China’s Response to Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
Beijing’s pushback against the Washington-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is likely to result in an intense regional geo-economic competition.
- Mayuri Banerjee
- June 15, 2022
Beijing’s pushback against the Washington-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is likely to result in an intense regional geo-economic competition.
The recent Joint Statement issued after the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Melbourne indicates the grouping’s drive towards institutionalisation and coming close to achieving a concrete mandate for its existence.
The Indo-Pacific construct has significantly enhanced the strategic salience of both India and Australia in a multipolar region. While the two nations have considerably deepened their strategic partnership, there is scope for much more improvement in several sectors.
The BrahMos deal with the Philippines marks a convergence between India’s Act East and Defence Export policies and adds to its profile as a reliable defence partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Given Myanmar’s geostrategic significance and the continuing insurgency threat, disturbances in Myanmar pose a direct and serious policy challenge to India. A calculated realistic approach weighing the evolving ground situation alone will deliver the objectives of India’s foreign policy.
A larger exchange of defence business between India and Southeast Asia may consolidate India’s position in the regional security architecture, and also forge greater political alignment with important ASEAN partners.
Showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. It could be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
The 18th ASEAN–India Summit reaffirmed commitment to shared values and norms that underlie ASEAN–India Dialogue relationship that started in 1992, i.e., the commitment to support ASEAN Community building and strengthening the ASEAN–India strategic partnership across the whole spectrum of political-security, economic, socio-cultural and development cooperation.
The drawbacks of over-reliance on China as a single manufacturing source has led to countries adopting “China Plus One” strategy to diversify supply networks. Whether Supply Chain Resilience Initiative by India-Japan-Australia can assist in partial decoupling from China is yet to be seen.
Prior to 1995 when Vietnam joined ASEAN and normalized relationship with the United States, the overriding concern was security as could be well explained by realism. Vietnam has made several critical, strategic moves since 1995 and by 2030 the country may be able to act internationally as an emerging middle power.