PRINCIPLED BUT EVOLVING

India's Approach to Multilateral Peace and Security

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मनोहर परिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

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Introduction

This monograph examines India's approach to multilateralism, with a particular focus on international peace and security. The general and predominant assumptions regarding India's multilateral approach are: India is a "naysayer" and rule breaker[1]; India's approach to multilateralism is dubious[2]; India is a selective rule taker with inconsistency and ad-hocism;[3] India's relationship to multilateral institutions is highly complex;[4] India is a hesitant rule shaper;[5] and India is reluctant to take on the global responsibility.[6] While discussing India's role as an emerging power, many foreign policy experts have noted that the country is neither a responsible player nor a reliable partner in multilateral institutions. Further, those who see India as one of the most ambitious multilateral players, have observed that the lack of material power to shape the global process has forced India to embrace multilateralism, the

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[1] Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p. 66.

[2] C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Asian Security Order", in Michael J. Green, and Bates Gill (eds), *Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community*, Columbia University Press, 2009; Kudrat Virk, "India and the Responsibility to Protect: A Tale of Ambiguity", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2013, pp. 56–83.

[3] Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, "From High Ground to High Table: The Evolution of Indian Multilateralism", *Global Governance*, Vol. 17, 2011, p. 325.

[4] Oliver Stuenkel, "Emerging India: A Farewell to Multilateralism", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 4, October–December 2013, p. 413.

[5] Waheguru Pal Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Bruce Jones, "A Hesitant Rule Shaper", in Waheguru Pal Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Bruce Jones (eds), *Shaping the Emerging World: India and Multilateral Order*, Washington: Brookings, 2013, pp. 3–24.

[6] Amrita Narlikar, "Is India a Responsible Great Power?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 9, 2011, p. 1618.

universalism of the weak.[7] Similarly, some have also examined the possible reasons for this behaviour, and argued for greater responsibility[8] and pragmatism[9] in India's multilateral approach.

India's multilateral approach has been influenced and guided by multiple strategies, interests, values, and has transformed significantly through the decades. However, most foreign policy scholars have argued that India has often acted like "spoiler" or "rule breaker" in international negotiations. They have also cited instances—such as India's approach towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its steadfast opposition to the developed world's position in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, and Climate Change Summits—as evidence to support their arguments.[10]

In the realm of peace and security also, things are not very different. For instance, most of the debate over the Indian stance on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention end up in New Delhi's ambivalent and irresponsible behaviour. India has refrained from actively engaging with R2P, despite its longstanding contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations. In terms of troop contribution, India's commitment to UN Peacekeeping far exceeds that of European Union states. India has contributed nearly 1,95,000 troops, the largest number from any country, and participated in 49 missions. However, throughout the evolution of R2P, particularly in its initial years, India was sceptical about the concept, and regarded it as a pretext for intervention to enforce Western interests.[11] Due to this stance,

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[7]   Manu Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World*, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2013.

[8]   Narlikar, 2011; Mukherjee and Malone, 2011.

[9]   Arpita Anant, "Global Governance and the Need for 'Pragmatic Activism' in India's Multilateralism", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2015, p. 488.

[10] Tobias Debiel and Herbert Wulf, "More than a Rule Taker: The Indian Way of Multilateralism", in Mischa Hansel et al., *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 49–68.

[11] Dan Krause, "It is Changing After All: India's Stance on 'Responsibility to Protect'", *ORF Occasional Paper*, April 2016, p. 19, at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ORF_OccasionalPaper_90.pdf

India was considered one of the recalcitrant opponents of the idea of R2P.

However, the inconsistency and reluctance in India's approach cannot be explained linearly, as most scholars have done. Equally, the ambiguity does not warrant that India is not a responsible player in the multilateral realm. A comprehensive assessment of India's multilateral engagements offers a different inference: that "India has developed and played in tune with a distinct multilateralism that combines norms of sovereignty and [the] quest for global justice and fairness."[12] Most foreign policy scholars have failed to recognise this because of their lackadaisical approach towards the idea and practice of multilateralism in general, and India's multilateralism in particular.

Multilateralism in practice has various shapes and different meanings. While analysing India's multilateral engagements, many scholars tend to ignore the gap between the theory and practice of multilateralism. Their efforts are mainly dedicated to categorising India's perspectives on multilateralism by the attributes of the various governments that have come to power in New Delhi, or the styles, behaviour, and functioning of different individual leaders.[13] The majority of them have

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[12] Ibid., p. 50. Also see, Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz, "Singing the Tune of Sovereignty? India and the Responsibility to Protect", *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014, pp. 461–487.

[13] See David Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Oxford, 2001, pp. 249–273; see also, Poorvi Chitalkar and David Malone, "India and Global Governance", in David Malone et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, London: Oxford, 2015, pp. 581–595; Karen Smith, "India's Identity and its Global Aspirations", *Global Society*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2012, pp. 369–385; Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy", *India Review,* Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, pp. 4–19; Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, "Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign and Security Policy", *India Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2012, pp. 76–94; Rahul Sagar, "State of Mind: What Kind of Power will India Become?", *International Affairs,* Vol. 84, No.4, 2009, pp. 801–816; C. Raja Mohan, "Changing Dynamics of India's Multilateralism", in W. P. S. Sidhu et al., *Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order,* 2013, pp. 25–41.

also failed to systematically explain whether the lack of a consistent strategy or the ambivalent foreign policy orientation has resulted in suboptimal outcomes. Even while criticising India for not having a consistent and clear-cut strategy, scholars have never tried to answer the question that if India had followed a clear strategy, would it have achieved more.[14]

Analysing two cases, India's engagement in UN Peacekeeping operations and its approach towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), this monograph argues that India privileges the principle of sovereign equality in its global multilateral engagements above all; this is the fundamental of the UN as well. India's continuing support to peacekeeping operations, while opposing humanitarian military intervention, demonstrates that the basis of India's approach to multilateral peace and security is the principle of sovereign equality, and its corollary, non-intervention. Thus, India has consistently pointed to the immanent weight of the central principles of peacekeeping operations: namely, impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force, except in self-defence or in defence of the mission's mandate. However, this does not mean that India's Peacekeeping approach is static, and determined by idealist thoughts. Instead, the approach is pragmatic and, from the time of Independence till today, it has evolved considerably.

In the context of R2P, India has been extremely cautious about the doctrine in practice. Perhaps India was one of the sharpest critics of the doctrine when it was tabled in the United Nations for approval. However, it toned down its opposition later, and agreed to the doctrine in principle by ensuring various checks and balances. It can be argued that, similar to Peacekeeping operations, India's position regarding R2P is principled but evolving. In both cases, India privileges the principle of sovereignty, and calls for international legitimization through the United Nations. One can also argue that India's primary characteristics fall in line with traditional/classical multilateralism, the centrality of

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[14]   Mischa Hansel, Raphaëlle Khan and Mélissa Levaillant, *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge, 2017, p. 9.

states, and the prominence of the principle of state sovereignty. Traditional multilateralism regards states as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system. It is the interrelations of the sovereign states that determine the form and content of multilateralism.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MONOGRAPH

This monograph is structured in two parts. The first part comprises three chapters, including the Introduction. The second chapter provides a brief overview of the literature on India's multilateral approach. It outlines the significant criticisms of India's multilateral approach by looking at India's global multilateral engagements. The third chapter discusses conceptual and theoretical underpinnings, and attempts to explain "ambiguity" and "reluctance" in India's multilateralism. The second part discusses two case studies: India's approach to UN Peacekeeping operations; and its evolving stance towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The concluding chapter discusses the significant findings of the research, and their policy implications.

INDIA'S MULTILATERAL APPROACH:
AN OVERVIEW

The multilateral engagement has always been one of the core tenets of India's foreign policy. India was one of the most ambitious players when the edifice of multilateral institutions was built in the post-World War II period.[15] India's membership of the United Nations even before its independence shows the country's firm support and belief in the multilateral system. In September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice President of the Interim government and then Prime Minister, enunciated that "towards the United Nations India's attitude is that of wholehearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in both spirit and letter, to the Charter governing it."[16] The Directive Principles of State Policy on international affairs in the Indian Constitution also affirms the country's adherence to the UN Charter's principles.[17] Similarly, India was a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Foreign policy scholars have viewed India's multilateral approach during the early decades of Independence as the "universalism of the weak".[18] According to them, during this period, India practised a principled and ideological but ineffectual approach towards multilateralism, being influenced by the moralist foreign policy perspectives of Jawaharlal Nehru.[19] In other words, moral principles often trumped pragmatism

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[15] Bhagavan, 2013.

[16] T. Ramakrishna Reddy, *India's Policy towards the United Nations*, Cranbury: Associated University Press, 1968, p. 30.

[17] Mukherjee and Malone, 2011, p. 312.

[18] C. Raja Mohan, "Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 2010, p. 134.

[19] Sidhu, Mehta and Jones, 2013, p. 4.

in India's approach towards the global governance system.[20] Taking NAM's leadership, championing decolonisation, and total nuclear disarmament in various global forums are cases in point. India was a zealous advocate of the peaceful settlement of conflicts among nations, and proposed banning all nuclear tests in the UN as early as 1954.[21] Similarly, bringing the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) shows how ambitiously India looked at multilateral institutions in settling disputes between states. India's commitment to UN Peacekeeping also reflects this approach well.

India's multilateral approach has evolved significantly over the last few decades. On the one hand, the emerging power label has led to the growth of India's stature within multilateral institutions. On the other, the same tag has invited many criticisms as well. Many observe that India is reluctant to shoulder global responsibility, and is not willing to bear the costs of providing global public goods.[22] Moreover, Indian responses are often considered "arrogant", "moralistic", and "confrontational" in the multilateral sphere.[23] Stephen Cohen notes that, "Western diplomats were for many years put off by India's flexible nonalignment, which for a time was a pretext for a close relationship with the Soviet Union. They were also irritated by the style of Indian diplomats."[24] According to Cohen, the unrealistic combination of arrogance and poverty was the significant factor behind the inscrutable behaviour of Indian diplomats in international forums.

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[20] Harsh V. Pant, "Rising India and Its Global Governance Imperatives", *Rising Powers Quarterly,* Vol. 2, No. 4, 2017, p. 7.

[21] In 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a nuclear testing "standstill" agreement, which was later forwarded to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Nehru was the first statesman to draw the attention of the world to the problem. For more details, see Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha, 2 April 1954, at http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?pdf0601?000

[22] Narlikar, 2011, p. 1613.

[23] Malone, 2011, p. 270.

[24] Cohen, 2001, p. 66.

There have been multiple attempts, especially in the West, to portray emerging powers, including India, as "disrupters of the liberal order, recalcitrant spoilers, vetoers and irresponsible stakeholders."[25] For instance, after the collapse of the WTO negotiations in Geneva in 2008, *The Washington Post* accused India's chief negotiator, Kamal Nath, for "repeatedly blocking attempts by developed nations to win greater access to India's burgeoning market."[26] In Doha also, India has been frequently cast as a troublemaker, and blamed for the breakdown of the negotiations. In this "blame game", the West has depicted India as a "pariah, standing in the way of progress and overly belligerent and failing to make sufficient concessions."[27] During the Doha round, *The Economist* featured a cartoon that depicted delegates from other states frantically trying to stop a giant elephant from crushing an egg representing the WTO.[28] The US delegates even branded India as a "won't do" country, involved in a "third-world chest-thumping festival."[29] The July Package 2008 talks in Geneva, where India's chief negotiator got branded as "Dr No", presented no departure from the norm of India's trade diplomacy.[30] In this way, whenever India tried to mobilise coalitions of developing countries, and positioned itself as their leader in multilateral platforms, the West invariably engaged in India-bashing, and framed New Delhi's conducts as aberrant. There is broad agreement among scholars that India played a central part in the collapse of the Doha and Geneva rounds of WTO negotiations.[31]

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[25] Kristen Hopewell, "Recalcitrant Spoiler? Contesting Dominant Accounts of India's Role in Global Trade Governance", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2018, p. 577.

[26] Stuenkel, 2013, p. 422.

[27] Hopewell, 2018, p. 578.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Amrita Narlikar, "Reforming Institutions, Unreformed India?", in Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper (eds), *Rising States, Rising Institutions*, Washington DC: Brookings, 2010.

[31] See Charalampos Efstathopoulos and Dominic Kelly, "India, Developmental Multilateralism and the Doha Ministerial Conference", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2014, pp. 1066–1081; Stewart Patrick, "Irresponsible Stakeholders: The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers", *Foreign Affairs*,

Beyond the "arrogance" and "irrationality" arguments, another significant factor that has invited much criticism is "responsibility." The responsibility debate has its roots in the principle of *noblesse oblige*: great power comes with greater responsibility. Scholars argue that, like the established powers, "rising powers should exercise responsible sovereignty for the sake of solving problems of international concern."[32] Accordingly, the lack of contribution from rising powers to global public good is increasingly regarded as a free ride. For instance, Stuart Patrick argues that India, like other emerging powers, is ambitiously seeking greater global influence without assuming obligations. Emerging powers prefer to free-ride on the contributions of established nations while opposing the political and economic ground rules of the Western liberal order.[33] The "emerging countries wrestle with conflicting identities. They seek a louder voice in global affairs but remain committed to alleviating poverty within their borders. Thus, they resist global initiatives that would hamper their domestic growth."[34]

Many see the multilateral Climate Change negotiations as showcasing India's reluctance to shoulder responsibility in the realm of the global public good. On several occasions, India, along with other emerging powers, has opposed calls to assume responsibility, thus affirming the necessity of voluntary actions to address global relevance problems.[35] Even the voluntary restraints on emissions proposed by the then Minister of Environment, Jairam Ramesh, attracted much opposition and

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Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, p. 47; Julian Culp, "How Irresponsible are Rising Powers?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 9, 2016, p. 1527. Also see, Narlikar, 2010, p. 112; Hopewell, 2018, pp. 577–593.

[32] Julian Culp, "How Irresponsible are Rising Powers?", *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 37, No. 9, 2016, p. 1527.

