity and field experience, and dynamics of alliance coordination both in defence and disaster would undeniably further broaden the new meaning of “security”.

This commentary highlights two points related to the March 2011 disaster in Japan. First, the US disaster assistance to Japan went beyond the customary dispensing of essentials or of providing relief funds by NGOs like InterAction. Instead, unlike the contributions of other countries<sup>5</sup>, the US disaster assistance to Japan was conspicuous for the scale of the military involvement embedded in the US Japan alliance. Second, the military-to-military cooperation between the US and Japanese forces played a key role in coordinating the US contribution to the response. In doing so, the alliance structured as a means for projecting hard power has appropriated a new role which is in sync with the new meaning of “security”. The alliance projected human values and delivered a “public good”. Hence, in view of this new role of the alliance, the second point this paper seeks to make is that the theoretical understanding of military alliances needs to be revisited.

The commentary begins with a brief explication on the new meaning of security followed by a description of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and then talks about the US response to the Japan disaster in the form of *Operation Tomodachi* (Friend). Since this operation was made possible by the flexibility of defence forces ingrained in the interoperable dynamics of the alliance, the commentary will then discuss the need to redefine Japan’s defence doctrine at the end of the Cold War which necessitated the streamlining and upgrading of its defense forces to operationalise the realignment envisaged by the reinforcement and expansion of the Japan-US Security Treaty. It is this reorientation of the Japan US alliance that made the interoperability possible. The last section highlights the fact that the extensive use of the military asset of interoperability during the recent disaster in Japan necessitates a fresh theoretical approach towards the concept of the alliance. The commentary concludes by making the observation that *Operation-Tomodachi* further strengthened the Japan US alliance, which was marked by tension because of differences over the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma located in the Ginowan City of Okinawa. On the other hand, the pretext of contributing to disaster management will become another means of legitimising Japan’s military modernisation.

### **Security: Meaningful Transition**

As a branch of international relations (IR), “security studies” had been overwhelmingly concerned with “understanding and explaining why and how actors use force.”<sup>6</sup> Concomitant with the transitions in international structure, there has been a paradigm shift in the focus of security studies. Social realities and

the human condition increasingly came to be considered as another dimension of security. Security became “extended”, all-inclusive—ranging from the security of the individual as a referral, to concerns regarding global security as well as serious concerns about securing the “supranational physical environment”. Economic, societal, environmental, and gender issues; intra-state ethnic violence and genocide; notions of “responsibility to protect”; transnational issues such as organised crime and spread of infectious diseases, terrorism and insurgency; proliferation of nuclear weapons; maritime piracy; migration problems and border security; water, food, and energy security are all now being placed within the context of security studies.<sup>7</sup> As eminent scholar Emma Rothschild puts it, “the geometry of the proposed new principles is in these terms of dizzying complexity.”<sup>8</sup> The ensuing preoccupation of security analysts, predictably, reverted to the primal introspection, i.e., to re-ponder over “what is security”? The intellectuals were at pains to academically refine the concept while the policymakers and practitioners worried about what all should be securitised.

The concerns of both the theoreticians and practitioners regarding the viability of the new conceptions of security, though not entirely misplaced, were nonetheless worrying. When it came to the crux, the new concept of security was not found to be lacking either dynamism or relevance. In fact, the notion of non-traditional security has pervaded the realm of the realist conception of security too; in particular, in relation to how alliance roles are being expanded. Military alliances are a well-established institution and have been a recurring phenomenon in the foreign policies of states since state security conflicts became an essential element of international politics. Stephen Walt has defined an alliance as a “formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states”<sup>9</sup>, usually taking the form of a written military commitment. In traditional security, states ally to oppose powerful or threatening states and alliances were primarily geared towards a collective effort, or aggregating fighting capabilities for fending off an attack by an enemy, and for maintaining the balance of power among nations. In the late 20th century, the term and mechanism of “interoperability” became central to alliance operations and was deemed to be indispensable for this purpose. However, alliance—and the notion of interoperability within the alliance—have found a new function apart from military action on the battlefield. The US–Japan alliance, in particular, worked effectively in coping with the consequences of the natural disaster that struck Japan on March 11, 2011.

