Sino-US rivalry has been simmering for the past many years, as China has replaced Russia in the American scheme of things as its most potent adversary.
Once the Chinese achieve the capability of producing UUVs with deep depth capability, they could surround India by placing these submersibles at strategic places.
As high-profile incidents of piracy become more common off Somalia, strategists have taken to urging the US government to send expeditionary forces ashore. The article uses history and Clausewitzian theory to estimate the nature of the threat and the likely efficacy of a land campaign. Even successful operations would entail costs exceeding the value of the political stakes. For this reason alone, going ashore is inadvisable.
The participation of the Indian navy in anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast is perceived by many as a manifestation of India's apparent willingness to take on a larger role on the global stage. This article explores the possibility for India to play a more important role in solving the Somali piracy crisis.
Not only would the presence of Chinese vessels present no real existential threat to Indian naval dominance in the region, it would also, paradoxically, provide the Indian Navy with a far greater degree of tactical flexibility in the event of a future conflict with China, be it on land or at sea.
The cooperation between China and Francophone Western Indian Ocean region is now getting more visible, particularly after the China-Africa summit in November 2006. China's new thrust in the Francophone Western Indian Ocean region was though framed within China's broader Africa policy, however there is indeed the centrality of maritime considerations. China seems to have a higher level of physical presence in the Francophone Western Indian Ocean's various island states than would be warranted by its present levels of trade and other economic activities.
The August 2009 bilateral pact will fortify the security of the Maldives as well as cater to Indian security concerns on the terrorism and geopolitical fronts.
Given the complexity and trans-national nature of the challenges, the paper explores solutions for enhancing littoral security, maritime domain awareness and response mechanisms.
The PLA Navy (PLAN)'s capabilities in key areas (assets, trained personnel, experience) are currently insufficient to support long-range sea lanes of communication (SLOC) defense missions. With sufficient effort, Beijing may eventually overcome these obstacles, but it would probably also have to acquire some form of overseas basing access, which its foreign policy still proscribes.