[33] Patrick, 2010, p. 47.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Sandra Destradi and Cord Jakobeit, "Global Governance Debates and Dilemmas: Emerging Powers' Perspectives and Roles in Global Trade and Climate Governance", *Strategic Analysis,* Vol. 39, No. 1, 2015, p. 64.

contention at home.[36] India's staunch defence of "common but differentiated responsibilities" is a case in point. According to Mukund G. Rajan, India's Climate negotiations approach explained the typical developing country anxieties about "sovereignty, equity, and the importance of economic development."[37] Critics also state that through this approach—adhering to the traditional sovereignty principle and adopting possible economic growth strategies—India displayed a multilateralism that is incapable of contributing to global problem-solving.[38] However, in the last decade, India's position and status in climate negotiations have witnessed a remarkable shift. The country has shown a willingness to play a more significant role in solving global challenges, shaping rules and norms, and transitioned from the "role of global opposition to a global agenda-setter."[39]

In the realm of peace and security as well, things are not different. For instance, most of the debate over the Indian stance on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention has ended up in India's ambiguous and irresponsible behaviour. The question of why India has refrained from actively engaging with R2P despite its longstanding contributions to UN Peacekeeping operations, is significant. In terms of troop contribution, India's commitment to UN Peacekeeping far exceeds that of European Union states. India has contributed nearly 1,95,000 troops, the largest number from any country, and participated in 49 missions. However, throughout the evolution of R2P, particularly in its initial years, India was sceptical about the concept, and regarded it as a pretext for intervention to enforce Western interests.[40] Due to this stance, India was considered one of the recalcitrant opponents of the idea of R2P.

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[36] Narlikar, 2011, p. 1614.

[37] Mukund G. Rajan, *Global Environmental Politics: India and the North-South Politics of Global Environmental Issues*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 266.

[38] Debiel and Wulf, 2017, p. 55.

[39] Aniruddh Mohan, "From Rio to Paris: India in Global Climate Politics", *ORF Occasional Paper*, December 2017, p. 22.

[40] Krause, April 2016, p. 19.

However, later, India expressed a positive attitude towards R2P, and was cautious in its commitments. It also acknowledged the basic tenets of the concept while adhering to the fundamental aspects of its interpretation.[41] For instance, in February 2011, as the Libyan crisis intensified, India voted for UNSC Resolution 1970, which reminded the Libyan government of its duty to protect its people. Many regarded this as a significant change in India's position towards the principle of R2P. However, after almost a month, in March 2011, India abstained from UNSC Resolution 1973 that authorised a no-fly zone and international military intervention in Libya.[42] This led to much debate within and outside the country about the position it ought to have espoused. While some analysts and practitioners argued for greater pragmatism and a shift in India's approach towards R2P, a few held the view that the country should play with the tunes of traditional sovereignty.[43] Some scholars cited India's intervention in Bangladesh in 1971, and in Sri Lanka in 1987, to establish the ambivalence theory.[44]

India's approach to multilateral disarmament and nuclear negotiations is another case in point. During the early two decades after Independence, India was an active advocate of the universal disarmament of nuclear weapons and proliferation. In 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a nuclear testing "standstill" agreement, which was later forwarded to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Nehru was the first statesman to draw the world's attention to the problem of nuclear weapons testing. The country played a vital role in drafting both the Partial Test Ban Treaty

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[41]   Jaganathan and Kurtz, 2014, p. 472.

[42]   Ian Hall, "Tilting at Windmills? The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect after the UNSC Resolution 1973", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, Vol. 5, 2013, p. 85.

[43]   For a detailed analysis, see Karthik Bommakanti, "India's Evolving Views on Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Interventions: The Significance of Legitimacy", *Rising Powers Quarterly*, No. 3, 2017, pp. 99–123.

[44]   Bjorn Moller, "India and the Responsibility to Protect", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 8, 2017, p. 1923.

and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[45] However, by citing the discriminatory nature of the NPT later, it refused to sign the treaty. Interestingly, while proposing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, India had developed its own nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, India is the only nuclear weapons state which demands the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Though the country is not active in multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts, it enjoys a meaningful level of support within the Indian foreign policy establishment. For instance, in 2006, India presented a working paper to the UN General Assembly proposing the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also supported a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the same purpose.[46]

A majority of the scholars explain the "ambiguity" and "reluctance" in India's multilateral approach looking at its history, culture, and domestic politics. For instance, Subrata Mitra and Jivanta Schottli attribute this ambiguous nature of Indian foreign policy to the inner contradictions in its domestic politics. According to them, this has been "partly the result of the nation-building process, which differed from Europe's experience of the nation appearing, historically, before the state."[47] Mukherjee and Malone cite Jaswant Singh, former Foreign Minister of India, to expose how history, culture, and identity have influenced the Indian approach to multilateralism. Singh states that:

> Multilaterally, many Indian voices have been very conscious of years of colonial subject-hood. The result has been excessive Indian touchiness at times. Underlying Indian positions in some international economic negotiations has been a fear of foreign economic looting rooted in history.[48]

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[45] Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Multilateralism in India's Nuclear Policy: A Questionable Default Option", in David Malone et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, London: Oxford, 2015, pp. 650–662.

[46] Ibid., p. 656.

[47] Subrata K. Mitra and Jivanta Schottli, "The New Dynamics of Indian Foreign Policy and its Ambiguities", *Irish Studies in International Affairs,* Vol. 18, 2007, p. 33.

[48] Jaswant Singh, cited in Mukherjee and Malone, 2011, p. 325.

The conflicting interests, rule-taker by capacity and rule-maker by ambitions, has led to many contradictions and inconsistencies in India's multilateralism. Consequently for India, multilateralism was, at best, a defence against the unilateralism of others.[49] Raja Mohan views this as an "unresolved tension between the reasoning of emerging power status and the actual policies rooted in the ethos of a post-colonial state."[50] According to him, until the 1990s, India saw global and regional security issues through the "prism of the Third World and anti-imperialism". Amrita Narlikar also emphasises this and she sees the role of the (post) colonial mindset in bearing the cost of a distributive strategy in multilateral forums. She notes that this attitude prevails across issue areas and international regimes, and the Indian governments with divergent political views have embraced such policies.[51] According to Kanti Bajpai, the two constituents which drive India's international behaviour are expediency and conviction—"the former because of material weakness, and the latter due to the Gandhian norms and principles of non-violence imbued during the nationalist struggle."[52]

Rahul Sagar identifies four competing visions that shape India's attitude in the international system: moralists, Hindu nationalists, realists, and liberals. While moralists emphasise principled actions in world politics and seek an egalitarian order, Hindu nationalists and realists argue for greater military and economic capabilities. Liberals, however, emphasise seeking prosperity and peace through increasing trade and interdependence.[53] Deepa Ollapally also provides a similar framework:

[49]   Mukherjee and Malone, 2011, p. 325.

[50]   C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's Foreign Policy*, Delhi: Viking, 2003, p. 139.

[51]   Amrita Narlikar, "Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India", *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2006, p. 72.

[52]   Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 3.

[53]   Rahul Sagar, "State of Mind: What Kind of Power will India Become?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2009, pp. 801–816.

traditionalist, nationalist, regionalist, and new globalist.[54] She argues that "India's foreign policy preferences cannot be understood without referring to its state identity as it has evolved." The ambivalence is rooted in factors such as "post-colonial nationalism, civilizational exceptionalism, and secular democracy."[55] These identity sources and visions have strikingly different approaches to the existing international order, producing inconsistency and ambiguity in policymaking.[56] Karen Smith supports this argument—that tension between developing an alternative form of government, a desire to mimic the colonial structures, and differentiation across foreign policy issue areas lie central to India's foreign policy ambiguity.[57]

Scholars also identify a significant transformation in India's multilateral approach from the original instinct of "rule-taker" and "rule breaker", to "rule shaper".[58] While India's support for UN Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions shows rule-taker behaviour, its negotiation strategies in world trade and nuclear disarmament underline the rule breaker instinct. The majority of the discussions about India being a rule-maker in multilateral forums was the product of the debate over the responsibilities of emerging powers. Many view this as a shift from a foreign policy based on moralism to one based on pragmatic realism. Sumit Ganguly sees this as India "growing up", and dropping the "ideological burden" of non-alignment and adopting more pragmatic policies.[59]

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[54] Deepa Ollapally, "India: The Ambivalent Power in Asia", *International Studies*, Vol. 48, Nos. 3–4, 2013, pp. 201–222.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Randall Schweller, "Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder", *Global Governance*, Vol. 17, 2011, p. 292.

[57] Karen Smith, "India's Identity and its Global Aspirations", *Global Society*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2012, p. 378.

[58] Sidhu, Mehta and Jones, "A Hesitant Rule Shaper", 2013, p. 325, pp. 3–21.

[59] Sumit Ganguly, "India and the Responsibility to Protect", *International Relations*, Vol. 30, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 259–261.

Raja Mohan is one of the strong proponents of the shift in India's multilateral diplomacy. He notes that India's identity in multilateral negotiations has effectively changed from being that of a "porcupine" into that of a "tiger".[60] The porcupine metaphor reflects India's old-style, defensive, distributive strategy, while the tiger symbolises the new dynamics, which started in the early 1990s. Mohan claims that rising India has the capability to shape the global commons, and is moving from the "universalism of the weak" to the "internationalism of the strong".[61] This transition is evident in the foreign policy establishment as well. For instance, in 2015, then Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar said that "India looks to transform itself from a balancing actor to a leading power."[62] India's role in creating new multilateral forums like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), and its active engagements in the global Climate Change negotiations are examples of such policy changes favouring greater responsibility in managing the global commons.[63]

Contrary to the general perception that India is a veto player and rule-taker in multilateral forums, Tobias Debiel and Herbert Wulf argue that India has developed "a distinct variant of multilateralism that combines norms of sovereignty, and non-interference with a quest for global justice and fairness."[64] According to them, the ambiguity or the absence of a solid strategy provides India the flexibility in pursuing its national interest; and, it cannot be taken for granted that ambiguous policies should result in sub-optimal foreign policy outcomes. Strategic autonomy and selectiveness are the fundamentals of such policies, and certain ambiguity can be a strength. Moreover, India views the multilateral framework as an opportunity to counter-balance Western

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[60] Mohan, 2003, p. 262.

[61] C. Raja Mohan, "Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2010, p. 138.

[62] S. Jaishankar, quoted in Harsh V. Pant, "Rising India and its Global Governance Imperative", *Rising Powers Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2017, p. 9.

[63] Pant, 2017, p. 13.

[64] Debiel and Wulf, 2017, p. 50.

hegemony through coalitions of developing/Third World countries.[65] Through these coalitions, India is "shaping the evolution of the rules of the road". However, Debiel and Wulf also attempt to link the behaviour of India in multilateral forums with the prominent perception that the history, civilisation, and nature of the governments are the predominant factors which influence the multilateral policies of the country.

To summarise, the majority of literature from different, however distinct, theoretical traditions argue that India's multilateral engagements are characterised by ambiguous and irresponsible behaviour. Their attempts are devoted to categorising India's viewpoints on multilateralism by the attributes of the various governments that have come to power in New Delhi, or the bearings of various individual leaders. According to them, the multiple identities of the Indian state and its inner contradictions are the sole determinants of the country's foreign policy in general, and the multilateral approach in particular. In this endeavour, this literature has overlooked the role of systemic/structural elements, such as the nature of international politics, the nature of multilateralism, and its practice in shaping the approach of the actors. While examining India's ambitions and responsibilities as an emerging power, such scholars have ignored India's status and positioning in the international system. Thus, most of them have failed to systematically explain whether the lack of a consistent strategy or the ambivalent foreign policy orientation have actually resulted in sub-optimal outcomes.

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[65] Ibid., p. 60.

THEORISING AMBIVALENCE AND RELUCTANCE

Theory needs a minimum degree of regularity and predictability of behaviour. Theorising, therefore, is about discovering patterns,[66] and explaining them. In the context of India's multilateral engagement, the most regular and predictable behaviours are ambiguity/inconsistency and reluctance. Therefore, the second aspect of theorising – discovering patterns – is indeed challenging. However, it is not impossible. According to some scholars, it is the "tension between the reasoning of emerging power status and the actual policies rooted in the ethos of a post-colonial state",[67] or the conflict between "expediency and conviction"[68] which have influenced the foreign policy approaches of the Indian state. Moreover, there are two contradictory trends in Indian foreign policy thinking: idealistic motivations on the one hand, and interest-based motivations on the other.[69]

However, neither the pursuit of national interest and unit-level goals, as the realists argue, nor the system-level values and goals, as liberals claim, alone have shaped India's multilateral approach. Similarly, though the identity formation of the Indian state provides a crucial insight into the striking duality between domestic and structural interests as social constructivists argue, the post-colonial identity was deeply internalised. In other words, in shaping the post-colonial identity of the Indian state, the role of interactions in the international political system was

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[66] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, New Jersey: Pearson, 2000, p. 17.

[67] Mohan, 2003, p. 139.

[68] Kanti Bajpai, "India: Modified Structuralism", in M. Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 195.

[69] J. N. Dixit, *India's Foreign Policy 1947–2003*, New Delhi: Picus, 2003.

minimal. What this reveals is that neither the realistic nor the liberalist nor the constructivist approaches can single-handedly explain the ambivalence in India's multilateral approach.

Thus, to get a comprehensive view and theorise it, one needs to examine domestic, systemic, and sub-systemic level factors, and how they shape the behaviour of individual actors in global politics. It requires analysing the correlation between all sorts of forces in the systemic and the domestic levels.[70] The following section argues that, variables such as the unequal characteristics of the international system in terms of power and the gap between the theory and practice of multilateralism, as well as the country's status/positioning in the international system, have had a definite influence on shaping India's multilateral approach. It also helps us to theorise India's ambiguity/inconsistency and reluctance in shouldering global responsibility more systematically.