### **The Great East Japan Earthquake**

A massive earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 occurred on March 11, 2011 off the Pacific coast in the north-eastern part of the Japanese mainland (Tohoku Region), causing devastation. The Japan Meteorological Agency termed this “The 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake.”<sup>10</sup> The worst affected areas were the Iwate,

Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. The disaster morphed into a triple tragedy followed by a tsunami<sup>11</sup> and a nuclear crisis resulting from the breakdown in the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station.<sup>12</sup> The natural disaster wreaked havoc: according to Japan's National Police Agency, as of October 26, 2011, the number of deaths was 15,829, about 3,725 were missing, and 5,943 injured. The Japanese Fire and Disaster Management Agency estimated that over 65,753 people had been evacuated by October 2011.<sup>13</sup> By June 24, 2011, the estimated total cost accruing from damage to buildings, lifeline utilities, and social infrastructure, among others was approximately US \$300 billion. Nothing could have prepared the country for an unprecedented disaster of this kind but for Japan's own disaster preparedness, a result of the extreme seismic vulnerability of the country. This preparedness has been ingrained in the everyday life of the Japanese, and its rigour was well-evident in how they encountered the tragedy.

The disciplined civilian response was complemented by the exemplary performance of Japan's Self Defence Forces (JSDF). On March 14, 2011, the Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the three Self Defence Forces was established by the then Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa.<sup>14</sup> The disaster relief operations of the JSDF involved around 1 million personnel. On March 11, the JSDF deployed 8,400 personnel to carry out rescue and relief operations. Thereafter, the number of personnel dispatched were increased from 20,000 to 50,000 on March 13 and then to 100,000 by March 18.<sup>15</sup> Major logistic support was provided by deploying about 540 aircraft and 60 ships.

In response to the nuclear disaster, the government established a Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters and mobilised about 500 Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) and Air Self Defence Forces (ASDF) from the Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defence Unit (CNBC). In order to measure the degree of radiation, ASDF RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft and GSDF UH-1 helicopters were deployed. The Technical Research Headquarters equipped Ground Self Defence Forces (GSDF) CH-47J helicopters with infrared thermography devices to measure temperature from the sky. However, the US–Japan alliance and their military-to-military cooperation performed the crucial task of coordinating a combined response to the disaster.

### **Operation Tomodachi**

On March 11 itself, "...the former Foreign Minister Matsumoto formally requested US Ambassador Roos for the assistance of the US Forces in Japan."<sup>16</sup> With exceptional promptness and readiness, within hours of the request, the US had launched Operation Tomodachi ('Friend', in Japanese), and dispatched military aircraft and personnel to assist the Japanese government in providing humanitarian aid. "On March 12, the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had authorised the US

Pacific Command (USPACOM)<sup>17</sup> to carry out the disaster relief operations and approved \$35 million in Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding for these purposes.”<sup>18</sup> Col. Robert Brassaw, the commander of the Marine Aircraft Group 36 of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is reported to have said: “We are currently positioning our forces as quickly as possible to alleviate the suffering of the people of our host nation.”<sup>19</sup> These words reveal their ability to undertake swift action and also to acknowledge Japan’s granting of forward bases to the US.

With great alacrity, within four days of the disaster, the US had laid a wide spectrum of its military forces at the disposal of JSDF for a multitude of tasks ranging from damage assessment, inter-agency collaboration, search, rescue, relief, and clean-up operations providing surveillance of the affected area, logistic support for distribution, supply points to increase the flow of humanitarian aid, and restoration of critical infrastructure such as the damaged Sendai airport, and in countering the complications especially of radiation<sup>20</sup> that arose from the affected nuclear reactor in Fukushima. According to Hiroaki Koide, assistant professor at the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute (KURRI), for the people in Fukushima, “it was akin to living in a war zone”.<sup>21</sup>

These tasks involved many of the US bases in Japan<sup>22</sup> including the disputed Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the Yokota Air Base in Tokyo, and the Misawa Air Base in Aomori, and more than 19,703 US marines and sailors. They provided humanitarian aid including 246 tonnes of food and 21 million gallons of water. Twenty US naval ships including the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group participated in Operation Tomadachi; 149 aircrafts were deployed in the area, including the Marine Corps C-130 aircraft and helicopters; Air Force surveillance U-2 reconnaissance airplanes and the RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle; 33 department of energy experts; nine Nuclear Regulatory Commission experts; and 150 search and rescue personnel, and 12 search dogs from the Agency for International Development. The US Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) was recalled from its scheduled participation in the US–South Korea joint military exercise and was stationed in Sendai Bay by March 13 to provide support for relief measures. It was used as refuelling station by the Japanese military and Coast Guard helicopters flying relief missions in the area.<sup>23</sup>

In order to conduct comprehensive, prompt, meticulous, and synchronised activities between the JSDF and USAF for effective assistance, Japan’s Ministry of Defence and US forces established two central Japan–US coordination offices at Ichigaya and Yokota bases. On March 15, 2011 the Japanese Ministry of Defence set up the first ever Bilateral Crisis Action Team (BCAT) at Camp Sendai. Apart from this

mechanism, Japan established a Joint Staff (JS) that placed all the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defence forces (SDF) under a single Joint Task Force Command with a Japan–US coordination office at their Tohoku headquarters to conduct the joint operations for carrying out missions swiftly and effectively. According to the US Navy Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, 59th Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Operation Tomodachi went beyond providing help to a nation in crisis; it cemented the US–Japan alliance, and highlighted the importance of understanding the geo-political challenges in the Asia-Pacific. According to a report of the Japan Society, it “...was an operation that called upon all the US armed forces’ logistical and technical skills but that also required immense compassion and diplomacy.”<sup>24</sup>

On April 4, 2011, Japan’s Defence Minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, accompanied by US Ambassador John Roos, visited the Ronald Reagan to thank its crew for its assistance as part of Operation Tomodachi. On board, Kitazawa said: “...I have never been more encouraged by and proud of the fact that the United States is our ally.”<sup>25</sup> Commenting on the emotional appreciation and gratitude of the Japanese minister, Vice Admiral Scott Van Buskirk, Commander, US Seventh Fleet remarked: “...as an American, I have never been more proud of the fact that Japan is our ally. As the Self Defence Forces have operated under intense physical and emotional stress, they’d been at their best, never wavering in their focus, in their devotion to the mission, and in their sense of duty to the nation they serve.”<sup>26</sup>

### **Alliance and Interoperability: A ‘Public Good’**

The element of interoperability rested at the core of the dynamics of Operation Tomodachi. Its efficacy was, in retrospect, a demonstration of the successful synchronisation expected in times of war exigency. In alliances, interoperability is at the heart of the military-technical revolution (MTR) comprising precision munitions, information-enabled precision strikes, wide-area sensors, computerised command and control (C2), and new non-nuclear means of destruction, which have brought about fundamental changes in the conduct of war amounting to a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The MTR begot a sharp increase in the destructive potential of conventional weapons. However, from the latter half of the 20th century onwards, war was mainly being fought against unequal adversaries such as the Taliban, the Iraqi army, insurgents, terrorists and jihadist fighters, and not against major powers with comparable military capabilities. Thus, along with MTR and RMA, asymmetric warfare was included in the new lexicon. The RMA is an on-going process based on robotics weaponry and is yet to fully operationalise and to fully exploit the wide spectrum of MTR. The MTR and ‘network centric warfare’ expertise intended for the battlefield, proved equally worthwhile in disaster management in the context of Japan.

## Realignment for Interoperability

The 1978 Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation had initially provided the legal framework for coordinated joint action in areas of operations<sup>27</sup>, intelligence, and logistics between the JSDF and the US forces in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The limitations of the 1978 posture of cooperation became glaring with the end of the Cold War that gave rise to a strategic environment, which compelled Japan to play a more proactive military role in regional security and seriously review and reorient its defence parameters as set out in the October 1976 National Defence Program Outline (NDPO). Consequently, the new defence guidelines were articulated in the NDPO adopted in November 1995 which “... underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War” along with the reiteration that “... the most effective framework for the defence of Japan is close defense cooperation between the countries.”<sup>28</sup>