In theory, multilateralism denotes the interactions of three or more states, based on some collectively agreed norms, rules, and principles that guide and govern interstate behaviour.[71] However, in practice, multilateralism has different shapes and various meanings. Scholars classify multilateralism into two broad categories: the traditional/classical, and the new multilateralism. Traditional multilateralism perceives multilateralism as a process, and a long-term organising principle. It also emphasises the centrality of states/agents. For instance, Robert Keohane views multilateralism as a special form of cooperation, based on the principle of "diffuse reciprocity."[72] He emphasises the institutional

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[70]   David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations", in Kluas Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds), *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 87.

[71]   Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research", *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 731–764.

[72]   Reciprocity is an arrangement whose members expect that it will yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate, and over time. See also, Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations", *International Organization,* Vol. 40, No. 1, 1986, p. 19.

characteristics of multilateralism by viewing it as a "persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles."[73] J. G. Ruggie describes it as "generalized principles of conduct", and underlines its normative aspects as well.[74] Hemmer and Katzenstein emphasise the role of a collective identity and a shared interest in multilateral cooperation.[75]

The primary characteristics of traditional/classical multilateralism are the centrality of states and the prominence of the principle of state sovereignty. States are regarded as the "constitutive elements of the multilateral system, and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism."[76] This could be viewed as a top-down process of multilateralism. International orders like the Concert of Europe, treaty regimes such as the Law of the Sea, and international organisations like the United Nations, are examples of classic intergovernmental multilateralism in which sovereign equality is the fundamental organising principle. Traditional multilateralism perceives the process as a means to an end. States or their agents are conceptualised as conscious, goal-seeking actors and, for them, multilateralism is one means among many to be used.[77]

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[73] Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, 1998, p. 384.

[74] John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1992, p. 571. Also see, J. G. Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

[75] Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism", *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, p. 576.

[76] Luk Van Langernhove, "The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0", *Global Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2010, p. 264.

[77] James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1992, p. 603.

Scholars like Robert Cox argue for a bottom-up multilateralism, a broader framework which takes states plus their societies as the primary entities.[78] This has resulted in the emergence of a newer strand of multilateral literature, which emphasises the end-means rationality and fragmented nature of multilateralism. Concepts such as "contested multilateralism", "effective multilateralism", "minilateralism", "adhoc-multilateralism", and "communitarian multilateralism" are associated with this new strand. Contested multilateralism emphasises that contemporary multilateralism is characterised by competing coalitions and shifting institutional arrangements.[79] It involves the use of various institutions to challenge the rules and practices or missions of existing institutions. Generally, the dissatisfaction of states with existing multilateral institutions leads to the creation of alternative institutions. When dissatisfied actors are unable to change the status quo, there is possibility of contested multilateralism.[80]

Minilateralism denotes the "diplomatic process of a small group of interested parties working together to supplement or complement the activities of international organisations in tackling subjects deemed too complicated to be addressed appropriately at the multilateral level."[81] According to Richard Haass, four types of minilateral groupings exist: "elite multilateralism"; "regional multilateralism"; "functional multilateralism"; and "informal multilateralism".[82] While "elite multilateralism" denotes groups such as the G20 which is composed

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[78] Robert W. Cox, "An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism for the Twenty-first Century", *Global Governance*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1997, p. 111.

[79] Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, "Contested Multilateralism", *Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 9, 2014, p. 386.

[80] Ibid., p. 390. The creation of multilateral forums like BRICS and IBSA can be viewed as an example of contested multilateralism in practice.

[81] Erica Moret, "Effective Minilateralism for the EU: What, When and How?", *European Union Institute for Security Studies Issue Brief*, June 2016, at https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_17_Minilateralism.pdf

[82] Richard N. Haass, "The Case for Messy Multilateralism", *Financial Times*, 6 January 2010.

of powers that serve a leading or pivotal role, "regional multilateralism" refers to the proliferation of regional trade pacts which have arisen in the light of the WTO deadlock. "Functional multilateralism" refers to "coalitions of the willing and relevant" as a first step in addressing a wider problem; and "informal multilateralism" describes actions employed by national governments to implement measures in line with global norms.[83]

In practice, the Indian way of multilateralism has all the features mentioned above. However, traditional/classical multilateralism that sees multilateralism as the end as well as a long-term objective is the primary characteristic of Indian multilateralism. India's consistent and enthusiastic support to the United Nations is a case in point. In its approach, India privileges the principle of sovereign equality above all–which is the fundamental doctrine of the UN as well. India's continuing support to Peacekeeping operations and the UN Democracy Fund while opposing humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion through military intervention demonstrate that the basis of India's approach to the multilateral system is the principle of sovereign equality and its corollary, non-intervention. India's involvement in UN Peacekeeping and its cautious and reluctant support for R2P "are neither contradictory nor antithetical."[84] Its peacekeeping commitments are "conditional upon the respect for sovereignty, consent of the government, and clear rules of engagement."[85]

For instance, during the first Gulf war, India backed UNSC Resolution 678 that denounced the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, it abstained from voting on Resolution 688, citing the violation of the principle of sovereignty. India was sceptical of UN-authorised Western military intervention in the name of humanitarian intervention at various occasions. India's permanent representative to the UN, Hardeep Puri, once stated that "R2P cannot turn out to be a tool to legitimizing big

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[83]   Ibid.

[84]   Jaganathan and Kurtz, 2014, p. 462.

[85]   Ibid., p. 467.

[86]   Hardeep Singh Puri, cited in Destradi and Jakobeit, 2015, p. 64.

power intervention on the pretext of protecting populations from the violations of human rights and humanitarian law."[86] Moreover, the country never became a part in "the coalition of the willing", despite the size of its military and its peacekeeping expertise.[87] The high selectivity of the UN-authorised humanitarian intervention proves India's scepticism is valid.[88]

India's demand for democratic reforms in international institutions, and its status as the world's largest democracy as contrasted with its reluctance to support "democracy promotion" is often highlighted as an ambivalent and inconsistent policy. Ian Hall, for instance, describes India as a "reluctant democracy promoter", which delivers its democracy assistance only after a transition to democracy has begun.[89] Like UN peacekeeping, in this case, India privileges the principle of sovereignty above all, and opposes the Western-style promotion and export of democracy through military intervention, or the use of force. However, India supports multilateral efforts of promoting democracy, and provides technical assistance to existing and transitioning democracies when requested.[90] For instance, India was one of the first countries to support the creation of the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) by pledging US$49 million, and between 2005 and 2017, India donated almost US$ 32 million to the Fund.

India also provides financial support mainly to its South Asian neighbours as Overseas Development Assistance (ODI). India emphasises the "consent of the affected country" and respect of

[87] Alyssa Ayres, *Our Time Has Come: How India is Making its Place in the World*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 135.

[88] For a detailed analysis of how the use of force authorisation was selectively done by the UNSC, see Dominic Zaum and Adam Roberts (eds), *Selective Security: War and The United Nations Security Council Since 1945*, London: Routledge, 2008.

[89] Ian Hall, "Not Promoting, Not Exporting: India's Democracy Assistance", *Rising Powers Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2017, p. 90.

[90] Ibid., p. 91.

[91] Claudia Meier and C.S.R. Murthy, "India's Growing Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance", *GPPi Research Paper* No. 13, January 2011, p. 8.

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and [the] national unity of States as a prerequisite for giving humanitarian and development aid.[91] As a senior diplomat noted, "while the promotion of democratic ideals may be in alignment with India's belief in these principles, New Delhi is not in the business of exporting democracy."[92] In short, the Indian approach towards promoting democracy can be viewed as "cautious",[93] and "exemplifies the wisdom of a case-by-case rather than a broad-brush approach."[94]

India's pragmatic willingness to seek the best possible deal through multilateralism is evident in its bid for UNSC seat, its approach to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and counter-balancing acts in trade and Climate negotiations. While many criticise India's nuclear policy and its demand for disarmament as merely rhetorical and ambiguous, other scholars view "India's policy with an emphasis on minimal deterrence and arms control has the potential to become the benchmark for the world's nuclear powers."[95] According to Rajesh Rajagopalan, it is the gap between India's strong arguments about the inequalities of the nuclear order and the lack of material capability to push this into practice that has resulted in an "ambiguous" nuclear policy.[96]

However, India's nuclear policy results from the realisation of the non-egalitarian nature of the international political system. India sees nuclear weapons as essential to its national security in an uncertain and anarchic

[92] Anil Wadhwa, quoted in Ian Hall, 2017, p. 91.

[93] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Reluctant India", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2011, pp. 101–113.

[94] Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Democracy Promotion Circa: An Indian Perspective", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010, p. 49.

[95] Debiel and Wulf, 2017, p. 57.

[96] Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Multilateralism in India's Nuclear Policy: A Questionable Default Option", in David Malone et al.,*The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Oxford, 2015.

[97] Shivshankar Menon, *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Penguin, 2016, p. 159.

world, and they could prevent others from attempting nuclear blackmail and coercion against India.[97] India's advocacy of a nuclear-weapons-free world—India is the only Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) that campaigns for complete nuclear disarmament—also exhibits this pragmatism. Former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor Shivshanker Menon rightly explains this paradox: "we do think that we would be more secure in a world that is truly free of nuclear weapons. But until we arrive at that happy state, we have no choice."[98] It explains how domestic concerns as well as structural elements, such as anarchy and uncertainty, have shaped India's so-called ambiguous nuclear policy. Therefore, India's opposition to nuclear treaties can be considered an ideological opposition to the formal institutionalised discrimination in the international system – in this case, the monopolisation of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, in many situations, the Indian dissent in multilateral forums has often been aimed at preventing multilateralism from becoming "minilateralism" in the hands of major powers. India "has always preferred to be a part of the democratic majority, helping in the adoption of broadly acceptable decisions and resolutions."[99] The country's leading role in creating the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and making coalitions of the developing world in trade and Climate Change negotiations are cases in point. In multilateral forums, the West has always been "preaching global governance on the one hand, while pursuing very narrow interests unilaterally on the other."[100] In areas such as global trade and climate governance, the emerging powers, including India, have stood for the majority, the developing countries, and demanded "common but differentiated responsibilities." However, the West has been eager to name the developing nations as spoilers (or rule breakers) instead of practising the basics of multilateralism, cooperation, compromise, and majority voting. It is a fact that India has effectively used their increasing economic weight "to block decision-

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[98] Ibid., p. 178.

[99] C.S.R. Murthy, "India as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council in 2011–12", *Frederic Ebert Stiftung Perspective*, May 2011, p. 1.

[100] Destradi and Jakobeit, 2015, p. 68.

[101] Ibid., p. 63.

making along the lines of obscure green room deals at the eleventh hour by the established powers of the North."[101]

The other significant factors that influence India's multilateral engagements are the nature of the current global order, and India's status and position in it. "Responsibility literature" has, on the whole, criticised India for its reluctance to shoulder responsibility concomitant with its emerging power status. However it neglected the global context. According to Randall Schweller, the world is in "an age of entropy."[102] By the entropy metaphor, Schweller captures the chaotic nature of the world, and the rise of bounded power, similar to useless or free energy. The lack of order or predictability, and the gradual decline into disorder is its fundamental character. This entropy situation is primarily the result of power transition: the relative decline of the West and the rise of the Rest, and the shift of global wealth and power to the East. Periods of global transition can be chaotic, unpredictable, long, and bloody.[103] In such a situation, emerging powers will be conflicted states with primarily three roles: spoilers, supporters, or shirkers, depending on particular issues and the targeted audience.[104] Thus, inconsistency is natural in this particular context wherein one cannot define roles and responsibilities.

Likewise, though India is considered as an emerging power, its capability to influence systemic change is very minimal. Beyond domestic factors, structural constraints also influence the behaviour of the states in the system. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, observes that the international political structure is the principal determinant of outcomes at the system level. It encourages certain actions and discourages others, and also defines the behaviour of units. He further notes that "a structure is defined by the arrangements of its parts. Only changes of arrangements

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[102] *Entropy* denotes the lack of order or predictability, and the gradual decline into disorder. See Schweller, 2011, p. 287.

[103] Christopher Layne, "The Global Power Shift from West to East", *The National Interest*, No. 119, 2012, pp. 21–31.

[104] Ibid., p. 290.

[105] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, California: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 104.

are structural changes."[105] According to him, the position of a state in the system is determined by its distribution of capabilities, both military and economic. Naturally, small or middle powers cannot seek greater responsibilities. Even if they aspire for greater responsibility and roles, their making a structural change in the system is almost impossible with their limited capabilities. This refutes the argument that "emerging India will have the opportunity to shape the outcomes on the most critical issues of the twenty-first century."[106] Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul describe this as "status inconsistency" – the discrepancy between capabilities and ambitions on the one hand, and attributed status on the other.[107]

The UN General Assembly vote on the Jerusalem issue also rejects the arguments and explanations of dominant foreign policy theories about Indian multilateralism. Amidst various speculations and opinions, India voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly resolution that denounces the USA's decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Many foreign policy experts foretold that India would abstain in the General Assembly vote. Some experts even proposed that India should be absent during the voting. However, against all these assumptions and predictions, India voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution and, consequently, denounced its friends: the USA and Israel. This raises questions regarding the validity of the argument that the nature of government influences the multilateral approach. The "yes" vote in the General Assembly shows that India is pragmatic and principled in multilateral forums, and the change of governments in New Delhi has minimal influence on it.[108]

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[106] C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2006, p. 17.

[107] Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 10.

[108] Rajeesh Kumar, "The Yes Vote at United Nations Against US: What It Tells About India's Multilateralism", at https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-yes-vote-at-united-nations-against-us-what-it-tells-about-indias-multilatera/305906

In short, domestic and structural, material and non-material factors have a definite influence in shaping India's multilateral approach. The country follows a flexible multilateral policy depending on issue or context: from making coalitions of the majority to breaking/blocking rulemaking by acting alone. However, it always gives privilege to the fundamental norm of multilateralism—respect to sovereignty. While some argue that "strategic autonomy" is pragmatic and helpful in protecting the national interest,[109] others question this policy by describing it as ambiguous or inconsistent, and argue that it has led to sub-optimal outcomes.[110] The majority of scholars view this vacillating policy as irresponsible in providing global public goods. Literature often describes India as "rule breaker", "naysayer", and "reluctant rule shaper" in multilateral forums. However, these are the expected positions of a sovereign state in multilateral forums due to the gap between the theory and practice of multilateralism as the various shapes and nature of such forums demonstrates. Depending on what one considers to be the right conduct of foreign policy and multilateralism, the criticism also varies.