Hence, the US Japan bilateral interoperability is a relatively new phenomenon effectively beginning with the April 17, 1996 Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security by the US President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. By virtue of this declaration, the Japan–US security relationship was formally announced as the “Alliance for the 21st Century”. A fillip to the interoperability function was further provided by the September 1997 US–Japanese Defense Cooperation Guidelines followed by the May 1999 legislation which enabled the JSDF to provide logistical support to the US forces to defend Japan in the event of regional contingencies around its periphery, or *Shuhen*.<sup>29</sup> The new strategic mindset was shaped by the events of the 1991 Iraq War, the 1993 Nodong 1 missile test conducted by North Korea in the Sea of Japan, the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis, and the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which collectively had revealed a fundamental lack of political and military operability in the US–Japan alliance. A renewed thrust and dynamism to the US–Japan interoperability was accorded by the unprecedented initiatives taken by the then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who endorsed the “integrated security strategy”<sup>30</sup> in the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.<sup>31</sup> Thereafter, in the October 2005<sup>32</sup> and May 2006<sup>33</sup> agreements, Japan and the US emphasised closer strategic consultations and enhanced operational coordination to meet common strategic objectives as well as bilateral contingency planning. Koizumi began the transformation of the alliance in terms of roles, missions, and capabilities, envisioning better bilateral cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), counter-terrorism, maritime interdiction, humanitarian relief, reconstruction assistance, and peacekeeping.<sup>34</sup> For BMD, a Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) was planned to be established at Yokoya Air Base for fulfilling the air and missile defence coordination function. Initially, BJOCC was to begin operations by the Japanese fiscal year (JPY) 2010<sup>35</sup>, but at the June 21, 2011 US–Japan Security

Consultative Committee, it was announced that it will commence operations by the end of JPY 2011.

In July 2005, it was made mandatory by law that that all military orders be given through Japan's Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) in both peace time and during contingencies. The present, JCS of Japan's SDF is Ryoichi Oriki. Japan and the US have been holding the Keen Sword exercises biennially since 1986 to strengthen US and Japanese military interoperability, to consolidate operational communication, increase readiness, and develop a professional relationship between the two nations' forces to meet mutual defence objectives. The training events are extensive and comprise integrated air and missile defence, base security, and force protection, search and rescue, close air support, live-fire training, and maritime security and interdiction operations.<sup>36</sup> About 10,500<sup>37</sup> US service members and their Japan SDF counterparts participated in the 10th Keen Sword training exercise held in 2010 between December 3–10, at military installations "...throughout mainland Japan, Okinawa and in the waters surrounding Japan"<sup>38</sup> in the East China Sea. According to a report available on the US Air Force website, "The goal of the Keen Sword is...to provide a realistic training environment that allows JSDF and US forces to respond to a wide range of situations."<sup>39</sup> "The timing of this exercise"— Keen Sword 11—coincided "with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security"<sup>40</sup> (January 19, 1960). The US forces and the JSDF had never conducted joint training exercises for disaster relief operations. But as a result of these exercises, the US-Japan alliance managed to develop a degree of expertise in interoperability; essentially a military good which would demonstrate its utility quintessentially as a "public good", in the wake of the worst disaster to have hit Japan in its modern history.

### **Redefining the Alliance: Theoretical Challenges**

The JSDF in conjunction with the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) greatly surpassed their conventional role in responding to this natural disaster. This cooperation, which involved unprecedented joint operations by Japan and the US armed forces, emerged as a conspicuously successful and inspirational undertaking amid the usual "disorderly, verbose and only intermittently inspirational"<sup>41</sup> international politics of the post-Cold War world. The joint operations were also the first in the history of the US–Japan alliance. An account of this cooperation would require extensive adjustments in the settled notions of IR theory regarding the purpose, performance and behaviour of alliances. The recognition of the typical attributes of military alliance for power projection is now considered a theoretical oversimplification, and only an interdisciplinary or an eclectic theoretical approach would be able to put forward the importance of the civilian role of a military alliance. In the case of US–Japan alliance, this role has infused it with exceptional resilience at a time when it was undergoing tension.



Alliances have been exclusively a political process. There is abundant IR literature on alliances in terms of their arrangement from a calculated analysis of the aggregate material/military/offensive to power projection capabilities along with the level of threat perceptions from a rival. Customary scholarship on alliances has also dealt extensively with the dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment, options of power balancing, and bandwagoning. The non-political aspect of the US–Japan alliance evidently poses a challenge to the purely political exigencies of alliance performance as offered by IR academia. The way new perspectives on security became established in IR theory in the aftermath of the post-Cold War order, IR theory will have to cogitate anew the definition of “alliance” befitting its new role in disaster management.

Commenting on Operation Tomodachi, US Admiral Patrick M. Walsh said: “The real story here is in the power of the idea, the idea of *tomodachi*, the idea that represents who we are, where our relationship is and what it could be.”<sup>42</sup> Speaking at the US–Japan Council Annual Conference held in Washington, DC on October 7, 2011 US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked: “... we believe that building this relationship is not only strategic, not only economic, not only political; we believe it is a noble cause...”<sup>43</sup> By saying so, Clinton raised the non-political variable in the alliance structure to profound heights, and inadvertently touched upon the need to debate on the new nature of the US–Japan alliance. This would make for a stimulating theoretical debate that can help illuminate the IR understanding on another facet of the alliance relationship in consonance with the new thinking on non-traditional notions of security.

## Conclusion

For Japan, the new thinking on the non-traditional concept of ‘security’ is, literally, a conceptual *homecoming* in redefining the purpose of defence forces. Japan has been at the forefront of developing an alternative perspective on security, known as “comprehensive security” which emphasises spheres other than military functions. Such an approach makes security truly *comprehensive* and, at the same time, the myriad attributes of defence more emphatic, particularly after 1990s when the utility of force itself was being viewed with scepticism since war between great powers was believed to be unthinkable. In the first decade of the 21st century, war and violence have been observed to have declined.<sup>44</sup> The utility of force is also under scrutiny as an effective instrument to resolve conflicts and incompatible interests. However, in Japan, the utility of force and alliance relationship will be legitimised for its utility in creating ‘public good’. The US humanitarian assistance not only represented the unequivocal of US commitment to Japan, but also demonstrated the more positive aspect of the US military and the Japan–US alliance especially in the eyes of some sections of the Japanese people. Their bitter feelings towards

the alliance owing to factors such as the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by an American serviceman<sup>45</sup> may not be assuaged just because of the US disaster assistance. But as the result of the best practices adopted by US servicemen during their trials amid the worst disaster they have faced since World War II, a larger section of the Japanese public have formed a more favourable opinion of the US. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2010, 66 per cent of the Japanese had a favourable opinion of the US. In 2011, this increased to 85 per cent of the Japanese polled. This is the highest percentage recorded since the Pew Global Attitudes Project began to poll the issue in 2002.<sup>46</sup>

The success of Operation Tomodachi has “cemented” the US-Japan alliance and this success would further nurture their military interoperability. For Japan, the requirements of interoperability will assure a sustained military modernisation to keep up with the exponential advancement of military technology. Contingencies of natural disaster demand the same kind of comprehensive operational performance for an immediate and seamless response as does a situation of war, a threat of war, or an impending military crisis. The fact that such coordination took place between alliance partners for coping with a natural disaster makes the inclusion of a different and an additional component in alliance structuring necessary.

Whether such characteristic will become the rule in alliance relations or will remain unique to the Japan–US alliance is contingent upon the future trajectory of events. Even if there is just one more instance of such alliance behaviour, it would force analysts to ponder upon the roots and dynamics of the new norms of military alliance. However, the experience acquired from handling the March 2011 disaster will encourage Japan to hone the skills which could lead to the expansion of its military security role predicated on the non-traditional security with disaster management expertise of its defence forces. Military readiness in the name of the new legitimatising principle of boots without bullets and defence with compassion would presumably be more agreeable to the Japanese public, known to be wary of accumulating and expanding of war making capabilities legally banned under Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution.



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Notes:

1. For example: Willy Brandt, see The Independent Commission on International Development Issues (1980), *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; For Olaf Palme, see The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982), *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, New York: Simon and Schuster; Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992), *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, submitted on 17 June 1992; Mahbub ul Haq (1994), “New Imperatives of Human Security,” RGICS Paper No. 17, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS), Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi; Amartya Sen (2000), *Why Human Security*, Presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security in Tokyo, 28 July, 2000; Kofi A. Annan (2000), *We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; James Bernard Quilligan (2002), *The Brant Equation: 21st Century Blueprint for the New Global Economy*, Philadelphia, PA: Brant 21 Forum, Centre for Global Negotiations; Sadako Ogata