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[109] Sunil Khilnani et al., "Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century", at http://www.cprindia.org/research/reports/nonalignment-20-foreign-and-strategic-policy-india-twenty-first-century

[110] P. R. Kumaraswamy, "National Security: A Critique", in P. R. Kumaraswamy (ed.), *Security Beyond Survival: Essays for K. Subramanyam*, New Delhi: Sage, 2004.

INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

India has always been a firm believer of the United Nations Charter, and sees it as a vehicle for international peace and security. As is well known, India was one of the signatories to the Declaration by the UN in Washington D.C., on 1 January 1942. It became one of the UN Charter members when the Charter was adopted in October 1945, even though the country was not yet independent.[111] India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, viewed the UN as a critical element of a global vision of peaceful co-existence. Nehru once observed that,

> Towards the United Nations, India's attitude is that of wholehearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in both spirit and letter, to the Charter governing it. To that end, India will participate fully in its various activities and endeavour to play that role in its councils to which her geographical position, population, and contribution towards peaceful progress entitle her.[112]

This concept of the UN's centrality in matters of global peace and security prevails in the Indian establishment without any significant shift even after seven decades. For instance, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 2014 as well as in the Summit on Peace Operations 2015, reiterated India's continuing commitment to the UN Peacekeeping operations. He stated that "India's commitment to UN Peacekeeping remains healthy and will grow. We have announced new intended contributions to the UN Peacekeeping

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[111] "India and the United Nations", Ministry of External Affairs, National Archives of India, HI/121/18/70 1970, p. 2.

[112] Ibid., p. 2.

operations."[113] After five years, in January 2021, India's Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla also repeated this commitment by stating that the UN should ensure that its Peacekeeping Operations are sufficiently mandated and resourced to implement a comprehensive understanding of international peace and security.[114]

India has provided more than 2,00,000 military and police personnel to UN Peacekeeping over the last 70 years. As of January 2021, India is the fifth largest troop-contributing country globally, with 5,428 personnel contingent troops, police, and experts deployed in seven UN missions. This chapter examines India's approach towards peacekeeping, its continuing commitments and contributions in keeping peace in many conflicting regions, and the rationale for contributing troops. The first part provides a brief overview of UN Peacekeeping: its history, evolution, and its fundamental principles. The second part focuses on the peacekeeping approach, the characteristics of Indian peacekeeping, and the factors that influence its peacekeeping policy. This inquiry's primary objective is to showcase the 'principled' but the evolving position in India's multilateral peace and security approach.

4.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations are as old as the United Nations. Since its inception, the UN has been called upon to maintain international peace and security, and support the setting conditions for peace processes. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council holds principal responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Though the UN Charter did not mention peacekeeping explicitly, Chapters VI and VII provide its legal basis. While Chapter VI talks about the "pacific

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[113] "PM's statement at the Summit on Peace Operations", 28 September 2015, at https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/statement-by-pm-at-the-summit-on-peace-operations/

[114] "Challenges of Maintaining Peace and Security in Fragile Contexts", remarks by Shri Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Foreign Secretary, at the UN Security Council Open Debate, 6 January 2021, at https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33372/Remarks_by_Shri_Harsh_Vardhan_Shringla_Foreign_Secretary_at_the_UN_Security_Council_Open_Debate_Challenges_of_maintaining_peace_and_security_in_fragil

settlement of disputes", Chapter VII discusses the "action concerning the breaches of peace and act of aggression". Article 33(1) of Chapter VI binds parties in a conflict that is likely to jeopardise international peace and security. It also enables member states to seek a solution to the dispute by "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements or other peaceful means of their own choice."[115] Chapter VII empowers the Security Council, "should all other measures fail, to resort to the use of armed force to maintain and restore international peace and security."[116] It also specifies that UN member states are obliged to provide armed forces and other assistance and facilities for these purposes when called upon to do so.

The primary objective of peacekeeping is to assist countries torn by conflict to create conditions for lasting peace. It has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to support its members to sail from conflict to peace during the years. Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including global legitimacy, burden sharing and ability to mobilise military and police from around the globe. It is a vital instrument of the Member States in support of the maintenance of international peace and security and remains a unique mechanism for collective action and partnership.

4.1.1 Evolution of Peace Operations

In 1948, only three years after the inception of the UN, a Peacekeeping mission—United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was deployed to the Middle East to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States.[117] However, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)—established in 1956 to secure and

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[115] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Article 33(1).

[116] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 42.

[117] United Nations Security Council Resolution, No. 50, 1948. Resolution of 29 May 1948, UN Doc. S/RES/50, 1948.

supervise the cessation of hostilities in Suez—was the first full-fledged peacekeeping mission. The United Nations Operation in Congo ONUC—launched in 1960—was the first large-scale mission, with nearly 20,000 troops. It revealed the risks associated with efforts to stabilise war-torn regions. For instance, nearly 250 UN staff members lost their lives during this mission, including the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld.

Table. 4.1: The Growth of UN Peacekeeping, 1988–2019

	1988	1992	1994	2000	2010	2019
No. of Active Missions	5	11	17	14	15	14
Countries Contributing Troops	26	56	77	89	115	122
Military Personnel	9,570	11,495	78,111	30,350	82,014	73,822
Civilian Police Personnel	35	115	2,263	7,038	14,322	10,186
Annual UN Peacekeeping Budget	$ 230.4 million	$ 1,689.6 million	$ 3,610 million	$ 2,220 million	$7.9 billion	$6.7 billion

Source: DPKO[118]

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[118] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors

Table 4.2: Current Operations

Country	Year (established)	Name of Operation	Strength (personnel)
Western Sahara	April 1991	MINURSO	485 (230 civilians, 19 contingent troops, 214 experts on mission, 7 staff officers, 15 UN volunteers)
Central African Republic	September 2014	MINUSCA	15,045 (1,162 civilians, 11,158 contingent troops, 169 experts on mission, 2,042 police, 308 staff officers, 206 UN volunteers)
Mali	April 2013	MINUSMA	16,453 (1,421 civilians, 12,644 contingent troops, 39 experts, 1,734 police, 454 staff officers, 161 UN volunteers)
D.R. of the Congo	July 2010	MONUSCO	20,486 (2,970 civilians, 15,292 contingent troops, 241 experts on mission, 1,359 police, 257 staff officers, 367 UN volunteers)
Golan	May 1974	UNDOF	1,904 (125 civilians, 915 contingent troops, 54 staff officers)
Cyprus	March 1964	UNFICYP	1,004 (151 civilians, 736 contingent troops, 65 police, 52 staff officers)
Lebanon	March 1978	UNIFIL	10,790 (809 civilians, 9777 contingent troops, 204 staff officers)
Abyei	June 2011	UNISFA	4,786 (217 civilians, 4,241 contingent troops, 134 experts on missions, 38 police, 123 staff officers, 33 UN volunteers)
Kosovo	June 1999	UNMIK	351 (312 civilians, 8 experts on mission, 10 police, 21 UN volunteers)
South Sudan	July 2011	UNMISS	19,402 (2,275 civilians, 14,276 contingent troops, 215 experts on mission, 1,797 police, 428 staff officers, 411 UN volunteers)
India and Pakistan	January 1949	UNMOGIP	117(72 civilians, 45 experts of mission)
Middle East	May 1948	UNTSO	374 (222 civilians, 152 experts on mission)

Source: DPKO

Over the next three decades, a limited number of similar missions were deployed—13 in total—until 1988. Their sole function was to monitor borders, and establish buffer zones after the agreement of ceasefires. The missions were typically comprised of lightly armed troops from member states. The end of the Cold War saw a surge in peacekeeping missions, and 53 of the 71 UN peace operations occurred after 1990. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations sent short-term missions to the Dominican Republic, Western New Guinea, West Irian and Yemen. Troops have also been deployed in the longer term to Cyprus and the Middle East.

This notable rise in the number of Peacekeeping operations has been followed by a significant change in their nature, especially in their function and composition. The "single function associated with traditional operations has evolved into a multiplicity of tasks."[119] Moreover, "the composition of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations [has become] more diverse and complex: peacekeepers [a]re drawn from a wider variety of occupations (military, civilian, police, and diplomatic), nations, and cultures."[120] In 1988, UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. On that occasion, the Nobel Committee had particularly pointed out that "by their efforts, peacekeeping forces have contributed significantly to the achievement of one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations. The Organization is now playing a central role in world affairs, and is invested with greater confidence."[121]

Over the past seven decades, more than 10,00,000 men and women from around 125 countries have served in more than 70 Peacekeeping operations. More than 4,020 personnel, from about 120 countries, lost their lives while serving under the UN flag. Currently, around 1,00,000 military, police, and civilian personnel serve in 12 Peacekeeping missions.

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[119] Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, "Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution", in A. Austin, M. Fischer and N. Ropers (eds), *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict*, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2004, p. 3.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid.

4.1.2 Types of Peace Operations

Peacekeeping operations are mainly four types: (i) monitoring and observer missions, (ii) traditional peacekeeping, (iii) peacebuilding, and (iv) peace enforcement.[122] The first two categories require the consent of the parties involved in the conflict, and include "actions by lightly armed troops and police to end hostilities, and to maintain peace in a conflict area."[123] Traditional peacekeeping typically involves interposing the UN troops between conflicting parties to bring about a ceasefire. At times, this may include disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of rebel forces. Peacebuilding is more complex. Its aim is to support essential safety and security; political processes; the provision of basic services; the restoration of core government functions; and economic revitalisation.[124] Lastly, peace enforcement operations denote the use of military force to end hostilities between conflicting parties.[125]

4.1.3 Core Principles of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is defined as a tool for maintaining international peace and security by three mutually reinforcing principles: the consent of parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.[126] The first principle, consent, suggests that Peacekeeping can only take place with the approval of conflicting parties. It guarantees that the mission has the necessary freedom and the protection to fulfil its mandate effectively. The absence of consent

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[122] Todd Sandler, "International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XX, No. X, 2017, p. 5.

[123] Ibid.

[124] "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding", UN Doc., A/63/881–S/2009/304, at https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/881

[125] For a detailed categorisation of Peacekeeping Operations, see Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, "Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2018, pp. 28–51.

[126] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, "The Capstone Doctrine", at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

may endanger the security of peacekeepers as they risk "becoming a party to the conflict, rather than the arbiter of the peace agreement."[127] The second, impartiality, denotes that peacekeepers will implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any of the parties to the conflict. The primary objective of this principle is to ensure a fair and transparent Peacekeeping mission. Third, non-use of force, that is, refraining from using force except in self-defence, or for the defence of the mandate.

The basic principles of peacekeeping are the doctrinal precepts of the operational philosophy for the soldiers participating in peacekeeping, and are an integral part of their pre-deployment training.[128] These principles are central to the respect and regard that the blue helmets have earned during the last seven decades of their peacekeeping engagements across the globe. However, the recent past has witnessed a dilemma in Peacekeeping: the mandate of the operations has become more robust and aggressive, and is now termed as peace enforcement. In the Security Council as well as in the troop-contributing countries, differences of opinion have emerged, some supporting and others opposing the aggressive mandate. In its report to the UN Secretary-General, the Horta Panel, which was constituted to review Peacekeeping operations, summarises this as,

> Some Member States, including many leading troop contributors have expressed to the Panel their strong view that the three core principles of peacekeeping, i.e., consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate, should be upheld. Others, however, have suggested that they are outmoded and require adjustment.[129]

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[127] Ibid., p. 31.

[128] Vikrant Deshpande, "Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement: Principal Dilemma Surrounding United Nations Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo", at https://idsa.in/africatrends/peacekeeping-or-peace-enforcement

[129] "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, Comprehensive review of special political missions, Strengthening of the United Nations system", the Horta Panel Report, A/70/95–S/2015/446, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95

A careful analysis of this contradiction reveals that "those that want UN Peacekeeping to continue in its traditional mould, with peacekeepers deployed only as arbitrators between conflicting parties, are the ones that contribute troops to the UN."[130] The ambiguity is reflected in doctrinal statements and reports in which the UN has sought to fit even its more muscular and forceful missions still within the category of "peacekeeping", as opposed to the more contentious category of "peace enforcement". For instance, the Capstone doctrine on peacekeeping argued that, "while robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic level".[131] Similarly, in 2009, the Secretary-General's report on peacekeeping reform argued that, contrary to enforcement activity, "robust peacekeeping … operates within the principles of United Nations peacekeeping", and involves "the non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate".[132] The following section discusses this in detail with a focus on India's engagement with UN peace operations.

4.2 India and the UN Peacekeeping

4.2.1 History

India's contribution to the maintenance of global peace and security began before its Independence. India was a part of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) formed in May 1947, and it made many suggestions to defuse the conflict.[133] This enthusiasm continues

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[130] Deshpande, at https://idsa.in/africatrends/peacekeeping-or-peace-enforcement

[131] "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine)", at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the-capstone-doctrine/

[132] Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko, "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations", *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 160, No. 1, 2015, pp. 6–12.

[133] See Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11 UN Special Committee on Palestine, at https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3

today as well through active participation in peace operations. As per December 2020 statistics, India has contributed nearly 2,53,000 troops —the largest number from any country—to 49 Peacekeeping missions. It also sustained 168 fatalities in its support for keeping the peace across the globe.[134] In addition to its troop contribution, India has also played a leadership role in many Peacekeeping missions. Till date, it has provided one Military Adviser, one Deputy Military Adviser, two Civilian Police Advisers to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and thirteen Force Commanders and several Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General to various Peacekeeping missions around the world.[135]As of January 2021, India is the fifth largest troop-contributing country in the world, with 5,428 personnel deployed in seven UN Peacekeeping missions.

From the initial days of the UN peacekeeping efforts, India has sent thousands of civil and military personnel to monitor ceasefires, mediate conflicts, and assist with transforming war-torn societies into stable ones. India's first contribution towards UN Peacekeeping goes back almost 70 years to the Korean War. War in the Korean Peninsula began on 25 June 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel.[136] The USA hastily referred the matter to the UN Security Council. The US intention was to legitimise its policy, including military intervention, taking full advantage of USSR absence in the Security Council.[137] However, from the very beginning itself India, as a non-permanent member in the Security Council at that time, offered its mediation efforts and attempted to ease the situation. When the US

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[134] See https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/49151pkeeping.pdf

[135] Dipankar Banerjee, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile of India", https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/india_banerjee130201.pdf

[136] The 38th Parallel is a circle of latitude in the Northern Hemisphere; this was used as the pre-Korean War boundary between North Korea and South Korea.

[137] Robert Barnes, "Between the Blocs: India, the United Nations, and Ending the Korean War", *The Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall, 2013, p. 266.

draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) described the North Korean move as an "act of aggression," India opposed the phrase, and argued that it would unnecessarily escalate the situation in the Korean peninsula. As a result, the UNSC agreed to change the phrase to "breach of the peace".

India also proposed a ceasefire at the UNSC, and mobilised Commonwealth nations and Arab-Asian members; however, they failed to pass the resolution. Regarding Korea, India's aims at the UNSC were two-fold: first, to prevent the UN Security Council from adopting a policy that might escalate the situation in the Korean peninsula. Second, reconcile the divergent positions of the two superpower blocs in the Council. India used its influence over the Third World and Commonwealth countries to counterbalance the bipolar Cold War system to achieve these aims.[138] Initially, in August 1950, with Cuba, Yugoslavia, Norway, Egypt and Ecuador, India proposed a group of six to study all proposals to find a solution to the Korean problem. Later, in December 1950, with the threat of a nuclear bomb looming large, the initiatives of the smaller powers were re-conceived. India convened a "meeting of representatives of 13 Asia-Arab nations at the UN—including Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Philippines."[139]

Moreover, in Korea, India's field activities were also significant. Indian troops performed almost 2,350 surgeries, and treated more than 20,000 inpatients and 1,95,000 outpatients. India also proposed the formation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) which played a critical role in the post-conflict years. Later, as the conflict was receding in 1953, India sent 6,000 soldiers to form the Custodian Force of India (CFI). This force was tasked with supervising the prisoners of war (POWs) and settling the issue of their repatriation. The Custodian Force of India (CFI) dealt with 22,951 Prisoners of Wars in three

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[138] Ibid.

[139] Vineet Thakur, "India's Diplomatic Entrepreneurism: Revisiting India's Role in the Korean Crisis, 1950–52", *China Report,* Vol. 49, No. 3, 2013, p. 285.

months. India took the Chair, and headed the Executive of the Repatriation Commission and the Commander of the Custodian Force.[140]

The efforts of Indian troops in Korea received praise from many corners. For instance, US President, D. Eisenhower said that, "No military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate and demanding peacetime mission that was faced by Indian troops in Korea."[141] Major General Shoosmith, Deputy Chief of UN Command, stated that:

> there is no question that the conduct and efficiency of the Indian army during their difficult and delicate tasks has called forth the admiration of the whole world and has done a tremendous amount to raise the prestige and standing of [India's] nation and Army.[142]

General Lee Sang Cho, Commander of the North Korean Army, said: "it has been a great pleasure for us to see your officers and men in action. They have proved that they are not only good soldiers but they are also good gentlemen."[143] India also significantly contributed to the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Indo-China deployed in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam from 1954–1975. Its contribution included a medical detachment and security guards.

In the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I, the first UN mission with armed military contingent troops, the Indian contribution

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[140] The Chairman of the NNRC was Lt. General K. S. Thimmayya, and the Commander of the Custodian Force was Major General S. P. P. Thorat.

[141] S. Dayal, *India's Role in the Korean Question: A Study in the Settlement of International Disputes under the United Nations*, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1959, p. 196.

[142] Bharat Verma et al., *Indian Army in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997, p. 11.

[143] Ibid.

was eleven infantry battalions, with "a total of 393 officers, 409 junior commissioned officers and 12,383 other ranks."[144] In Congo, from 1960–64, India sent 12,225 troops, along with a detachment of the Indian Air Force. In the Iran-Iraq War (1988–89), Iraq-Kuwait War (1991), and internal conflicts in Namibia (1989–90), Central America (1990–92), Cambodia (1991–93), Mozambique (1992–94) and Liberia (1994), India provided military observers. Besides, India also provided police personnel to a number of UN missions in Namibia, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Liberia.[145] India was the first member state to field a unit comprised solely of women police officers when it sent a Formed Police Unit (FPU) to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in January 2007.

Moreover, Indian military contingents have participated in Peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Lebanon, and Sierra Leone.[146] The Somalian operation witnessed the first ever use of the Indian Navy in UN Peacekeeping operations. The Indian troops demonstrated to the international community not only their capability to deal with the military aspects of UN Peacekeeping but also their capacity to assist the local community in restoring their livelihood and providing humanitarian assistance, like medical aid, reviving schools, livestock care, and so on. Currently, Indian troops are serving in Congo with 2,604 contingent troops and 140 Police; in South Sudan with 2,334 contingent troops; in Lebanon with 762 contingent troops, and in Golan Heights with 175 troops. It also provides five experts on mission for two missions: MINURSO in Western Sahara, and UNTSO in the Middle East.

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[144] Satish Nambiar, *For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping*, New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2009, p. 10.

[145] Ibid., p. 11.

[146] Ibid.

Table 4.3: Indian Peacekeepers in Current UN Missions

Mission	Staff Officers	Police	Contingent Troops
MONUSCO		147	2604
UNMISS			2336
UNIFIL			762
UNDOF			175
MINURSO	3		
UNTSO	2		

Source: DPKO

Figure 4.1: Troop Contribution by India 1992–2019

Source: DPKO

India is justifiably proud of its long historic links with UN Peacekeeping engagements. By and large, India feels that it has performed worthily in peacekeeping operations. India's perceived credibility as an impartial entity has helped it to stay longer terms in conflict zones successfully. Whenever Indian troops have been deployed under the aegis of the UN, they have received praise from both the international and the host community. Though the post-Cold War UN peace operations have become multifaceted due to the complex nature of humanitarian emergencies on the ground, India has continued to contribute more proactively. At the same time, India has attempted to ensure that peacekeeping operations are not violating the fundamental principles of peacekeeping.

4.2.2 Characteristics of Indian Peacekeeping

What the above facts and figures show is that India has one of the longest and most consistent records of participation in UN Peacekeeping operations since its inception. India has the unique capacity of sustaining large troop commitments over lengthy periods of time even in the most challenging situations. This reliability is the most desirable quality that peacekeepers are supposed to display as per the Brahimi Report on the reform of peacekeeping operations.[147] In this sense, India's contribution is significant since it has the ability and willingness to keep its troops in today's harsh, dangerous, and risky operational environments for longer terms. India's participation in most of the missions in Africa is a case in point. In Somalia, "which was one of the most dangerous UN operations ever, India did not withdraw its troops till the end despite suffering many casualties on [the] ground."[148] Rwanda, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Mali are other examples where Indian peacekeepers have exhibited their risk-taking capacity and staying power.

Moreover, on several occasions, India has made a much larger troop contribution than some of the major powers and other traditional peacekeepers. Its share represents 7–8 per cent of the total troops deployed under the UN at any time. This is much higher than that of the major powers such as the USA 1 per cent; the UK 2 per cent; Russia 2 per cent; and China 3 per cent.[149] In July 2019 India was the fourth largest troop contributor, with 7.1 per cent of total troops deployed in 14 UN Peacekeeping missions.[150] While the military's deployment is well-known, the role of the police, including women

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[147] Yeshi Choedon, "India's UN Peacekeeping Operations Involvement in Africa: Change in Nature of Participation and Driving Factors", *International Studies*, Vol. 51, Nos 1–4, 2014, p. 25.

[148] Ruchita Beri, "India's Role in Keeping Peace in Africa", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2008, pp. 197–221.

[149] Kabilan Krishnasamy, "A Case for India's 'Leadership' in United Nations Peacekeeping", *International Studies*, Vol. 47, Nos 2–4, 2012, p. 230.

[150] See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors

police officers, and civil affairs specialists assisting in tasks like the conduct of elections or other capacity building exercises is no less important.[151]

Beyond this reliability, continuing commitments, and higher numbers, Indian peacekeepers are praised by some of the host States, affected people as well as UN and other international agencies, for their professionalism and friendly approach to the conflict-affected people. Indian troops are known for providing essential services, and carrying out social and developmental activities in their areas of deployment in order to win the hearts and minds of the local population, which is crucial for the success of UN missions.[152] For instance, in Rwanda, the Indian peacekeepers carried out community work such as the building of roads and schools, digging tubewells for fresh water, and establishing places of worship. They also looked after eight orphanages, several schools, and provided much needed medical assistance to the local population.[153] In Soaltee and Alexandra, the Indian troops established two medical clinics and provided free medical care. The battalion also undertook the responsibility for the provision of rations.[154] The then Vice President and Defence Minister of Rwanda, Paul Kigame, said,

> I was enabled to express my gratitude and do so on behalf of my government to the Indian battalion for the dedication they have shown when serving here in our country under the UN to help in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of our country.

The Force Commander, Major General Tousignant, paid tributes to the Indian contingent, and stated that,

> You brought UNAMIR, to the United Nations, to Rwanda a sense of pride…You came in and you demonstrated what it is to

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[151] Anit Mukherjee, "At the Crossroads: India and the Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa", at https://www.brookings.edu/research/at-the-crossroads-india-and-the-future-of-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/

[152] Choedon, 2014, p. 25.

[153] Kabilan Krishnasamy, "A Partnership for Peace in the UN Peacebuilding: The Case of Indian Peacekeepers", Paper presented at The ISA Global South Caucus Conference, Singapore, 8–10 January 2015.

[154] Nambiar, 2009, p. 289.

be good soldier and you brought respectability to the mission. You brought also a sense of professionalism in everything that we have to do for the Rwandese. I say without any reservation; you are probably one of the best soldiers in the world at this time.[155]

Indian peacekeepers generally follow the "hold the fire" approach rather than the "pull the trigger" policy. Western troops have most commonly followed the latter approach in the peace missions.[156] Indian peacekeepers' experience in MOUNSCO is a case in point. When an African contingent was confronted by a mob with weapons, they opened fire, and eight teenagers were killed in the incident. However, an Indian patrol resolved a similar issue by the threat of use of force and negotiations.[157] One of the peacekeepers explains,

> The Indian psyche, even that of a soldier abjures violence. This is not only a cultural context but also a result of the institutional philosophy of maximum restraint and minimum force ingrained in him due to skills honed in internal security situations in his own country and amongst his own citizens. Kautilyan precepts of *sama* (conciliation), *dana* (gratification), *bheda* (division), and *danda* (force), with *danda* as an instrument of last resort, and to be applied when everything fails, may not be formally taught in schools of instruction but is a concept ingrained in doctrinal and operational philosophies related to use of force in a population centric conflict environment which UN peacekeeping is.[158]

Such concerns about using force as a last resort are prevalent not only among the soldiers but present in the policymaking community as well. For instance, while referring to the robust mandates given to the UN

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[155] Ibid., p. 289.

[156] Kabilan Krishnasamy, "A Case for India's 'Leadership' in United Nations Peacekeeping", *International Studies*, Vol. 47, Nos 2–4, 2012, p. 228.

[157] Deshpande, at https://idsa.in/africatrends/peacekeeping-or-peace-enforcement

[158] Ibid.

troops, one of the policymakers in the Indian establishment observed that:

> First, we need to acknowledge and address the political and legal challenges that have arisen when robust mandates are conferred on UN troops to achieve ambitious objectives. We remain an international system founded on the principle of respect for sovereignty, and there are difficult legal and political choices that will have to be made when robust mandates are given to UN peacekeeping missions.[159]

The statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, India's Permanent Representative at the UN, on 19 December 2013, sums up the Indian view:

> India believes that peacekeeping has been a critical instrument of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. Its collaborative character infuses it with a unique legitimacy that defines its strength. The core values of UN peacekeeping explain its enduring relevance. Principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate have evolved many transitions that peacekeeping has witnessed from truce-supervision missions of yesteryears to multidimensional mandates of today. While the United Nations, to further strengthen its peacekeeping operations has, over a period of time, evolved different strategies to address the ever emerging complex security scenarios, a cautious and pragmatic approach in [the] application of these new strategies is crucial to ensure that such operations continue to be viable and do not become counterproductive.[160]

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[159] See, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29873/ Speech+by+Secretary+West+at+3rd+United+Nations+ Peacekeeping+Course+for+African+Partners+UNPCAP3+May+07+2018

[160] Statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, Permanent Representative of India to the UN, at High-Level Seminar on UN Peacekeeping, "Blue Helmets: New Frontiers", ECOSOC Chambers, 19 December 2013.

Though reliability, professionalism, and a human approach are true and important, the most significant aspect of India's peacekeeping approach is its adherence to the core principles of Peacekeeping. While India maintains a proactive commitment to UN Peacekeeping, certain fundamental policy issues continue to shape New Delhi's overall approach to UN Peacekeeping. First, India sees peacekeeping as a pacific third-party intervention that should always be initiated with the consent of the conflicting parties, and under the aegis of the UN. Second, India believes that a clear distinction between Peacekeeping operations and other activities of the UN, including coercive peacekeeping, should be maintained.[161] For instance, specific policy parameters guided India's reservations and its initial hesitation to join in the UN operation in Somalia. India was not a part of the first phase of the peace enforcement operation led by the US in 1992 to create safe conditions for the delivery of humanitarian relief. India refused to send troops as part of Unified Task Force (UNITAF) by pointing out that it had not met the condition of "request and consent" by the host government.[162] Similarly, India does not subscribe to the "lead nation" concept in Peacekeeping operations, and hence contributed troops in Somalia in 1993, only after the takeover of the mission by the UN. With regards to the consent principle, India sent a team to Somalia before deploying the troops, and understood that consent was difficult since there was no functioning government in Somalia.[163]

Due to the Indian government's sensitive view "on the authorization of the 'use of force', Indian peacekeepers always have been cautious in operations even with the mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter."[164] However, India's apprehension regarding the use of force and intervention on humanitarian grounds did *not* lead to a confrontation

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[161] Krishnasamy, 2012, p. 228.