- and Johan Cels (2003), "Human Security-Protecting and Empowering the People", *Global Governance*, vol. 9, no. 3, July-September 2003, pp. 273-282.
2. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Redefining Security: The Human Dimension", *Current History*, vol. 94, 1994, pp. 229-236. The Canadian, Japanese and Norwegian governments have institutionalised the concept of NTS and 'human security' in their foreign policies.
  3. See Richard Ulman (1983), "Redefining Security", *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 129-153; Barry Buzan (1983), *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. [Second edition, 1991, Third Edition 2008]; Lawrence Freedman (1988), "International Security: Changing Targets", *Foreign Policy* (Spring), pp. 48-63; Colin Gray (1992), "New Directions for Strategic Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice", *Security Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 610-635; David A. Baldwin (1995), "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War", *World Politics*, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 117-141; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (1996), "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods", *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol. 40, no.2, pp. 229-254; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde (1997), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) (1998), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  4. The conventional formulation of security is limited to military threats.
  5. 116 countries and 28 international organisations offered assistance to Japan. But in terms of military personnel, rescue teams, relief goods and donations, the contribution of the US far exceeded the rest. For details see [http://www.mofa.go.jp/j\\_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/r\\_goods.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/r_goods.pdf), [http://www.mofa.go.jp/j\\_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/map\\_operations.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/map_operations.pdf), and [http://www.mofa.go.jp/j\\_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/rescue.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/rescue.pdf).
  6. Edward A. Kolodziej (2005), *Security and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 17.
  7. For an overview of this focus refer to Paul D. Williams (ed.) (2008), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Oxon and New York: Routledge.
  8. Emma Rothschild (2007). "What is Security?", in Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (ed.), *International Security Volume III: Widening Security*, Sage Library of International Relations, Sage Publications Ltd., pgs. 1-33.
  9. Stephen M. Walt (1987), *The Origin of Alliances*, London: Cornell University Press, p. 12.
  10. Japan Meteorological Agency, "The 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake", available at [http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011\\_Earthquake.html](http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake.html), accessed on December 11, 2011.
  11. The earthquake triggered powerful tsunami waves which reached height of up to 40.5 m (133 ft) engulfing settlements along the coast of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures.
  12. Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station has six reactors, three of which were operational when the earthquake struck. The reactor in Unit 1 heated up causing damage to nuclear material. Partial meltdown of the nuclear fuel rods occurred at the Unit 2 reactor due to the failure of the cooling system leading to hydrogen explosions. An explosion near the base of Unit 2 reactor breached the concrete reactor vessel containment structure. These explosions released radioactive cesium and iodine gases into the environment. At the fourth reactor, fire broke out in the spent-fuel pool. Japan declared a state of nuclear emergency and designated areas lying within 10 km radius of the damaged nuclear power plant as evacuation zone. Later, the evacuation zone was extended to 20 km.
  13. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), "Great East Japan Earthquake, Current situation and the Government of Japan's Response", available at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/j\\_info/visit/incidents/announcements.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/announcements.html), accessed on January 10, 2012.
  14. The JTF was abolished on July 1, 2011. On August 31, 2011, the large-scale disaster dispatch of JSDF was terminated and converted to a normal disaster dispatch command.
  15. See "Special Feature: Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake", available at [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/pdf/2011/02\\_SpecialFeature.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/02_SpecialFeature.pdf), accessed on December 10, 2011.
  16. MOFA, "Great East Japan Earthquake", available at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/j\\_info/visit/incidents/announcements.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/announcements.html), accessed on December 10, 2011.
  17. USPACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, is a unified command which includes about 300,000 military personnel from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps comprising about 20 per cent of all active duty US military forces. These forces are in three categories: Forward-Deployed (about 100,000), Forward-Based, and Continental US (CONUS)-Based. For more details regarding the area of responsibility of USPACOM see the Statement of Admiral