[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Choedon, 2014, p. 23.

with those who favoured it. Instead, "India participated in the Peacekeeping operations with such mandates to effect change in the actual operations in the field, instead of standing aloof on principle ground."[165] For instance, among the 21 Peacekeeping operations in Africa in which India participated, 11 of them authorised the use of force under Chapter VII.[166] Despite the robust mandate in these operations, India held its position that the final solution to internal conflicts can only be arrived through political negotiations, and not by the use of force.

The scholarly discussions about India's rationale for contributing troops will be helpful to understand the principled position of India concerning international peace and security. Hansel and Moller observe that both ideational and material interests determine India's Peacekeeping policy. From non-alignment to strategic autonomy to staying free of entanglement in conflicts or alliances, complex variables and factors work in shaping this approach.[167] According to Thakur and Banerjee, factors such as the size of India's armed forces, the lack of such forces in other parts of the newly colonised world, and the influence in world affairs through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement, have shaped India's proactive peacekeeping approach.[168] After Independence, India made a foreign policy commitment to support freedom for other colonies in Asia and Africa. India viewed this commitment as an opportunity to support the principles of peace and security enshrined in the UN Charter as well.

Krishnasamy and Weigold argue that concern for its global image could be a primary source of motivation for India's proactive peacekeeping

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[165] Ibid., p. 24.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Mischa Hansel and Miriam Moller, "House of Cards? India's Rationales for Contributing to UN Peacekeeping", *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2014, p. 146.

[168] Dipankar Banerjee and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Indo-Japanese Dialogue,* New Delhi: Sanskriti, 2006.

engagements.[169] According to them, the idealist-solidarist approach is "far [out]weighed by its aspirations for great power recognition and the need to increase its presence within the UN, with the long term aim of being considered favourably as a candidate for a permanent seat on the Security Council".[170] Thus, participating in UN Peacekeeping operations helps to shape India's image positively as a good international citizen that is committed to global responsibilities. However, though India often cites its Peacekeeping contribution for reinforcing its claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the fundamental motive behind its Peacekeeping commitment is its principled approach to global peace and security.

As far as Peacekeeping is concerned, India prioritizes and supports traditional Westphalian conceptions and principles such as primarily sovereignty and non-intervention in internal matters. Thus, India consistently points to the immanent weight of the principles of impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force.[171] For instance, in the 2012 Annual Debate of the Peacekeeping Committee, India's Deputy permanent representative to the UN, Manjeev Singh Puri, stated that "respect for sovereignty and integrity of states constitutes the very core this organization and our debates rest on. National ownership in our peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, therefore, is critical for the credible success of our field missions."[172] He also added that, "the founding principles of neutrality, consent, impartiality, and non-use of force continue to constitute the core of UN peacekeeping. Today's doctrinal approaches appear of questionable relevance to us."[173]

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[169] Kabilan Krishnasamy and Auriol Weigold, "The Paradox of India's Peacekeeping", *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 12. No. 2, 2003, pp. 263–280.

[170] Krishnasamy, 2010, p. 238.

[171] Hansel and Moller, 2014, p. 147.

[172] Statement by Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the Opening Session of the Annual Debate of Peacekeeping Committee C-34 on Peacekeeping, 21February 2012, at https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/83531ind1992.pdf

[173] Ibid.

According to C. S. R. Murthy:

> India's approach to the UN peacekeeping operations is a by-product of the convergence of the country's foreign policy principles, such as the non-use of force, non-alignment, peaceful coexistence and so forth, with its outlook towards the world organization's potential in managing stable international order.[174]

India's response to the Korean War in the UN is a case that helps us to understand the country's principled position concerning matters of peace and security. Despite its strong objections to being a part of the UN military force, India sent humanitarian aid to Korea, including a field ambulance unit and a small contingent of troops. The Korean experience also played a significant role in India's Peacekeeping policy and its evolution. Murthy also observes that the mistakes committed by both significant member countries and the UN have pointed to the limitations of the great power mode of maintaining peace. This, in turn, has led to the alternative, non-coercive method articulated by India.[175] Later, India has reiterated this principled position several times. For instance, when the UNEF was formed, India stood for non-use of force, except in self-defence and impartiality.

Though India always held a position that Peacekeeping operations must have the parties' consent on several occasions, its policy has also undergone pragmatic adjustments when a particular situation has demanded it.[176] India's support to the UN missions in Congo, Somalia, and Iraq are cases in point. In these three cases, India shared the view that the sovereignty principle and the consent of the parties were irrelevant where the state is in a state of collapse, or if any other equivalent unique situations emerge. For instance, in Congo, in 1961, after the death of Dag Hammarskjold, India supported the use of force by the UN to remove foreign mercenaries.[177] However, on the other hand,

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[174] C. S. R. Murthy, *India in the United Nations: Interplay of Interests and Principles*, New Delhi: Sage, 2020, p. 120.

[175] Murthy, 2020, p. 121.

[176] Ibid., p. 122.

[177] Ibid., p. 123.

India has been critical of more recent developments in peace and security and the associated role of the UN, particularly of ideas like "robust mandates". According to India, such developments will make boundaries between peacekeeping and other forms of military intervention too fluid. Consequently, it poses a challenge to the core principles of Peacekeeping operations.[178] This approach was evident in Somalia where, on multiple occasions, India cautioned that mixing force with the concept of Peacekeeping would undermine the non-partisan credentials of the peacekeepers.

To conclude, though India's Peacekeeping approach is more concerned about sovereignty and consent principles, the country has been ready to make exceptions when the situation has demanded it. Its peacekeeping commitments are conditional. However, unlike many foreign policy experts have argued, these commitments are not solely driven by New Delhi's aspiration for a UNSC seat. Rather, they are driven by a firm belief in the UN's capability in solving international peace and security issues. These also pull New Delhi towards UN Peacekeeping. Therefore, any attempt to analyse India's approach to UN Peacekeeping may have to consider multiple factors, including the nature and mandate of the peace operation, the interests and motivations of member states, and the global geopolitical context.

India's critical stance towards Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is another case in point that explains its principled but evolving approach. There is a general tendency in the Indian establishment to dismiss the liberal interventionist designs of the West. Despite being an emerging power and a strong contender for UNSC permanent seat, when the R2P deliberations came to the UN, India resolutely opposed its approval by the UN. This was also in the time of high expectations from India to perform an active role in armed humanitarian interventions. India is always cautious in endorsing humanitarian intervention by citing the principle of sovereignty. It always pushes for non-coercive elements in such interventions. The next chapter discusses this in some detail.

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[178] Mukerji, 2013.

INDIA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A majority of the debates over India's approach to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention end up in conclusions about the country's ambivalent and irresponsible behaviour. To ask why India has refrained from actively engaging with R2P, despite its longstanding contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, is significant. As discussed in the last chapter, India's commitment to UN Peacekeeping in terms of troop contribution far exceeds that of European Union members. India has contributed more than 2,00,000 troops over the years—the largest number from any country – and participated in 49 missions. However, throughout the evolution of R2P, particularly in its initial years, India was sceptical about the concept, and regarded it as a pretext for intervention to enforce Western interests. Due to this stance, India was considered one of the recalcitrant opponents of the idea of R2P.

This chapter examines India's approach to R2P and humanitarian intervention to explain its principled position on both the concept as well as its practice. It argues that India's position towards R2P is not ambiguous: instead, it is consistent, but also evolving. The chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly examines the origin and evolution of the concept of R2P. The second part focuses on how India responded to R2P, by focusing on the UN Security Council Resolutions on Libya and Syria.

5.1 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

In 2001, it was the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which first proposed the idea of the responsibility to protect. Later, the UN World Summit in 2005 adopted it. R2P mainly

addresses some critical questions about the legitimate use of force, the most appropriate actions to stop mass violence, and the prevention of violence effectively at the same time as being respectful of state sovereignty. R2P was best viewed as an attempt to balance the two most significant challenges that emerged with the post-Cold War complex emergencies. On the one hand, there was a risk of mass atrocities, where the international community was reluctant to stop the slaughter of civilians. The Rwandan Genocide and the international community's approach towards it is a perfect example. On the other, there was a risk of doing too much in the context of intra-state conflicts. For instance, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and its various ramifications.[179]

In 2000, in his Millennium Report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on this challenge, and raised some significant questions. He asked: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to the gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"[180] Annan also challenged the Member States to "find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of common humanity."[181] With the UN's backing, Canada appointed an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and charged it with drawing up guidelines for humanitarian intervention in the future. In December 2001, the Commission released its report titled, "Responsibility to Protect." This provoked an international debate among both scholars and practitioners.

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[179] Moller, 2017, p. 1921.

[180] Millennium Report, at https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/ We_The_Peoples.pdf

[181] Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly, at https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136. html

In September 2003, Annan appointed a "High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change", which came out with its report in 2004, and included its analysis of R2P. Next year, at the World Summit, the UN unanimously adopted the "responsibility to protect" as a guiding principle for preventing "atrocity crimes". At the Summit, the Secretary-General explained the necessity of a new doctrine to protect the civilians from state atrocities in the changed context, particularly against the backdrop of post-Cold War complex emergencies. He noted that "it cannot be right when the international community is faced with genocide or massive human rights abuses, for the United Nations to stand by and let them unfold to the end."[182] He further stated that,

> The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with its 16 members from all around the world, endorsed what they described as an "emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect." While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d'être and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may, out of necessity, decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required.[183]

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[182] "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All", A/59/2005, Report of the Secretary-General, at https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/followupreport.pdf

[183] Ibid.

Moreover, the World Summit declared that,

> Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.[184]

About the responsibility of the international community, the Summit noted that,

> We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.[185]

In addition to this, the then Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's 2009 report, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect", reaffirmed the 2005 understanding of the R2P as confined to the four crimes, and envisioned them in a three-pillar institutional architecture.

- Pillar 1 – the primary responsibility of the state to protect its populations from four circumscribed mass atrocity crimes:

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[184] Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 16 September 2005, at A/RES/60/1, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf, p. 30.

[185] Ibid.

genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes

- Pillar II – the concurrent responsibility of the international community to assist States in their efforts to do so

- Pillar III – the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive collective action should national authorities fail to protect their populations from imminent or unfolding atrocities.[186]

Over the subsequent decade, after multiple deliberations, a high degree of consensus has emerged on many aspects of the R2P doctrine. In the realm of international peace and security, references to the doctrine have become increasingly regular. For instance, by 2015, the UNSC had adopted more than 30 resolutions and six presidential statements drawing on the R2P.[187] As of July 2019, the R2P doctrine has been referred to in 81 UNSC resolutions and 21 presidential statements.[188] However, in practice, only three of these resolutions invoked R2P in connection with a recommendation for third-party military intervention on humanitarian grounds: UNSCR 1973 Libya, March 2011; UNSCR 1975 Côte d'Ivoire, March 2011; and UNSCR 2100 Mali, April 2013.[189]

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[186] United Nations, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect", A/63/677. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/report-of-the-secretary-general-implementing-the-responsibility-to-protect/

[187] Charles Cater and David M. Malone, "The Origins and Evolution of Responsibility to Protect at the UN", *International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2016, pp. 278–297.

[188] See http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/unsc-resolutions-and-statements-with-r2p-table-as-of-1-april-2018.pdf

[189] Michael J. Butler, "Is R2P Failing Humanitarian Intervention? Norm Stagnation and the De Construction of R2P", Paper Presented at the CEEISA-ISA Joint International Conference University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23–25 June 2016.

Table 5.1: Country Specific UNSC Resolutions Invoking R2P, 2006–present

Country	Resolutions	Dates
Central African Republic	2121; 2127; 2134; 2149; 2196; 2217; 2262; 2301; 2331; 2339; 2399	10 Oct 2013; 5 Dec 2013; 28 Jan 2014; 10 Apr 2014; 22 Jan 2015; 28 Apr 2015; 27 Jan 2016; 26 Jul 2016; 30 Jan 2018
Côte d'Ivoire	1975	30 Mar 2011
DRC	1653; 2211; 2277; 2348; 2360; 2409; 2463	27 Jan 2006; 26 Mar 2015; 30 Mar 2016; 31 Mar 2017; 27 Jun 2017; 27 Mar 2018; 30 Oct 2018; 29 Mar 2019
Liberia	2237; 2288	29 Sept.2015; 25 May 2016
Libya	1970; 1973; 2016; 2040; 2095	26 Feb 2011; 17 Mar 2011; 27 Oct 2011; 12 Mar 2012; 12 Mar 2013
Mali	2085; 2100; 2227; 2295; 2364; 2374; 2324	20 Dec 2012; 25 Apr 2013; 29 Jun 2015; 29 Jun 2016; 29 Jun 2017; 5 Sep 2017; 28 Jun 2018
Middle East (Yemen)	2014	21 Oct 2011
Somalia	2093; 2093; 2317; 2372; 2385; 2431; 2444	6 Mar 2013; 6 Mar 2016; 10 Nov 2016; 30 Aug 2017; 14 Nov 2017; 30 Jul 2018; 14 Nov 2018
Sudan (Darfur)	1706; 2228; 2296	31 Aug 2006; 29 Jun 2015; 29 Jun 2018
Sudan/ South Sudan	1996; 2109; 2155; 2187; 2206; 2223; 2241; 2252; 2290; 2304; 2327; 2340; 2363; 2428; 2429; 2459	8 Jul 2011; 11 Jul 2013; 27 May 2014; 25 Nov 2014; 3 Mar 2015; 28 May 2015; 9 Oct 2015; 15 Dec 2015; 31 May 2016; 12 Aug 2016; 16 Dec 2016; 8 Feb 2017; 29 Jun 2017; 13 Jul 2018; 13 Jul 2018; 15 Mar 2019
Syria	2139; 2165; 2254; 2258; 2332; 2449	22 Feb 2014; 14 Jul 2014; 18 Dec 2015; 22 Dec 2015; 21 Dec 2016; 13 Dec 2018

Source: Compiled from various sources

5.2 INDIA AND R2P

Foreign policy scholars note that India's approach to R2P was initially rigid, and later progressively evolved. When the ICISS began its R2P deliberations, India's response was very hostile. The MEA sending a protocol officer when the R2P Commission visited New Delhi in June 2001 (in the course of its 11 regional roundtables) to forge a consensus on the fundamentals of R2P, is a case in point.[190] Similarly, at the 2005 World Summit, India attempted to thwart the international community's efforts to obtain an official UN endorsement to the R2P. During the deliberations of R2P at the UN, India expressed its "reservations on intrusive monitoring and finger-pointing while dealing with specific human rights situations in individual countries".[191] Nirupam Sen, India's Permanent Representative, reinforced the significance of an approach based on dialogue, consultation, and cooperation in the event of a humanitarian emergency. It also implicitly stated that any discussion which is used as a cover for conferring legitimacy to the "right of humanitarian intervention", or making the R2P a pretext for "military humanism", is unacceptable.[192] Such objections even threatened to tear the existing agreement on R2P apart in the final hours of the negotiations.[193]

However, after much persuasion and the watering down of the original ICISS provisions, India agreed to accept the doctrine. This resulted in many changes in the R2P norm, including limiting the scope of R2P to four specific crimes, and making UN authorisation a mandatory pre-

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[190] Sumit Ganguly, "India and the Responsibility to Protect", *International Relations*, Vol. 30, Issue 3, 2016, p. 5.

[191] "The Role of the Security Council in Humanitarian Crises", Statement by Nirupam Sen, Permanent Representative to the UN, at the Security Council, 12 July 2005, at https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/45939ind1118.pdf

[192] Ibid.

[193] C. S. R. Murthy and Gerritz Kurtz, "International Responsibility as Solidarity: The Impact of the World Summit Negotiations on the R2P Trajectory", *Global Society*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2016, p. 44.

requisite for invoking the principle.[194] As a result, only one long-winding sentence remained that referred to coercive action without state consent in the final document. Even that sentence was diluted by putting multiple qualifiers and changes. It was probably the strategy behind the Indian negotiations, which was made in close consultation with the Non-Aligned Movement—that is, "to put in as many qualifiers as possible" in this section.[195] The qualifiers and changes effectively minimised the question of international military interventions without host state's consent. India has also emphasised the first pillar of the doctrine which says that the welfare and protection of the population are the primary responsibility of the state. It has, thus, argued that "the enhancement of sovereign capacity is the prerequisite for effective discharge of any responsibility."[196]

Though India agreed on the R2P principle at the World Summit, it continued to have reservations on R2P doctrine at various levels. For instance, when the UN issued the report on implementing R2P in January 2009, India drafted a letter for the President of the UN General Assembly which stated that "the principle of R2P could be traced to colonialism and interventionism."[197] India's attitude towards the situation of Rohingyas in Myanmar in 2007– 08, and the Tamils in Sri Lanka plainly elucidate its stance on R2P in the initial phase. In both cases, India emphasised the view that the conflicts were internal affairs, and had to be solved by dialogue within domestic boundaries, or peaceful means by the international community.[198]

However, in the evolution of the doctrine, India's approach has also evolved. It has diluted its strong objections. Consequently, at the UN,

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[194] Urvashi Aneja, "India, R2P and Humanitarian Assistance", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, Vol. 6, 2014, p. 235.

[195] Murthy and Kurtz, p. 46.

[196] Aneja, 2014, p. 235.

[197] Ganguly, 2016, p. 5.

[198] Krause, 2016.

India's focus has shifted to bringing appropriate safety mechanisms to R2P, and using it as a last resort—also in full compliance with the UN Charter.[199] India's concern has always been about the intention of interventionist states. For instance, at the 2009 General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, India's Permanent Representative, Hardeep Puri, expressed the view that;

> we don't live in an ideal world and, therefore, need to be cognizant that [the] creation of new norms should at the same time completely safeguard against their misuse. India warned further that [the] misuse of R2P would not only give the doctrine a bad name but also defeat its very purpose.[200]

At the UNSC Debate on the "Protection of Civilians" as well, a similar position was reinforced, and there was emphatic opposition against any attempt to use R2P as the tool for humanitarian intervention or unilateral military action.[201] Puri stated at the Council that;

> Protection of civilians, when applied as a basis for Security Council action, needs to respect the fundamental aspects of the UN Charter, including [the] sovereignty and integrity of the Member States. Any decision to intervene that is associated with political motives distracts from the noble principles, and needs to be avoided … We must also be clear that the United Nations has a mandate to intervene only in situations where there is a threat to international peace and security. Any decision by the Council to intervene must, therefore, be based on credible and verifiable information.[202]

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[199] Ibid., p. 23.

[200] Ibid., p. 23.

[201] Ganguly, 2016, p. 5.

[202] Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative, Open Debate On Protection of Civilians at the United Nations Security Council, 9 November 2011, at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094451

Later, this position was further articulated by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, at the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2011. In the meeting, Prime Minister Singh warned of the dangers of societies being reordered from outside through military force.[203] He further stated that,

> People in all countries have the right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future. The international community has a role to play in assisting in the processes of transition and institution building; but the idea that prescriptions have to be imposed from outside is fraught with danger. Actions taken under the authority of the United Nations must respect the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of individual states. Correspondingly, governments are duty-bound to their citizens to create conditions that enable them to determine their pathways to development freely. This is the essence of democracy and fundamental human freedoms.[204]

India's response to the Libyan crisis is a case in point. It helps us understand its evolving approach to R2P and humanitarian intervention. Interestingly, the Libyan question in the Council also coincided with India's non-permanent membership at the Council. On 26 February 2011, UNSC Resolution 1970—which reminded the Libyan government of its responsibility to protect its people, and imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on Gaddafi's family and associates—was adopted with India's support.[205] However, during the vote of the follow-up resolution, UNSCR 1973, in March 2011, India abstained. The Resolution established a no-fly zone, and authorised the use of

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[203] Aneja, 2014, p. 235.

[204] Statement by the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September 2011, at https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/287/Statement_by_the_Prime_Minister_Dr_Manmohan_Singh_at_the_General_Debate_of_the_66th_Session_of_the_United_Nations_General_Assembly

[205] Ian Hall, "Indian and the Responsibility to Protect", in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 180.

force by NATO to protect civilians in Libya. Clarifying the abstention, India expressed its concern that "the Council had authorized far-reaching measures under Chapter VII of the UN charter with relatively little credible information of the situation on the ground."[206] In the Security Council, India also stated that the military action would likely have unintended consequences, probably escalating violence.[207]

India's abstention in the Council attracted considerable debate, both within and outside the country. On the one hand, some argued that it was adherence to high moral principle,[208] and the outcome of a pragmatic calculation about the possible consequence of authorising military intervention.[209] On the other, some viewed it as result of cynicism, prudence, and weakness of conviction and will.[210] Most

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[206] UNSC resolution on Libya, India's Explanation of Vote, at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/639/UNSC+resolution+on+Libya++Indias+Explanation+of+Vote

[207] Ibid.

[208] John Cherian, "Libya in the Crosshairs", *Frontline*, Vol. 28, No. 8, April 2011, at https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl2808/stories/20110422280800400.htm

[209] Arvind Gupta, "Mind the R2P", *Indian Express*, 22 April 2011, at http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/mind-the-r2p/779647/. See also, Prem Shankar Jha, "Does the West have a Death Wish?", *Tehelka*, Vol. 8, No. 13, 2 April 2011, at http://old.tehelka.com/does-the-west-have-a-death-wish; Brahma Chellaney, "Saving Civilians: The Murky Geopolitics", *The Hindu*, 6 April 2011, at https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Saving-civilians-murky-geopolitics/article14671792.ece

[210] See, Ian Hall, 2018, p. 183; see also, Manoj Joshi, "Dodgy Stand on Libya Crisis", *India Today*, 24 March 2011, at https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/manoj-joshi/story/dodgy-stand-on-libya-crisis-130852-2011-03-24; C. Raja Mohan, "India, Libya and the Principle of Non-Intervention", *ISAS Insights*, Vol. 122, 13 April 2011, at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128706/ISAS_Insights_122_-_Email_-_India,_Libya_and_the_Princple_of_Non-Intervention_19042011144243.pdf; Sumit Ganguly, "A Pointless Abstention", *The Diplomat,* 23 April 2011, at https://thediplomat.com/2011/03/a-pointless-abstention/; Harsh Pant, "Libya Exposes New Faultlines in Indian Foreign Policy", *ISN Insights,* 21 April 2011, at https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/128595/pdf

Western analyses of India's response to the Libyan civil war conclude that India's R2P stance was ambiguous. They regarded India as one of the most stringent opponents of R2P, and a staunch advocate of a state-centred Westphalian system. For instance, Kudrat Virk argues that the overall portrait that emerges from India's response is of an actor that is unable and unwilling to move beyond a reactive posture defined by caution toward the principle, and ad-hocism towards the implementation.[211] According to Alan Bloomfield, in the Libyan case, India flirted with the responsibility to protect norm by abstaining from voting on UNSC Resolution 1973 and, subsequently, retreating to the sovereignty norm.[212]

India's voting behaviour and statements in the Security Council during the Libyan crisis authenticate India's careful attitude towards R2P. India voted in favour of Resolution 1970 since it did not mention military intervention, or the use of force. India's position at the Security Council on Libya was influenced by both ideational and institutional variables. India's R2P stance, "notwithstanding its nuances, has been cautious and calibrated. India is in agreement with Pillars one and two, but apprehensive about Pillar three".[213] India's respect for sovereignty underlines its basic position on R2P, and the influence of domestic factors explains the identification of the three phases in the evolution of such a position. As a matter of principle, India has been forthright in stressing that sovereignty is the cardinal principle in international relations, taking precedence over the international responsibility to protect.[214] The Indian perspective was that the support feature, together with capacity building under Pillar II should take precedence over the response aspect under Pillar III. Moreover, India has repeatedly said that the real problem lies with the interpretation and application of Pillar III.

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[211] Virk, 2013.

[212] Alan Bloomfield, "India and the Libyan Crisis: Flirting with Responsibility to Protect, Retreating to the Sovereignty Norm", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2015, p. 27.

[213] Jaganathan and Kurtz, 2014, p. 479.

[214] Ibid., p. 480.

It is not ambiguity, rather cautiousness and wisdom in policymaking that has led to India's opposition to the R2P. For instance, in the case of Resolution 1970, "the US ploy was to incorporate 'all [the] necessary means' for the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance as carte blanche for the use of force."[215] However, the heated discussions and debate on this particular phrase in the Council, the opposition from many of the Council members, including India, compromised the language, and finally withdrew it. India took a tough line on the International Criminal Court (ICC) referral, and it did have some positive impact. Hardeep Puri notes that "the resolution finally adopted referred to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which provides that no investigations or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the ICC for 12 months if the Security Council makes such a request."[216] Here, India's primary concern was the safety of Indian nationals in Libya, and preventing reprisals against them. India's apprehensions became blatant with the adoption and implementation of Resolution 1973. India was highly sceptical of Libya's ground realities, and hence it did not want to make any decision in haste.

India's scepticism and hostile approach to R2P has not been limited to deliberations in global platforms. Instead, it has been well debated even in domestic political and policy platforms. For instance, during a debate in March 2011 in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, the Samajwadi Party leader, Mulayam Singh Yadav, moved a motion denouncing the NATO-led bombing of Libya in what was then being perceived as a forceful attempt at regime change.[217] In addition to this, many commentators questioned the political and economic implications of Western-led forces intervening in a primarily Muslim region. India's criticism of NATO action in Libya broadly followed three central lines.

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[215] Puri, 2016, p. 70.

[216] Ibid., p. 71.

[217] Roopmati Khandekar, "India and the Responsibility to Protect's Third Pillar", in Daniel Fiott and Joachim Koops (eds), *The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 120.

First, it accused the Western powers of exceeding the scope of their mandate from Resolution 1973 due to the selection of an opponent, the arming of rebels and the attack of a broad range of targets beyond those necessary for the protection of civilians. Second, India supported the broader claim that the RtoP and civilian protection had been used by the West as a pretext for the strategic goal of removing the Qaddafi regime. The third criticism of the NATO campaign was that military force was entered into too rapidly, and that an aggressive response did more harm than good. India had clearly indicated a preference for a soft-power, political, rather than military, approach to resolving the situation of the Libyan conflict.[218]

This apprehension is marked by demand for accountability and the monitoring of any measures under the third Pillar at the United Nations Security Council. In the subsequent Security Council meetings, India was actively denouncing how Resolution 1973 was being implemented. In a sharp exchange of words in April 2011, the Indian representative pointed out to the Council that the reports showcased the rebel groups' being armed by NATO forces.[219] India also noted that Libya gave a bad name, and raised serious questions about the credibility of the principle of R2P.

The flawed implementation of Resolution 1973 by Western powers striving for regime change in Libya confirms that India was right with its observations about Pillar III of the R2P.[220] India opposed the use of the expression "all necessary means" in Paragraph 4 of the Resolution, amounting to a blank cheque for the intervention.[221] As India stressed, "almost all aspects of Resolution 1973, namely pursuit of ceasefire, arms embargo, no-fly zone, were violated not to protect

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[218] Ibid., pp. 120–121.

[219] Puri, 2016, p. 102.

[220] Sandra Destradi, "India's Reluctant Approach to R2P: Lessons from Perilous Interventions", *Global Responsibility to Protect,* Vol. 9, No. 2017, p. 234.