- Robert F. Willard, US Navy Commander, US Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture, April 12, 2011, available at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Willard%2004-12-11.pdf>.
18. Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery (2011), *Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) Response*, Congressional Research Service, Report for the Congress, R41690, March 22, 2011, p. 1.
  19. Gidget Fuentes, "31st MEU, ships and Aircraft En Route to Japan", March 14, 2011, available at <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/03/marine-31st-meu-ships-enroute-to-japan-031411/>, accessed on December 10, 2011.
  20. These included radiation measurement and decontamination activities. Aircraft and vehicles used for assistance operations were also decontaminated.
  21. Paul Arenson (2011), "Beware the Nuclear Apologists", *Japan Times*, October 9, 2011, available at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/rc20111009a1.html>, accessed on November 12, 2011.
  22. There are about 85 US military facilities in Japan out of which seven are in Tokyo. Yokota and Misawa represent the Air Force; Camp Zama represents the Army; Iwakuni, the Marine Corps; and Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo represent the Navy.
  23. The details mentioned here have been gathered from a report by Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery "Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response", Congressional Research Service, Report for the Congress, R41690, dated March 22, 2011.
  24. See the website of Japan Society, "The Power of Tomodachi: U.S. Military's Humanitarian Efforts Cemented An Alliance", November 21, 2011 at <http://japansocietyny.blogspot.com/2011/11/operation-admiral-patrick-m-walsh.html>, accessed on November 25, 2011.
  25. See the Chronology of Operation Tomodachi provided by The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) titled "Amidst Trial, Ties that Bind: Enduring Strength in the U.S.-Japan Alliance", available at <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=121>, accessed on November 8, 2011.
  26. Ibid.
  27. The "Concept of Operations" defined by the 1978 Guidelines was that the "JSDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace. US Forces will support JSDF operations. US Forces will also conduct operations to supplement functional areas which exceed the capacity of the JSDF"
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  30. Christopher W. Hughes (2008), *Japan's Remilitarization*, Adelphi Papers, 48: 403, p. 12. See also Richard Halloran (2004), "U.S.-Japan Alliance", *Korea Herald*, November 19, 2004, available at [http://asiaviews.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=8935:colcomalias4899&catid=3:column-a-commentaries&Itemid=10](http://asiaviews.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8935:colcomalias4899&catid=3:column-a-commentaries&Itemid=10), accessed on
  31. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Weston S. Konishi (2009), *The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests*, Congressional Research Service, Report for the Congress, RL33740, July 23, 2009, p. 4.
  32. A joint US-Japan document titled the "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" was issued. It is available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>.
  33. The document finalised was titled "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation", and is available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html>.
  34. James L. Schoff (2007), "Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 31, no.1 (Winter), p. 87.
  35. Ministry of Defense (MOD), *Defense of Japan 2009*, Annual White Paper, Part III, Chapter 2: "Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement", Section 2: "Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other Matters", Point (4) Yokota Airbase and Airspace. These are available at [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/2009.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html) and [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/pdf/2009/Part3-chap2.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/Part3-chap2.pdf).
  36. Seaman Cheryl Callahan, "George Washington Strike Group Prepares to Begin Keen Sword 2010", Official website of the United States Navy, December 2, 2010 [http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=57501](http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=57501), accessed on December 10, 2011.

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38. Ibid.
39. Tara A. Williamson, "Keen Sword Exercise Sharpens US-Japan alliance", Official website of the U.S. Air Force, December 2, 2010 <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123233042>, accessed on December 10, 2011.
40. See Juan Pinalez, n. 37.
41. See Emma Rothschild n. 8, p.2.
42. See the website of Japan Society, "The Power of Tomodachi: U.S. Military's Humanitarian Efforts Cemented An Alliance", November 21, 2011, available at <http://japansocietyny.blogspot.com/2011/11/operation-admiral-patrick-m-walsh.html>, accessed on November 25, 2011.
43. Available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175151.htm>.
44. Joshua S. Goldstein (2011), *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide*, Dutton Adult. Goldstein says that the decade since 9/11 has been the most peaceful worldwide in a century. See also Steven Pinker (2011), *The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined*, Viking Adult.
45. Some of the other grievances of the Japanese against the stationing of US troop in their country stem from the occasional violence, petty crimes, noise pollution and environmental degradation created due to the location of the military bases and other military facilities. In 2004, a US military helicopter had crashed into a crowded university campus. The relocation of the Futenma Marine Air Station from its current location in crowded Ginowan city to the less populated area around Camp Schwab in Nago (near Henoko Bay) is yet another contentious issue which has built a negative public opinion towards the alliance.
46. Pew Global Attitudes Project, "U.S. Applauded for Relief Efforts-Japanese Resilient, But See Economic Challenges Ahead", Survey Report, June 1, 2011, available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/06/01/japanese-resilient-but-see-economic-challenges-ahead/>, accessed on January 11, 2012.