[221] Resolution 1973, 2011, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011, at https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%202011

civilians but to change the regime."[222] The "decision to go to war and effect regime change had been taken even before Resolution 1973 was passed."[223] Speaking in June 2011, Puri stated that "Libya has given R2P a bad name." He also noted that "while emphasizing action under NATO, the US appeared to be showing the signs of getting itself more directly involved."[224] This opinion was echoed by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who acknowledged that "[honestly,] the way the 'responsibility to protect' was used in Libya caused a problem for the concept."[225]

India's primary concern was that R2P must not become a tool in the hands of the powerful to pressurise weaker states, and bring about regime change. In effect, the Libyan case vindicated India's apprehensions regarding the possibility of the misuse of the R2P principle to justify regime change. India's abstention raised many criticisms over its foreign policy; these came from both within and outside the country. Many criticised India for having a weak foreign policy, and disapproved of its unwillingness to strengthen and support the principle of the R2P. Contrary to the scholarly accounts, ambiguity and ambivalence in India's perspective on R2P is explicit. The primary characteristics of India's approach is the "privileging of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its corollary, non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states."[226] This is supported by India's persistence upon the legitimacy of the implementation of R2P, which is mainly the obligation to obtain consent from the host state so as to discourage unilateral behaviour. The rationale for India's abstention during the vote on UNSCR 1973 was that the Resolution deplored force, and was unacceptable to India. India's emphasis on the United

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[222] Jaganathan and Kurtz, 2014, p. 475.

[223] Hardeep Puri, quoted in Sandra Destradi, 2017, p. 232.

[224] Puri, 2016, p. 76.

[225] Kofi Annan, "On Syria, obviously we have not succeeded", at https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/in-the-news/kofi-annan-sur-la-syrie-a-levidence-nous-navons-pas-reussi/

[226] Jaganathan and Kurtz, 2014, p. 480.

Nations Security Council's authorisation for applying R2P, and undertaking intervention, makes it clear that legitimacy matters unequivocally. The idea is that if sovereignty has to be overridden at all, in the rarest of rare circumstances, it ought to command a robust mandate that emanates from the UN.[227]

It is a fact that India has always been cautious about the R2P, particularly its third pillar. However, India's responses towards the crises in Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan, and Syria have portrayed flexibility in its approach. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, India voted for the Security Council Resolution 1967, which endorsed the mandate of United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)—to use "all necessary means" for the protection of civilians.[228] In his explanation on the Vote, the Indian Permanent Representative, Hardeep Puri, stated that peacekeepers should draw their mandate from the Security Council's relevant resolutions; however, they cannot be made instruments of regime change.[229] India also said that UNOCI should not become a party to the political stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire, and should not get involved in a civil war.

The Indian position on Syria at the Security Council is another case that explains India's principled but evolving approach to the R2P. In the initial phase of the deliberations on the Syrian conflict, India was in absolute opposition to the proposed Western response to the crisis. However, later, India shifted its position, and became more open to the proposed civilian protection measures.[230] In the initial period, India

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[227] Ibid., p. 480.

[228] Akanksha Singh, "Indian Perspectives on the 'Responsibility to Protect'", *International Studies,* Vol. 57, Issue 3, 2020, pp. 296–316.

[229] India's "Resolution on Cote d'Ivoire: India's Explanation of Vote", 31 March, 2011, Ministry of External Affairs, at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/609/Resolution+on+Cote+dIvoire++Indias+Explanation+of+Vote

[230] Roopmati Khandekar, "India and the Responsibility to Protect's Third Pillar", in Daniel Fiott and Joachim Koops (eds), *The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 122.

abstained from the voting of the UK drafted Security Council Resolution, by raising the concern that the text did not address the violence emanating from opposition groups.[231] As in the case of Libya, in the Syrian conflict, India was sceptical about the West seeking regime change. Nonetheless, as the conflict escalated and violence against civilians increased, India slowly shifted away from resistance.[232] As a result, on 4 February 2012, when a Western-led resolution endorsed by the League of Arab States was tabled, India voted in its favour. However, India ensured two things: first, there was to be no reference to military action under Article 42 of the Charter in the resolution. Second, the political transition in Syria would be Syrian-led. During the voting, India's Permanent Representative reiterated India's firm view that the Syrians themselves should lead a political path out of the crisis. India also emphasised that the international community's role in Syria was to facilitate the peace process while taking the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity into account.[233] Besides, when India presided over the Security Council, it obtained the Security Council endorsement for a unanimous statement by the UNSC President on the Syrian crisis. In effect, the statement highlighted India's stance on the Syrian crisis in general, and R2P in particular. It stated that,

> The Security Council expresses its grave concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria and expresses profound regret at the death of many hundreds of people. The Security Council calls for an immediate end to all violence and urges all sides to act with utmost restraint, and to refrain from reprisals, including attacks against state institutions. The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria. It stresses that the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led

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[231] Ibid.

[232] Ibid.

[233] "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League's Proposed Peace Plan", at https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm

[234] Security Council, Presidential Statement, 6598th Meeting, SC/10352, 3 August 2011, at https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10352.doc.htm

political process, with the aim of effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the population.[234]

This also explains India's world view that state sovereignty also implies the responsibility to protect its subjects and, therefore, there is no need to assign a new label such as "responsibility to protect" by the international community. India's later support for R2P is based on its premise that the sovereign state will not be circumvented, but rather rendered functional so as to discharge its duty in a responsible manner. The Indian government considers R2P and humanitarian assistance as part of the same moral and operational framework. However, the principal objective of such actions should be strengthening sovereignty. Similarly, India assigns greater importance to the principles of partnership and consent rather than neutrality as it provides humanitarian assistance directly to the affected state. All this shows that India only supports military intervention as a last resort—and that too, with extreme caution.

CONCLUSION

The multilateral engagement has always been one of the core tenets of India's foreign policy. India was one of the most ambitious players when the edifice of multilateral institutions was built in the post-World War II period. India's membership in the United Nations even before its independence shows the country's firm support and belief in the multilateral system. Similarly, India was a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and was a zealous advocate of the peaceful settlement of conflicts among nations, and proposed the ban of all nuclear tests as early as 1954. India's long-term commitments to UN Peacekeeping operations also endorse this proactive multilateral approach.

However, most of the literature on India's multilateral policy argues that India's response to pressing international issues such as international peace and security, trade negotiation, nuclear proliferation, Climate Change, and humanitarian intervention is ambiguous. According to many, India often acted like a 'spoiler' or 'rule breaker' in international negotiations. While discussing India's role as an emerging power, analysts have also noted that the country is neither a responsible player nor a reliable partner in multilateral institutions. Against this backdrop, this monograph has examined India's approach to multilateral peace and security, and found that India has developed a distinct variant of multilateralism that combines sovereignty and a quest for global justice and fairness.

This study has offered a critique of the prevailing literature on India's multilateral policy, and attempted to answer the pertinent question: is there an Indian way of multilateralism? Rather than viewing India's multilateral approach as a reflection of its domestic politics, the study has attempted to conceptualise it by analysing state, systemic and sub-systemic level factors. This section detailed and established the deficit in literature, and how it has overlooked the role of systemic/structural elements, such as the nature of international politics as well as the nature

of multilateralism and its practice in shaping the actors' approach. Similarly, while examining the ambitions and responsibility of India as an emerging power, scholars have ignored the status and positioning of India in the international system. Thus, most of them have failed to systematically explain whether the lack of a consistent strategy or the ambivalent foreign policy orientation resulted in suboptimal outcomes.

The monograph has proposed the employment of analytic eclecticism—the use of middle-range theories and plural methods to analyse these nuances of multilateralism in general, and India's policy in particular. An eclectic approach is preferable mainly for two reasons. First, it assures that the scholarly endeavour is sufficiently close to the experience and choices of real-world actors.[235] The accommodative character of the eclectic approach and the opportunity of a collaborative research agenda offer more profound insights into policy puzzles, and how to deal with them. Second, eclecticism is also useful to address the Western-centric bias of the dominant theoretical paradigms in International Relations. For instance, most of the criticism about the reluctance of emerging powers in shouldering global responsibility comes from the West. However, none of the critics consider how different states view responsibility and sovereignty in distinct ways. India's policy towards multilateral institutions has always exhibited a dichotomy between principle and practice: it is an ideological opposition to formal institutionalised discrimination in the international system. Therefore, in such forums, India's inclination is to stand with the majority while upholding the principle of sovereignty, and views multilateral platforms as an opportunity to counter-balance Western hegemony through coalitions of developing/Third World countries.

Taking the cases of India's engagements in UN Peacekeeping operations and its approach to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the monograph has argued that, in the realm of international peace and security, India's approach is principled but evolving. It has also argued that, in global

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[235]   Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions", *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2010, pp. 411–431.

multilateral engagements, India privileges the principle of sovereign equality above all, one of the fundamentals of the UN as well. India's continuing support to Peacekeeping operations while opposing humanitarian intervention demonstrates that the basis of India's approach to the multilateral system is the principle of sovereign equality and its corollary, non-intervention.

As far as Peacekeeping is concerned, India prioritises traditional Westphalian conceptions and principles – that is, primarily sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal matters of a sovereign state. Thus, India has consistently pointed to the immanent weight of the principles of impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force. However, this does not mean that India's approach to Peacekeeping is static, and determined by morals and principles only. It is evolving and pragmatic, and a product of many factors. In the initial years of independence, the rationale for India's participation was to express solidarity with newly independent colonies, and to support peace in such countries. Later, the aspiration of the recognition of being a great-power and gaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council has become a constant factor of India's engagement in Peacekeeping operations.

Thus, India maintains a proactive commitment to UN Peacekeeping, and its approach has evolved significantly. Moreover, certain fundamental policy issues continue to shape India's overall approach to UN Peacekeeping operations. First, India views Peacekeeping as a pacific third-party intervention that should always be initiated with the consent of the conflicting parties, and under the aegis of the UN. Second, India believes that a clear distinction between Peacekeeping operations and the other activities of the UN, including coercive peace enforcement, should be maintained. Thus, it can be argued that India's peacekeeping approach is partly in line with a realistic foreign policy, and partly with an idealistic approach.

In the context of R2P, India has been extremely cautious about the ideas in practice. Perhaps India was one of the sharpest critics of the doctrine in its initial years. However, later, its approach evolved. The Libyan and Syrian cases show that while India agrees with Pillars I and II of the R2P, it is concerned about Pillar III. India's overall position to R2P has been two dimensional. It accepts that the primary responsibility

to protect rests with the states themselves. However, India also retains intense apprehension about the coercive aspect of the third pillar. This is predominantly due to the perception of the use of force in international politics, particularly about the interventionist nature of Western countries. India believes that the powerful states will use the third pillar of the R2P (that is, using force) to bring about change purely on strategic, political and economic considerations.

India's later support for R2P is based on its premise that the sovereign state will not be circumvented, but rather rendered functional to discharge its duty responsibly. It can be argued that India considers R2P and humanitarian assistance as part of the same moral and operational framework in so far as the primary goal of both spheres of action is to strengthen sovereign capacity, in line with a pluralist conception of the world order. Similarly, India assigns greater importance to partnership and consent principles than neutrality as it provides humanitarian assistance directly to the affected state. All this shows that India only supports military intervention as a last resort, and that too, with the extreme cautiousness.

The primary characteristics of India's multilateral approach falls in line with traditional/classical multilateralism—the centrality of states and the prominence of the principle of state sovereignty. Traditional multilateralism regards states as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system, and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. Thus, India believes that the primary responsibility of protecting its civilian population rests with a sovereign state. Consequently, in the situations of conflict or humanitarian emergency, international responsibility is to act based on the sovereign state's necessity, and to strengthen the sovereign state through peaceful means to solve the conflict/crisis.

Policy Implications

In recent years, multilateralism, both in idea and practice, has undergone many crises. On the one hand, the retreat of the USA from its global commitments and China's increasing/widening interests have thrown a challenge to existing norms, rules and institutions. On the other hand, the burgeoning populism across the globe and return of trade

protectionism has questioned the very existence of multilateral institutions. While in the UN the crisis has manifested itself in the form of fund cuts and ever-increasing policy paralysis in its Security Council, other institutions (like Bretton Woods) have faced scepticism of effectiveness. The COVID-19 pandemic is the latest in the list of such issues. It has pushed the idea and practice of multilateralism into a profound dilemma. For the international community, the COVID-19 pandemic was an opportunity to reinvigorate multilateral cooperation. The pandemic has been the world's biggest challenge since World War II. However, the politics of blame games and opportunism have dominated almost all the multilateral deliberations on the pandemic. This situation necessitates a careful investigation of how and why the states act in a particular way in multilateral platforms, and what factors influence their approach.

India is an emerging power, with significant interests and influence in global multilateral institutions. Understanding its multilateral engagement is crucial not only for Indian policymakers and practitioners but others as well. For instance, India and the USA are strategic partners; however, they blame each other for the failures of multilateral negotiations. In the context of the increasing Chinese influence in multilateral institutions, both India and the USA need to understand the multilateral approaches of each other so as to strengthen their future strategic partnership. Otherwise, China would use its growing influence to the detriment of its strategic opponents. The debates over expanding the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are cases in point.

Thus, it is important to understand India's approach to global multilateral institutions, and its role in shaping the future global governance system. This will also enable researchers to propose policy recommendations in shaping India's future multilateral engagements. Similarly, the pragmatic ethos of eclecticism, which is employed in this monograph, will also be useful to fix the policy-praxis gap in India's multilateral engagements.

India's multilateral approach has been influenced and guided by multiple strategies, interests, values and has transformed significantly through the decades. However, most foreign policy scholars have argued that India has often acted like a "spoiler" or "rule-breaker" in multilateral negotiations. While offering a critique of the prevailing literature, the monograph attempts to answer one of the pertinent question: is there an Indian way of multilateralism? Analysing two cases, India's engagement in UN Peacekeeping operations and its approach towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the study argues that in the realm of international peace and security, India's approach is principled but evolving.

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